Islam Review

2011-04-21T09:52:00.000-07:00

الاختلاف في تعريف البدعة وأثره في حكم ذكر المولد النبوي على صاحبه الصلوة والسلام

بسم الله والحمد لله والصلوة والسلام على رسول الله

ظهر منهجان بين العلماء في تعريف البدعة وتطبيقها ويمكن لنا أن نسمي المنهج الأول "المنهج الشافعي" والثاني "المنهج المالكي" لكون أصل المنهجين منهما وإن لم يكن المنهج المنسوب إلى أحد هذين المذهبين على وجه كلي بل أكثري

المنهج الشافعي

عند الشافعي - كما نقل البيهقي بإسناد صحيح - البدعة وهي عُرِّف بكل ما أُحدث بعد زمن النبي عليه السلام تنقسم إلى قسمين: قسم ممدوح وهو ما يوافق الشريعة وقسم مذموم وهو ما يخالف الشريعة. ومبنى هذا المنهج هو قول عمر رضي الله عنه "نعمت البدعة هذه" فى التراويح التي صُلِّيَت لأول مرة في عهده فى اجتماع كبير واحد على أن قبله صليت فرادى أو في اجتماعات صغيرة

هذا يدل عند الشافعي ومن اتبع منهجه كالعز بن عبد السلام والنووي أن البدعة المنكرة مخصوصة بالبدعات التي تعارض نصوص الشريعة أو أصولها كمذهب القدرية لخلافه نصوص القرآن وكاتخاذ العوام الأشجار سببا للشفاء والبرء لمنعه النبي في حديث ذات الأنواط - أنظر للكلام في هذا فى "الباعث على إنكار البدع والحوادث" لأبى شامة الشافعي الذى اتبع هذا المنهج في كتابه بتقسيمه البدعة إلى المستحسنة والمستقبحة. ومن الذين ينتمون إلى هذا المنهج علماء كابن رجب والعسقلاني الذين اقتصروا جواز إطلاق "البدعة" لما هو مذمومة منها ولا يُطلق البدعة عندهم لما هو محمودة منها إلا من جهة اللغة

وهذا المنهج يسمح في تخصيص الأعمال التي تراد بها الثواب الثابتة فى الشريعة بالأوقات الخاصة والأماكن الخاصة التزاما وإن لم يكن فيه دليل خاص لشموله فى عمومات الشريعة. فعلى هذا استحسن أبو شامة في كتابه المذكور ذكر المولد النبوي ما كان خاليا من منكرات الشريعة لكونه مجتمع الخيرات الثابتة في عمومات الشريعة كإطعام الطعام وقراءة القرآن والتذكير بأيام الله وإن كان في يوم وشهر معين. نعم لو كان فيه ما ينكر فى الشرع أو اعتُقِد وجوبه أو اعتقد كونه ثابتا في هذا الوجه الخاص من فعل النبي عليه السلام فهذا بدعة منكرة حتى في هذا المنهج السامح

"المنهج المالكي كما حققه وشرحه الشاطبي المالكي في كتابه "الاعتصام

في هذا المنهج لا ينقسم البدعة إلى الأقسام بل الحديث الذي فيه "كل بدعة ضلالة" يحمل على عمومه فالبدعة كلها منكرة لا خير فيها. وتعريف البدعة فيه هو الإتيان بكل ما يراد به الثواب والتدين على وجه لم يأت به النبي عليه السلام ولا أصحابه وسببه كان موجودا في زمنهم. ويدخل في هذا التعريف تخصيص العمل الصالح الذي فعله النبي عليه السلام أو استحسنه بوقت أو مكان خاص بدون دليل خاص على وجه الالتزام لا بسبب الفراغ أو النشاط فإنه لو أُتي به بسبب الفراغ أو النشاط أو لوجود الفرصة ما كان بدعة ولا بأس به

فمثلا لو فُعِل الدعاء الاجتماعي بعد الصلوات المكتوبة أحيانا لسبب وجود الفرصة فلا بأس به في هذا المنهج لثبوت شرعيته فى الحديث ولكن لو فُعِل التزاما واستمرارا في ذلك الوقت المعين كما هو معروف في بعض بلاد المسلمين فذلك بدعة عند الشاطبي في كتابه "الاعتصام" لأنه يصار إلى خروج العمل من حده الثابت فى السنة النبوية; ومع هذا فى المنهج الشافعي المذكور آنفا يدخل هذا العمل في عمومات الشريعة في استحسان الدعاء الاجتماعي فلا بأس به على وجه الالتزام في هذا الوقت الخاص ولا بسبب وجود الفرصة ما لم يُعتقد كونه من فعل النبي عليه السلام أو واجبا أو عدم جوازه في غير هذا الوقت

وكذلك ذكر المولد الذي هو عبارة عن الأعمال الخاصة في شهر خاص لم يفعله النبي عليه السلام ولا أصحابه والسبب الداعي إليه وهو إظهار المحبة للنبي عليه السلام كان موجودا في زمنهم فهو بدعة في هذا المنهج المالكي ولذا كرهه الشاطبي وغيره من المالكية

وفي هذا المنهج مستثنيان: أولا لو حدث سبب جديد كالحاجة الداعية إلى جمع القرآن أو الحاجة إلى جمع الاجتماعات المتفرقة للتراويح فتنفيذه يسمى "مصلحة" وهي من السنة لا البدعة لأن السبب الداعي إليه لم يكن موجودا في زمن النبي عليه السلام فالعمل به مستخرج من مقتضيات الشرع. ففي مثال جمع القرآن لم يكن إليه حاجة في وقت استمرار نزوله من السماء والحاجة إليه ظهر لأبي بكر وعمر بعد وفاة النبي عليه السلام. وفي مثال جمع اجتماعات التراويح لم يُفعل في زمن النبي عليه السلام لخوفه كونه فرضا بالوحي كما جاء فى الحديث فلما زال هذا المانع فِعْله في كل رمضان وفى اجتماع كبير صار مصلحة ممتدة من سنة النبي عليه السلام

والثاني الوسائل التي احتيجت إليها بعد زمن النبي وأصحابه لإبقاء مقتضيات الشرع كدرس النحو وتدوين الحديث وبناء المدارس كلها واجبة على الأصل الشرعي "كل ما يتوسل به إلى الواجب واجب" والأصل "للوسيلة حكم المقصود" اللذان ثابتان من تعليلات النبي عليه السلام للأحكام الشرعية

كل ما دخل تحت هذين المستثنيين يجوز تسميته بدعة من حيث اللغة فقط لا من حيث اطلاقات الشرع. فالأولى ترك إطلاق "البدعة" لها وتسميتها واجبة أو سنة

هذا خلاصة الكلام في هذا الباب ولعله سبب استحسان كثير من الشافعية عمل المولد كأبي شامة والعسقلاني - كما نقل السيوطي فى "الحسن المقصد" - والسيوطي وسبب كراهته كثير من المالكية كالفاكهاني وابن الحاج والعليش

وصلى الله تعالى على سيدنا محمد وعلى آله وصحبه وسلم

زميل الرحمن

Is Islam Essentially Violent? A Response to Robert Spencer

2010-01-12T09:11:00.000-08:00

Introduction

Robert Spencer claims to write about Muslims and Islam in the strident and shrill manner that he does because he believes the global “jihadist threat” proceeds from a mainstream understanding of Islam’s core texts. He therefore interprets not just the “jihadist threat” in this light, but nearly all kinds of Muslim activism and even petty criminal acts committed by Muslims. Over and over he writes “there is an expansionist and supremacist imperative shared by all orthodox sects and schools of Islam” which is essentially “the idea that it is part of the responsibility of the Muslim community to wage war against unbelievers in order to convert or subjugate them”. This conclusion is important as it asserts that Islam is by its very essence violent. Furthermore, the topic is poorly understood by many neutral observers of Islam and the Muslim world.

Spencer believes this view of Islamic supremacism and expansionism is so acutely tied with the Qur’anic view and Muhammad’s sayings (hadith) and practice (sunna, sira) that any attempt at an Islamic reformation of this idea is doomed from the start; he also claims independent juristic reasoning in Islam, as embodied in the activity known as ijtihad, has ceased to be in practice and therefore is an impediment to progress in Islamic jurisprudence. The following will firstly lay out the proofs that Spencer uses to support this narrow view of jihad in Islam, and will then objectively examine the above claim. The notion that ijtihad (juristic reasoning) no longer functions, and that as a result this idea cannot be authentically challenged, will also be analysed. Finally, the notion that the global “jihadist threat” proceeds from this traditional formulation, which Spencer takes for granted, will briefly be considered.

The Argument for Jihad Expansionism

There are essentially four strands of evidence used to prove that Islam in its authentic form, as Spencer argues, is expansionist and supremacist. They are: firstly, the opinions expressed by the orthodox Islamic schools of jurisprudence; secondly, an interpretation of the Qur’an that involves progressive revelation and an “abrogation” (naskh) scheme with regards to the Qur’anic verses on fighting; thirdly, a similar progressive evolution in the life and example of the Prophet Muhammad; and finally, the recorded sayings of the Prophet Muhammad in the hadiths. These will be looked at in turn. The evidence used by Spencer will firstly be laid out without any attempt to rebut them and a refutation will subsequently follow.

The Opinions of the Four Schools of Thought

To prove his assertion that this is the view accepted by “all” mainstream schools and sects, Spencer quotes texts from the four schools of thought:

“Shafi'i school: A Shafi'i manual of Islamic law that was certified in 1991 by the clerics at Al-Azhar University, one of the leading authorities in the Islamic world, as a reliable guide to Sunni orthodoxy, stipulates that “the caliph makes war upon Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians...until they become Muslim or pay the non-Muslim poll tax.” It adds a comment by Sheikh Nuh ‘Ali Salman, a Jordanian expert on Islamic jurisprudence: the caliph wages this war only “provided that he has first invited [Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians] to enter Islam in faith and practice, and if they will not, then invited them to enter the social order of Islam by paying the non-Muslim poll tax (jizya)...while remaining in their ancestral religions.” ('Umdat al-Salik, o9.8)...

Hanafi school: A Hanafi manual of Islamic law repeats the same injunctions. It insists that people must be called to embrace Islam before being fought, “because the Prophet so instructed his commanders, directing them to call the infidels to the faith.” It emphasizes that jihad must not be waged for economic gain, but solely for religious reasons: from the call to Islam “the people will hence perceive that they are attacked for the sake of religion, and not for the sake of taking their property, or making slaves of their children, and on this consideration it is possible that they may be induced to agree to the call, in order to save themselves from the troubles of war.”

However, “if the infidels, upon receiving the call, neither consent to it nor agree to pay capitation tax [jizya], it is then incumbent on the Muslims to call upon God for assistance, and to make war upon them, because God is the assistant of those who serve Him, and the destroyer of His enemies, the infidels, and it is necessary to implore His aid upon every occasion; the Prophet, moreover, commands us so to do.” (Al-Hidayah, II.140)

Maliki school: Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), a pioneering historian and philosopher, was also a Maliki legal theorist. In his renowned Muqaddimah, the first work of historical theory, he notes that “in the Muslim community, the holy war is a religious duty, because of the universalism of the Muslim mission and (the obligation to) convert everybody to Islam either by persuasion or by force.” In Islam, the person in charge of religious affairs is concerned with “power politics,” because Islam is “under obligation to gain power over other nations.”

Hanbali school: The great medieval theorist of what is commonly known today as radical or fundamentalist Islam, Ibn Taymiyya (Taqi al-Din Ahmad Ibn Taymiyya, 1263-1328), was a Hanbali jurist. He directed that “since lawful warfare is essentially jihad and since its aim is that the religion is God’s entirely and God’s word is uppermost, therefore according to all Muslims, those who stand in the way of this aim must be fought.”” (1)

Abrogation of Peaceful Qur’anic Verses

Spencer says the Qur’anic text can be understood either peacefully, as tolerating the other, or in expansionist and intolerant terms. However, he argues, mainstream classical interpretation understood that there was a progression in the Qur’anic revelation which culminated in a total war against unbelievers to subjugate them under Islamic law. He refers to a “cluster of [Qur’anic] verses containing general and open-ended commands to fight”(2), most importantly verses 9:5 (“slay the idolaters wherever ye find them, and take them (captive), and besiege them, and prepare for them each ambush”) and 9:29 (“Fight those who believe not in Allah nor the Last Day, nor hold that forbidden which hath been forbidden by Allah and His Messenger, nor acknowledge the religion of Truth, (even if they are) of the People of the Book, until they pay the Jizya with willing submission, and feel themselves subdued”), which are thought to be the last verses in this progressive scheme of abrogation. In support of this kind of interpretation Spencer refers to classical commentaries like Ibn Kathir’s, Ibn Juzayy’s and others.

The Sira

Adding further support to the above interpretation is the example of the Prophet Muhammad, who firstly forbade retaliation in the face of persecution and encouraged patience, but later legalised warfare for defensive purposes before pursuing a total warfare against unbelievers. In support he offers Ibn Ishaq’s (d. 767) interpretation of Qur’anic verses in light of the Prophet’s biography:

“The apostle had not been given permission to fight or allowed to shed blood...He had simply been ordered to call men to God and to endure insult and forgive the ignorant. The Quraysh had persecuted his followers, seducing some from their religion, and exiling others from their country. They had to choose whether to give up their religion, be maltreated at home, or to flee the country, some to Abyssinia, others to Medina...When Quraysh became insolent towards God and rejected His gracious purpose, accused His prophet of lying, and ill treated and exiled those who served Him and proclaimed His unity, believed in His prophet, and held fast to His religion, He gave permission to His apostle to fight and to protect himself against those who wronged them and treated them badly.

The first verse which was sent down on this subject...was: “To those against whom war is made, permission is given (to fight), because they are wronged;- and verily, God is most powerful for their aid;- (They are) those who have been expelled from their homes in defiance of right, (for no cause) except that they say, "our Lord is God". Did not Allah check one set of people by means of another, there would surely have been pulled down monasteries, churches, synagogues, and mosques, in which the name of God is commemorated in abundant measure. Allah will certainly aid those who aid his (cause); for verily God is full of Strength, Exalted in Might, (able to enforce His Will). (They are) those who, if We establish them in the land, establish regular prayer and give regular charity, enjoin the right and forbid wrong: with Allah rests the end (and decision) of (all) affairs.” (22:39-41) The meaning is "I have allowed them to fight only because they have been unjustly treated while their sole offense against men has been that they worship God. When they are in the ascendant they will establish prayer, pay the poor-tax, enjoin kindness, and forbid iniquity, i.e., the prophet and his companions all of them." Then God sent down to him: "Fight them so that there be no more seduction," i.e. until no believer is seduced from his religion. "And the religion is God's," (2:193), i.e. until God alone is worshipped." (3)

The Hadiths

There are two important hadiths utilised in this reading:

1. “I have been commanded to fight against people so long as they do not declare that there is no god but Allah, and he who professed it was guaranteed the protection of his property and life on my behalf except for the right affairs rest with Allah” (4)

2. “It has been reported from Sulaiman b. Buraid through his father that when the Messenger of Allah (may peace be upon him) appointed anyone as leader of an army or detachment he would especially exhort him to fear Allah and to be good to the Muslims who were with him. He would say: Fight in the name of Allah and in the way of Allah. Fight against those who disbelieve in Allah. Make a holy war, do not embezzle the spoils; do not break your pledge; and do not mutilate (the dead) bodies; do not kill the children. When you meet your enemies who are polytheists, invite them to three courses of action. If they respond to any one of these, you also accept it and withold yourself from doing them any harm. Invite them to (accept) Islam; if they respond to you, accept it from them and desist from fighting against them. Then invite them to migrate from their lands to the land of Muhairs and inform them that, if they do so, they shall have all the privileges and obligations of the Muhajirs. If they refuse to migrate, tell them that they will have the status of Bedouin Muilims and will be subjected to the Commands of Allah like other Muslims, but they will not get any share from the spoils of war or Fai' except when they actually fight with the Muslims (against the disbelievers). If they refuse to accept Islam, demand from them the Jizya. If they agree to pay, accept it from them and hold off your hands. If they refuse to pay the tax, seek Allah's help and fight them. When you lay siege to a fort and the besieged appeal to you for protection in the name of Allah and His Prophet, do not accord to them the guarantee of Allah and His Prophet, but accord to them your own guarantee and the guarantee of your companions for it is a lesser sin that the security given by you or your companions be disregarded than that the security granted in the name of Allah and His Prophet be violated When you besiege a fort and the besieged want you to let them out in accordance with Allah's Command, do not let them come out in accordance with His Command, but do so at your (own) command, for you do not know whether or not you will be able to carry out Allah's behest with regard to them.” (5)

Ijtihad

Spencer’s final line of proof is that after the death of Ahmad ibn Hanbal in 855 AD no mujtahid (a Muslim jurist capable of independent juristic reasoning) of this standard was ever assumed to have lived thereafter, and the process of ijtihad itself was severed, or “the gates of ijtihad were closed”. As evidence, he quotes modern scholars on religion, most prominently Cyril Glasse (6). His point in offering this argument is to give the impression Muslim scholars today cannot argue against what he suggests is the mainstream classical position.

Response

Firstly, by way of a disclaimer, this is not meant to prove that the idea Spencer expounds, jihad expansionism, did not exist, rather that the idea was not universally accepted by the mainstream as Spencer claims, nor is it a logical conclusion of the Islamic texts themselves. I also aim to show that such a worldview was inspired by the global political climate of that period; hence even Christendom adopted the same position.

The Early Juristic Opinions

Juristic reasoning (fiqh) first systematically appeared in the late seventh and early eight centuries, less than a century after the Prophet Muhammad’s death, its major pioneers being Malik (d. 795), Abu Hanifa (d. 750) and al-Shafi‘i (d. 820). Nearly all of the major Islamic conquests occurred in the first Islamic century from 634 to 732 AD, i.e. before fiqh (jurisprudence) became a recognised intellectual science. In this early foundational period, the roots of the later schools of jurisprudence and the legitimate points of contentions were established.

If we were to believe Robert Spencer’s assertion that “all mainstream schools and sects” accepted the “idea that it is part of the responsibility of the Muslim community to wage war against unbelievers in order to convert or subjugate them”, we should expect to see an agreement in this early period between all the fuqaha (jurists) that this was a religious mandate for the Muslim community. Instead, what we see is a clear divergence of opinion. Broadly speaking, from the seventh to the eleventh century, the jurists were divided according to three major perspectives representing the Maliki, Shafi‘i and Hanafi strain of thought.

The Maliki perspective, which was popular among other prominent schools of thought at this time, took the opinion that it is obligatory to fight disbelievers only in the event of an attack, but if they are not the aggressors the decision to fight is discretionary (nafila) and depends on the opinion of the Muslim leader. Ibn Abd al-Barr (d. 1071), a relatively late prominent Maliki jurist, said “[Jihad] is an obligation when one is in a state of fear (insecurity), while discretionary when one is enjoying security” (7). Likewise the Kufan jurist Sufyan al-Thawri (d. 778), who had his own school of thought which lasted all the way till the twelfth century before it eventually died out, said “fighting the idol-worshippers is not an obligation unless the initiative comes from them. If that is the case they must be fought in fulfilment of Allah’s command ‘if they fight you, kill them’ (2:191) and His saying ‘fight all the idol-worshippers as they fight you all’ (9:36)...” (8). This point of view was adopted by Imam Malik himself and the Maliki Sahnun (d. 854) as well as Ibn Umar (d. 693), Ata ibn Abi Rabah (d. 734), Ibn Shibrima and ‘Amr ibn Dinar (d. 788), all influential fuqaha in this period (9).

The second prominent position was that of the Hanafis as represented by Abu Hanifa’s student, Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Shaybani’s remarkable work on international relations, al-Siyar, in which a “state of hostility” is assumed although not expressly mentioned, but aggression is identified specifically as the trigger for war, and toleration, peace and mutual cooperation are emphasised. Majid Khadduri, an American scholar on jihad quoted extremely selectively by Spencer, wrote in the introduction to his translation of al-Siyar “We have seen how Abu Hanifa and his disciples, especially Shaybani, laid down general rules and principles governing Islam’s external relations, based on the assumption that a normal state of war existed between Islamic and non-Islamic territories; but they made no explicit statements that the jihad was a war to be waged against unbelievers solely on account of their disbelief (kufr). On the contrary, the early Hanafi jurists seem to have stressed that tolerance should be shown unbelievers, especially scriptuaries, and advised the Imam to prosecute war only when the inhabitants of the dar al-harb came into conflict with Islam” (10). In other words, this position does not explicitly profess that there should be a total warfare against unbelievers in order to subjugate or convert them, but assumes that such a warfare already exists and seeks to amend relations beginning from this premise. It is perhaps for this reason, that Abu Hanifa and the Hanafis explicitly said that a peace treaty between Muslim nations and non-Muslim nations may be permanent and unlimited, making peaceful coexistence a legal possibility.

The last mainstream position was first explicitly formulated by al-Shafi‘i in his work al-Umm. Majid Khadduri describes it as follows: “It was Shafi‘i who first formulated the doctrine that the jihad had for its intent the waging of war on unbelievers for their disbelief and not merely when they entered into conflict with Islam. The jihad was thereby transformed into a collective duty enjoined on Muslims to fight unbelievers “wherever you may find them” (9:5), although not every Muslim was necessarily obligated to fight. This legal principle provoked a discussion among Shafi‘i’s contemporaries and led to a division of opinion among the Hanafi jurists who followed Shaybani. Some, like Tahawi (d. 993), adhered more closely to the Hanafi doctrine that fighting was enjoined only in conflict with unbelievers; but Sarakhsi (d. 1097), the great commentator on Shaybani’s works, accepted the Shafi‘i doctrine that fighting the unbeliever was “a duty enjoined permanently until the end of time” (11). It is significant that the Hanafi school of thought dominated in most historical Islamic polities, including the Abbasid, the Seljuk and the Ottoman governments. Hence, when the Hanafi commentator on Shaybani’s Siyar, Sarakhsi, adopted the Shafi’i point of view described, it is no wonder that this is the view that became dominant in all the other madhhabs after the eleventh century. It is therefore unsurprising that all the ulama Spencer quotes appear after the eleventh century: Ahmad ibn Naqib (d. 1368), al-Marghiyani (d. 1197), Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328) and Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406).

The Reason for this Early Juristic Dispute

Most Muslim jurists held, at the time of authoring their works, in the early period that Abyssinians, Nubians and Turks may not be fought based on an explicit statement of the Prophet Muhammad (12). Yet, Shaybani’s Siyar the medieval text outlining Islamic international relations par excellence appears to assume a permanent state of hostility. The apparent contradiction in these perspectives can be resolved by understanding as Khaled Abou El Fadl wrote “(Early) Muslim jurists hardly discussed issues relating to jus ad bellum [conditions justifying warfare]; they focused nearly exclusively on jus in bellum [rules in warfare]” (13). What this meant for early jurists is al-Shafi‘i’s more explicit formulation came to be the starting point of debate for the jus ad bellum, and eventually became the accepted premise of war across most madhhabs. Likewise, the hadiths rarely concern themselves with jus ad bellum, and instead outline rules of warfare and how one should conduct oneself while fighting.

However, the reason why al-Shafi‘i’s juristic view had favour and dominated in the eleventh century does require an explanation. As Sherman Jackson shows in this article empires and nations all over the world were in constant fear of threat and war. War between empires was the assumed state of affairs. It is therefore no wonder that Christendom too had the same view of international relations. As Majid Khadduri wrote “Similar to the law of ancient Rome and the law of medieval Chrisendom, the Muslim law of nations was based on the theory of a universal state. Both Christendom and Islamdom, as divine universal nomocracies, assumed that mankind constituted one community, bound by one law and governed ultimately by one ruler...their rules for foreign relations, accordingly, were the rules of an imperial state which would recognise no equal status for the other party (or parties) with whom they happened to fight or negotiate [jus fetiale in ancient Rome]. It follows therefore that the binding force of such a law of nations was not based on mutual consent or reciprocity, but on their own interpretation of their political, moral and religious interest, as they regarded their principles of morality and religion superior to others.” (14) Hence, although al-Shafi‘i’s view, that it was a communal obligation for the collective Muslim body to extend Islamic rule by conversion or conquest, became accepted by all schools following the eleventh century, the underlying motivation was security not conversion or expansion; Jackson for example finds an example of this in Ibn Rushd the Elder’s writings:

“To take one example, the juridical writings of the Spanish jurist, Ibn Rushd the Elder (d. 520/1122), a major legal authority and grandfather of the celebrated Averroes of Western fame, clearly reflect the influence of the perceived "state of war." Because Ibn Rushd perceived it to be impossible for Muslims to live as Muslims outside of Muslim lands, he insisted that it was forbidden for Muslims to take up residence abroad. In fact, he even banned travel to non-Muslim countries for purposes of commerce, going so far as to urge the ruler to build check-points and light-houses to stop Muslims from leaving the lands of Islam. As for individuals in non-Muslim countries who converted to Islam, Ibn Rushd insisted that they were religiously obligated to migrate to a Muslim polity. On this understanding, it comes as no surprise that Ibn Rushd endorsed the traditional doctrine on aggressive jihad as a communal obligation. During the course of his discussion, however, it becomes clear that his ultimate consideration was the security of the Muslims rather than either conquest or conversion. After exhausting the point that jihad is a communal obligation, Ibn Rushd comes to the following conclusion:

So, whenever we are placed beyond the reach of the enemy and the outlying districts of the Muslim lands are secured and the gaps in their fortifications are filled, the obligation to wage jihad falls from all the rest of the Muslims ... (al-Muqaddimat 1:374)

The purpose of jihad, in other words, is to provide for the security and freedom of the Muslims in a world that kept them under constant threat.” (15)

This also forms part of the explanation of what motivated the early Muslim conquests. Majid Khadduri notes that the ideology propelling the early conquests “was not a consciously formulated policy” (16). Sherman Jackson describes how the Muslims found themselves in a pre-existing “state of war” with which they had to contend. Having already had violent clashes with the Byzantines of the Levant [prompted by the unjust execution of a messenger who was sent with the purpose of inviting them to Islam] and encountered the Arab allies of Byzantium from Northern Arabia during the lifetime of Muhammad, the Muslims were aware of the threat they faced. They were not militarily superior to either the Byzantine Romans or the Sassanid Persians, but their growing presence meant they had to become part of the heterogenic world of hegemonic empires, for had they not, their destruction would have been inevitable. It is not that the religious concept of “jihad” had no part to play in this process, but jihad was merely an instrument whereby the ideology was legitimised and internalised. After citing a few examples of the state of hostility between sovereign empires assumed throughout the world, Jackson writes “In the case of the Muslim empire, an identical assumption would collude with the presumed "state of war" and produce a sense of mission that was reinforced by the overall medieval thirst for conquest. Jihad, for its part, like the Roman-Byzantine "charismatic victoriousness," would lend itself well to these ambitions and these concerns.” But, he notes, “the Muslim conquests were neither for the sole purpose of conversion nor annihilating the infidel. In addition to the fact that non-Muslims paid higher taxes -- and thus non-conversion operated to the financial advantage of the state -- the rules of jihad stipulated that non-Muslims remained free to practice their religion upon payment of the so-called jizya, or income tax, in exchange for which the Muslim state incurred the responsibility to protect them from outside attack. While the imperial quest for empire invariably informed the policies of every Muslim state, Muslim juristic writings continued to reflect the logic of the "state of war" and the assumption that only Muslims would permit Muslims to remain Muslims. They continued to see jihad not only as a means of guaranteeing the security and freedom of the Muslims but as virtually the only means of doing so. For even peace-treaties were usually the result of one's surrender to demands that had been imposed by a real or anticipated defeat by the sword.”

The Permanent Hudna and Later Juristic Thought

Al-Shafi‘i’s construction of a fiqh-based jihad ideology described above was formulated with the caveat that peace treaties between Muslim and non-Muslim nations may only be for a maximum duration of ten years so that the permanent state of hostility is not diminished into permanent peace. However, as other madhhabs began to adopt the Shafi‘ite jihad ideology, their initial preference for peace and toleration did not disappear; rather it was upheld via the more widespread acceptance of a long-term truce which did not have a limit. Khaled Abo El Fadl writes “an increasing number of jurists [from all madhhabs] after the fifth/eleventh century rejected the ten-year limit, with many of them arguing either that the Muslim ruler may continue to renew a peace treaty for ten-year periods indefinitely, or that permanent peace treaties are lawful in Islam [Fadl’s note: See: Imam Ibn Muflih, “al Mubdi' fi sharh al-Muqni”, [ Beirut: al-Maktab al-Islami , 1973 ] , 3:398–99; al-Sarakhsi, “Sharh” 3:46–47; al-Najafi, “Jawahir al-Kalam” 21:298–99; Abu Bakr Muhammad b. Ahmad; al Shashi al-Qaffal, “Hulyat al-'Ulama' fi Ma'rifat Madhahib al-Fuqaha” 7:718–21 ; al-Ramli, “Nihayat al-Muhtaj”, 8:107; Al-Nawawi “Rawdat al-Talibin”, 10: 334–35 ; Ibn Qudama, “al-Mughni”, 8:460–61]. A prominent jurist such as Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328) argued that there is no evidence supporting a particular term limit on peace treaties” (17). The famous fourteenth century scholar Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 1350) also favoured the view that an imam may enter into a permanent peace treaty (hudna) but each party should have the freedom to revoke the pact whenever they like, so long as the other is informed (18). In fact in describing Abu Hanifa’s view on the matter, Ibn Qudama writes that he not only believed peace treaties may be without term, he took the opinion that “the interest of the Muslims lies more in peace than it does in war” (al-maslaha qad takunu fi l-sulhi akthara minha fi l-harb) (19).

Not only were the jurists in favour of the permissibility of a permanent peace treaty, it became an actual reality during Ottoman rule. Majid Khadduri wrote:

“[A] significant change in the relationship of Islam with other nations was the adoption by Islam of the principle of peaceful relations among nations of different religions, replacing the classical principle of the permanent state of war between Islamic and non-Islamic territories. The jihad, as we noted earlier, became inadequate as a basis for Islam’s relations with other nations. Peace treaties extending beyond the ten-year period provided under the classical law of nations necessarily replaced the jihad as a normal relationship between Islam and other states.

The most notable instrument that recognised peace as the normal relationship between Islamic and non-Islamic states was the Treaty of 1535, concluded by Sultan Sulayman the Magnificent with Francis I, the King of France. The treaty provided quite a few innovations in the relationship between Islam and other nations. The preamble treated the King of France and his envoys on an equal footing with Sultan Sulayman and his representatives. Article I provided for the establishment of “valid and certain peace” between the Sultan and the King “during their lives” and granted the subjects of each sovereign reciprocal rights in the territory of the other…Article 15 stated that such privileges would be extended to other sovereigns if they adhered to the treaty, thereby indicating that the Sultan sought to establish a principle applicable to other Christian princes…Nor was this all. The treaty modified yet another classical principle by exempting from the poll tax French subjects who resided in the Ottoman Empire, even for a period exceeding one year” (20)

This period of consolidation lasted from the eleventh to the nineteenth century. It remains the case, therefore, that establishing a fundamental relationship based not on jihad warfare but peace and mutual cooperation was a possibility even in this period. In the nineteenth century Muslim scholars and the general population had to come to terms with colonialism. As a direct effect of colonialism, individual opinion about the Qur’an and hadith rapidly multiplied and the authority of the ulama diminished. As a result, many innovative ideas emerged at this time, including cults like the Ahmadiyya. I will return to the opinions of the ulama in this modern period from the nineteenth to the twenty-first century a little further down.

Abrogation and the Verses of Peace

The view that the duty of jihad as prescribed in the Qur’an transformed from a non-confrontational form of peaceful preaching to defensive war and finally to a total war against all disbelievers to convert or subjugate under Islamic law reflected al-Shafi‘i’s viewpoint. The major early Qur’an commentator al-Tabari (d. 923) did appear to follow this method in determining which verses were abrogated and which were not, as he was a follower of the Shafi‘i school. However, the view that the verses of peace were abrogated by 9:5, 9:29 and some other verses has been proven to be largely based on personal opinion and not on sound authority from the apostolic period. This is demonstrably the case as all verses that were thought to have been abrogated were disputed, revealing the arbitrary, circumstantial and inconsistent nature of such a task. Reuven Firestone wrote “Despite the lack of consistency, these verses are cited by the legal literature (and, following them, Western scholars) in such a way as to suggest a historical development in the qur’anic conception of holy war…The fact is that the conflicting qur’anic verses cannot prove an evolution of the concept or sanction for religiously authorised warring in Islam from a nonaggressive to a militant stance” (21) This is because, if we are to see a consistent evolution “we should expect…a substantial degree of repetition and agreement in the sources over the occasions of revelation and the hierarchy of abrogation. In reading a representative sample of commentaries and naskh and asbab works from the first five Islamic centuries, however, we find tremendous disagreement over what interpretations inspired the major war verses, when they occurred, and to what or whom they refer. This decided lack of agreement destroys the classic argument of divinely guided evolution and reveals its origin as a theoretical solution to the problem of qur’anic contradiction.” As for the origin of such a view, Firestone writes “in fact, this classic Islamic “evolutionary theory” of warring presumes from the outset that war against non-Muslims would be essentially unrestricted even before the Muslims engaged in the process because that was the policy of the empire under which the theory evolved” (22).

If analysed carefully, it can be observed that this Qur’anic exegesis involving an evolution in this manner often leads to contradictions and is therefore self-defeating. For instance, al-Tabari in commenting on Qur’an 60:8 which recommends friendliness and equitability to non-aggressive disbelievers cannot accept the conclusion of some individuals that this verse was abrogated as the Prophet used this verse to encourage friendly behaviour towards non-Muslims near the end of his Prophetic career; instead al-Tabari says: “The preferred (view) from these opinions which is correct is the (view of the) one who says that by (the statement) ‘Allah forbids you not, with regard to those who fight you not for (your) Faith’ is meant from all the various types of religions and sects that you be friendly to them and maintain (family) bonds and are equitable to them. Allah Glorified and Exalted be He generalised by His saying ‘those who fight you not for (your) Faith nor drive you out of your homes’ all those whose description this is, and He did not specify thereby some apart from others...The truth of what we have said is clear from the report we mentioned [of the Prophet using this verse as evidence towards the end of his life]” (23)

Although the prevailing paradigm for understanding Qur’anic verses that apparently contain contradictory imperatives was to invoke the concept of “abrogation” (naskh) with regards to the verses of fighting, the stringent rules of abrogation the classical ulama outlined, like attempting to reconcile the verses before postulating abrogation, prohibits such a view. Clearly, as Firestone pointed out, the impulse for the prevalence of this view came not from an internal contextual analysis of the Qur’anic text but an external circumstantial imperative. It is for this reason many contemporary Qur’anic exegetes do not accept this paradigm and offer an alternative one which takes inter-textual and contextual analysis more seriously. Some of these ulama will be mentioned below. However, reading the Qur’an in context reveals that there is a way all the verses on fighting can be reconciled. Some of the major sections in the Qur’an dealing with fighting are: 2:190-5, 216-8, 2:246-51, 256, 4:74-7, 88-91, 5:51-2, 8:15-19, 38-40, 53-62. 65-7, 9:1-13, 29-36, 122-3, 22:39-41, 47:1-4, 34-5, 49:9-10, 60:7-9. The verses generally command warfare only against those who fight the Muslims (2:190, 9:13, 36, 4:75) and exhort believers to cease fighting when aggression ends (2:193, 4:90, 8:61, 60:8, 9:4,6,7); the open-ended command to warfare are generally placed in the midst of verses describing persecution and aggression, so 47:4 is preceded by a verses describing disbelievers who prevent people from following God’s religion (47:1) and 9:5 is surrounded by verses describing the polytheists’ treachery in breaking the peace agreement.

After citing the verses that suggest fighting may only be for defensive purposes and must stop when aggression ends, Rudolph Peters writes “Taking the aforementioned verses as the decisive ones in the relationship with unbelievers, modernists were obliged to reinterpret the verses that were traditionally understood as giving an unconditional command to fight them. They accomplished this by means of contextual exegesis. Thus 9:5, which is traditionally taken as the sword verse, must according to the modernists, be read in the context of the first part of sura 9 directed against the Meccans that had broken their treaty-obligations...In the same way 9:29 is reinterpreted. The modernists deny the verse contains an unconditional command to fight all People of the Book until they pay the poll-tax but infer from the context that only those Jews and Christians were meant that had violated their pledges and assailed the propagation of the Islamic mission. An additional argument for this interpretation is to be found in the phrase “have been humbled” which implies, according to modernist authors, that previously, they were recalcitrant and that there had been reasons for Muslims to fight them.” (24) These scholars who Peters describes as “modernists” are in fact mainstream ulama working within a mainstream interpretation of the Qur’an and fiqh, as will be demonstrated below.

The view described by Ibn Ishaq above, outlining a change from non-confrontation to defensive fighting is also mentioned explicitly in the Qur’an (4:77), but as would be expected his description of the final stage is unclear and ambiguous. The very first verses to be revealed on fighting (22:39-41) describe the trigger for jihad as injustice, expulsion and the forceful prevention of remembering God in “monasteries, churches, synagogues, and mosques” (22:40); 2:193 which provides a similar justification and exhorts believers to stop fighting when aggression ceases is in fact the verse used by Ibn Ishaq in describing the final stage in the Prophet’s mission; hence, there is no Qur’anic evidence that the initial command to fight found in the very first verses revealed, and the justifications found in them, was ever “abrogated” or superseded.

The Hadiths

The two hadiths cited above are used by Spencer to prove that the jihad ideology formulated by al-Shafi‘i is proven by the canonical sayings of the Prophet Muhammad. However, with regards to the first hadith, most Muslim traditionists and jurists understood it to refer to the polytheists or idolaters (mushrikun), and the Hanafis restrict these to the polytheists of Mecca. Furthermore, it is significant that the hadith uses the word “fight” and not “kill”. Ramadan al-Buti writes extensively on the difference between “fight” (uqatil) and “kill” (aqtulu) drawing on Ibn Hajar’s classical commentary on Sahih al-Bukhari (25). The word that is used, uqatil, denotes mutual participation in the act from both the subject and the object. In other words, the command wouldn’t be in effect if resistance was absent, and therefore must refer to hostile polytheists. Conversion to Islam is only one way the hadith describes that a peaceful solution can be reached, the other being a peaceful settlement that involves mutual recognition of the other, as was the case in the Prophet's own lifetime. Ibn Taymiyya in his Risalat al-Qital wrote "[The Prophet's] biography demonstrates that anyone who signed a pact from the non-Muslims did not fight him whether from the polytheists of the Arabs or others. This is documented in the biographical literature, and the narrations, Quranic exegesis, jurispudence, tales of prophetic battles speak of this. This is mass transmitted from his example; the Prophet never initiated war with anyone from the non-Muslims." (quoted in Wahba Zuhayli, Athar al-Harb, p. 105)

As regards to the second hadith, the Prophet Muhammad exhorted the fighters to maintain good ethical conduct during war, so he prohibited them from mutilating the bodies and killing children. Furthermore, the hadith refers to offering the three options mentioned to polytheists, not all disbelievers. For this reason, as al-Nawawi notes in his classical commentary on Sahih Muslim, Malik and Awza‘i held the opinion that the jizya could be extracted from polytheists too, and not just scriptuaries (Jews and Christians); Abu Hanifa opined that the jizya was not an option for the Meccan polytheists but was for all other polytheists and scriptuaries; it was only al-Shafi‘i who took the opinion that the term “polytheists” may include scriptuaries and this hadith is meant specifically about the latter (26). Nonetheless, the hadith gives no indication of the jus ad bellum, the reason(s) for going to war, and the view of the majority that war is legitimised by aggression, not disbelief, is therefore not negated by this hadith.

Did the Gates of Ijtihad Close?

Wael Hallaq wrote a pioneering article on the topic of “closing the gates of ijtihad” in the early 1980s which has transformed Western scholarly views on this issue (27). In this important article, Hallaq shows that Western studies on Islam was dominated by Joseph Schacht’s view that “by the beginning of the fourth century of hijra (about AD 900)...a consensus gradually established itself to the effect that from that time onwards no one might be deemed to have the necessary qualifications for independent reasoning in law”. This view that the “gates of ijtihad” were closed at about the end of the third/ninth century was commonly accepted by Orientalists. W.M. Watt was aware of some inaccuracies about this standard account but did not offer any alternative formulation. As Hallaq explained “many scholars would have us believe that the closure of the gate had an impact on, or was influenced, by this or that element in Islamic history. Some use it to explain the immunity of the Shari‘a against the interference of government, and others to illustrate the problem of decadence in Islamic institutions and cultre” (28). Spencer uses it in this case to prove that Muslims cannot challenge what he believes to be the orthodox classical view.

However, a “systematic and chronological study of the original legal sources” reveals that these views are “entirely baseless and inaccurate” (29). The gates of ijtihad were not closed, neither “in theory nor in practice”. He proves in his study that ijtihad was practiced by competent jurists in every age and the theoretical notion of “closing the door of ijtihad” only appeared in the literature at about 1100 AD (i.e. two centuries after Western scholars assumed it happened). Hallaq shows that the major legal theorists who wrote on the prerequisites of practicing ijtihad like Ghazali (d. 1111), Amidi (d. 1234) and their successors did not list intellectual tools that were superhuman or impossible. Nearly all of these legal theorists divided (tajzi’a) ijtihad so as to make it feasible at least in some specialised areas e.g. family law for a scholar who had complete expertise in this field. Hallaq writes “It would therefore be implausible to maintain that the qualifications for ijtihad as set forth in Muslim legal writings made it impossible for jurists to practice ijtihad” (30). Hallaq describes two early schools, Zahirism and extreme Hanbali Traditionalism, which were inherently opposed to ijtihad and qiyas (analogical deduction) and thus came under heavy criticism and eventual expulsion from mainstream Sunnism. Hallaq runs through dozens of ulama from every century beginning from the ninth century who practiced independent reasoning and thus often diverged from the madhhab which’s broad legal theory they operated under; examples include al-Tabari (d. 923), Ibn Abd al-Barr (d. 1071), al-Suyuti (d. 1505) and Shah Wali Allah al-Dehlawi (d. 1762). In fact even commentaries and legal exegeses represent clear stages of advance from earlier works of the school (31).

Ijtihad was believed to be a communal obligation (fard kifaya) so could not be abandoned by the collective body of Islamic scholars. The Hanbali Ibn Aqil (d. 1119) was perhaps the first to consider the question of whether a qualified mujtahid must exist; he contended that the world cannot be absent of a qualified mujtahid as it is a communal obligation. He wrote “It is not possible for an age to be devoid of a mujtahid. This is contrary to the claim of some muhaddiths who argue that there remained no mujtahids at our age.” (32) Al-Amidi (d. 1234) summed up a debate that was brewing at his time between the Hanbalis and Shafi‘is on one side and the Malikis and Hanafis on the other; the first believed based on the evidence of the hadith and the fact that ijtihad is a communal obligation that a mujtahid must always exist, while the latter argued that there may eventually be a time when mujtahids become extinct. Subki (d. 1369) agrees that this difference highlighted by Amidi exists among legal theorists, but argued that although the extinction is a theoretical and theological possibility, it did not actually take place. This debate was furthered by legal theorists like Isnawi (d. 1370), Taftazani (d. 1388) and Ibn Amir al-Hajj (d. 1474); although the debate raged on about its possibility very few (Baydawi was amongst these few) argued that the mujtahids were actually extinct. Ibn Amir argued that the highest rank of mujtahid was absent from the twelfth century but the “limited/affiliated mujtahid” or the mujtahid that operated within the legal system of a madhhab still existed. Another legal theorist, Siddiqi (d. 1563), also argued that the extinction of muhtahids is a possibility but that jurists right up to his time were mujtahids. Hallaq demonstrates that although there was general agreement that jurists practiced ijtihad of the “affiliated” type (i.e. affiliated to a madhhab’s legal system) although not of the “independent” type, without pause in Islamic history, there was a great deal of confusion over terminology which led to an apparent disputation over whether ijtihad was in practice. Normally when it was said mujtahids no longer existed it was meant the mujtahid independent of following a legal system from one of the four maddhabs, but mujtahids affiliated to madhhabs were always believed to exist. Ibn Abd al-Salam (d. 1261) wrote that Muslims “disagreed as regards to the closure of the gate of ijtihad. They expressed different views to the effect of the closure...but these views are all null and void because if a new case comes up and no solution is found in the scripture, or the case is a subject of controversy among our forefathers, ijtihad is needed” (33).

Ijtihad however did begin to decline from the fourteenth century on until al-Suyuti seeing this decline assumed the rank of mujtahid himself and penned the polemical work al-Raddu ‘ala man Akhlada ila l-Ardi wa jahila anna l-Ijtihad fi Kulli ‘Asr Fard (Refutation of He Who Clings to the Earth and is Ignorant of (the fact that) Ijtihad in Every Age is Obligatory); although al-Suyuti faced opposition, it was directed more towards his boastfulness of claiming the title for himself than it was with regards to the existence of mujtahids; however al-Suyuti listed a number of ulama from every period who practiced ijtihad up to his time like Ghazali (d. 1111), Razi (d. 1209), Ibn Daqiq al-Id (d. 1302) and al-Bulqini (d. 1403). In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries there was an apparent decline in ijtihad but Hallaq explains that this was simply because the ijtihad practiced by the jurists was not recognised by the term. In the nineteenth century there was a steep rise in the practice of ijtihad (34).

In sum, although there was a popular understanding that the degree of ijtihad could not be reached, this was normally restricted to “independent” ijtihad i.e. those not working within a broad framework of legal theory from one of the four traditional madhhabs; “affiliated” ijtihad however was practiced and defended by mainstream Sunni scholars throughout all of Islamic history, and the effect was certainly an advancement in positive law in every century. There was, however, some disagreement over terminology that confused the issue.

Modern Views on Jihad

Modern views on jihad have evolved to take the early divergence and the ambiguity with regards to the jus ad bellum into account. In his analysis on the differences between classical and modern discourse on jihad, Rudolph Peters finds the definition of jihad is much broader in modern readings as compared to classical definitions. For example, following the Rwanda genocide of 1994 in which the state-backed Hutu death squads murdered nearly a million Tutsis supported all the while by Catholic church leaders, Muslims who did not participate in the genocide harboured and saved thousands of Christian Tutsis in the mosques, the head Mufti of Rwanda, Saleh Habimana, described the Muslim struggle during and after the genocide as a “struggle to heal” in Rwanda and he described it as a “jihad”; as a result the Muslim population in Rwanda has more than doubled (35). In modern discourse “the principle of peaceful relations between the Islamic and the other states” dominates based on Qur’anic verses such as 8:61 and 4:90 (36). The legal aims of jihad to defend Muslim land and protect minorities against oppression (i.e. jus ad bellum) are more emphasised, and an overall effort to avoid the classical approach of conflating Muslim security with jihad expansionism is made. These authors indeed began as Western-influenced modernists like Sayyid Ahmad Khan (d. 1898), Cheragh Ali (d. 1895), Molvi Abu Said Hussain, Syed Amir Ali (d. 1928) from nineteenth century India; and Muhammad Abduh (d. 1905) and Rashid Rida (d. 1935) from nineteenth century Egypt. However, in the twentieth century this viewpoint was adopted by mainstream ulama from all the traditional madhhabs, as it certainly had its roots in Islamic tradition but was merely poorly defined.

Rashid Rida (d. 1935), the author of the most renowned work of Qur’anic exegesis in the twentieth century, wrote “everything that is mentioned in the Koran with regard to the rules of fighting, is intended as defence against enemies that fight the Moslems because of their religion” (37). Mahmud Shaltut (d. 1963), who was the grand shaykh of al-Azhar in Egypt, showed in his tract al-Qur'an wa l-Qital (The Qur’an and Fighting) (38) that by taking an inter-textual and contextual approach to the Qur’an as opposed the classical “evolution theory”, jihad becomes primarily defensive, and the fundamental relationship between Muslim and non-Muslim nations is established as one of peace.

In his extensive thesis on Jihad, the modern academic Muhammad Khayr Haykal quotes many modern authorities (ulama) on the subject of jihad and he discovers most of them believe it to be primarily defensive and one that envisages peaceful coexistence (39). I will quote a few examples here (all references are taken from Haykal’s work).

Abd al-Wahhab Khallaf (d. 1956), who was a teacher at Azhar and supervisor of Shari'ah courts in Egypt, wrote: “Islam establishes relations between Muslims and others as peace and security, not as war and fighting, except when they are targeted with harmful (intentions) to reek havoc in their religion, or quell their call (to Islam), for then jihad would be made obligatory in order to deter the harm and protect the call...and if non-Muslims withhold from their persecution and leave them free to call (to Islam), Muslims should not display a sword or initiate war” (40)

Abd al-Hafiz Abd Rabbih wrote, quoting and approving another authority, Dr. Muhammad Abd Allah al-Darraz: “We agree expressly that the war legislated in Islam is a defensive war only, and none besides, and it behooves us to point out that defence includes within it two types, both of which the Qur'an alludes to: 1. defending lives and 2. the necessary aid for the Muslim subjects...we see from this, war in Islam is an evil, and there is no recourse to it except in (cases of) necessity” (41) In his foreword to this work Dr Muhammad Muhammad al-Fahham (d. 1975?), the grand shaykh of Azhar from 1969-1973, commends the author and approves of the book.

Dr Mustafa al-Siba‘i (d. 1964), who was Professor of Law at the University of Damascus and established the Faculty of Shariah there in 1955, wrote: “Jihad in Islam is legislated for two purposes: 1. repelling the enemy to free the (Muslim) community in its land and its religion, and 2. rescuing oppressed people from tyrant rulers” (42)

Sayyid Sabiq (d. 2000), a jurist from the Muslim Brotherhood, a teacher at Azhar as well as Umm al-Qura in Mecca and author of the renowned work Fiqh al-Sunna (Understanding Tradition), wrote: “Since the fundamental principle is peace and war is the exception, there is nothing permitting war in Islam whatever the situation except in two instances: 1. when defending life, honour and property, and land when it is occupied; 2. when defending the call to God if one is hampered along his path, by torturing the one who believes it or by preventing one who intends to engage in it or by stopping the caller from his call” (43)

The Egyptian judge Ali Ali Mansur wrote: “Islam does not approve of offensive warfare with the intention of conquest (fath) or expansion (tawassu)...the war that is legislated in Islam is defensive war, to repel the hostility which an enemy initiated, or to defend an established clause in a treaty or an agreement broken by the opposition, or to protect the call (to Islam)” (44)

Wahba al-Zuhayli (b. 1933), Professor of Islamic jurisprudence at Damascus University, wrote “The jurists of both Sunni and Shiite orientation believed, in the age of juristic innovation of the second century, that the fundamental relationship between Muslims and others is war … on the premise of what they understood from the verses of the Qur’an upon its apparent (meaning) and absolute (rendering), without efforts to reconcile and combine between them…perhaps their pretext for this ruling is their condition of being affected by the state of the Muslims at that time of the necessity of firmness before the enemies who surrounded them from every side” (45). Based on Qur’anic verse 8:61 and others and the Prophet’s biography, Zuhayli goes on to argue the fundamental relationship between Muslim and non-Muslim nations according to the Muslim scriptures is in fact one of peace. The opinions described here have been adopted by ulama throughout the world e.g. the world renowned Indian scholar Abu l-Hasan Ali Nadwi (d. 1999) and Wahiduddin Khan (b. 1925) of Delhi; and from the West, such scholars as Mustafa Ceric, Zaid Shakir and Abd al-Hakim Murad

In his book, al-Jihad fi l-Islam, Ramadan al-Buti (b. 1933) conclusively proves that military jihad has been legislated for the purpose of averting aggression (hiraba) not disbelief (kufr) based on the opinions of the majority of the ulama and texts of the Qur’an and hadiths. He writes “The majority, that is the Hanafis, Malikis and Hanbalis, have adopted (the view) that the ratio legis for military jihad is averting aggression, and al-Shafi‘i adopted (the view) in the most prominent of his two pronouncements that the ratio legis is disbelief, and this is also the madhhab of Ibn Hazm” (46) [references he cites: Bidayat al-Mujtahid 1:369-372, al-Mughni 9:301, Fath al-Qadir 5:452, al-Sharh al-Saghir ‘ala Aqrab al-Masalik 2:275, Mughni al-Muhtaj 4:234, al-Tuhfa 9:231]. He elaborates on this point in terms of evidence from the Qur’an and hadith and finds the minority Shafiite view is based on a weak interpretation of the evidence (47).

Rudolph Peters suggests the idea of the “exclusively defensive character of jihad” may have been a popular understanding even before the modern period: “Although the exclusively defensive character of jihad was only recently put forward by the modernists, there are indications that this concept is much older...The collection of Thousand and One Nights contains the didactic story of Tawaddud, a slave girl that astonishes the ulama by her extensive knowledge of Islam. With regard to jihad, we read: ‘He said: “What is the jihad and what are its essential elements (arkan)?” She answered: “As for its essential elements, they are: an attack on us by the unbelievers, the presence of an Imam, preparedness and constance when one meets the enemy”’(Alf layla wa layla Vol. 2, p. 309)” (48).

Modern Jihadism

Falsely claiming that the view he describes, jihad expansionism and supremacism, was never genuinely challenged or opposed, Spencer cites selectively from modern Muslim ulama to buttress this claim. In the modern period, Salafi, Wahhabi and (many) Deobandi ulama hold to the jihad ideology ascribed initially to al-Shafi‘i. Hence Sepncer quotes selectively from these scholars e.g. Abd Allah ibn Humaid and Mufti Ibrahim Desai, but does not engage with any of the ulama quoted above.

Although working within the broad framework of the Shafi‘ite jihad ideology, even Wahhabi and Deobandi ulama strongly condemn jihadist terrorist activity. Mufti Desai of the Deobandi background, Salafist ulama like Al-Albani (d. 1999) and Wahhabi ulama like al-Ouda, Bin Baz (d. 1999), Ibn Uthaymin (d. 2001) and Salih al-Fawzan have strongly condemned suicide terrorism and the targeting of civilians as they are opposed to the essence of jihad. There was no equivalent of al-Qaeda until the 1990s. Speaking of Muslim activism in Egypt and elsewhere in the early 90s, Rudolph Peters wrote “They first and foremost wanted to change the government of the countries they lived in. Of course, they supported the jihads of Islamic people elsewhere (Palestine, South Philippines, Afghanistan) who were struggling against foreign occupation, but that was a matter of Islamic solidarity and not part of a strategy to realise a unified Islamic polity” (49). Global jihadism is therefore a late invention with no equivalent in classical Islam. In fact even suicide terrorism was a new introduction in the Muslim world with strong evidence that it was borrowed from the example of the Tamil Tigers in the seventies and eighties (50). Terrorism itself was part of Islamic legal vocabulary long before it was in the West and was thus denounced centuries earlier (51), and the act of deliberately targeting civilians began in Palestine in the sixties when Muslim nationalists recognised the success of earlier Zionist terrorism.

The global jihadism of al-Qaeda which has suffused, in small or large part, into groups such as AQIM, Abu Sayyaf and al-Shabaab is a reflection of the internalisation of some Western norms and ideologies related to revolution and freedom, not the Islamic concept of jihad which plays a small role. John Gray wrote “No cliche is more stupefying than that which describes Al-Qaida as a throwback to medieval times. It is a by-product of globalisation. Its most distinctive feature - projecting a privatised form of organised violence worldwide - was impossible in the past. Equally, the belief that a new world can be hastened by spectacular acts of destruction is nowhere found in medieval times. Al-Qaida’s closest precursors are the revolutionary anarchists of late nineteenth-century Europe” (52). It is therefore not surprising to find that the major architects and actors of global jihadism are not qualified ulama, but trained rather in secular subjects. The major revolutionary thinker Syed Qutb was a literary critic who read such Nazist authors as the French Aliexis Carrel; similarly, the author of The Neglected Obligation, Abd al-Salam Faraj, was trained as an electrician and was not a recognised alim; likewise Bin Laden, al-Zawahiri, al-Zarqawi, Abu Mus‘ab Abdel Wadoud, and most members of ideological groups like Hizb al-Tahrir and al-Muhajiroun are not ulama, but generally doctors, engineers, businessmen and lawyers; this type of education is conducive to such revolutionary rhetoric and ideas (Exceptions like the alim and Afghan mujahid Abdullah Azzam (d. 1989) are exceptions precisely for the reason that they opposed Bin Laden’s tactics and in large part advocated only a defensive jihad, hence aren’t really exceptions at all; the mainstream “moderate” Islamism of the Muslim Brotherhood does include many ulama). The effect of the colonialist and neo-colonialist destruction of traditional Islamic institutions has had the effect of diluting the authority of the ulama, facilitating such radical ideologies, which are un-Islamic and opposed to the norms of the Shari‘ah (53).

Conclusion

Is Spencer correct in his assertion that “all -- not just one, or a few, but all -- the orthodox sects and schools of Islamic jurisprudence teach that it is part of the responsibility of the Islamic community to wage war against unbelievers and subjugate them under the rule of Islamic law”? When all the evidence is objectively analysed such a conclusion is easily dismissed as essentialist and ignorant. The view presumes that Islam cannot authentically embrace such notions as mutual recognition and peaceful coexistence. Rather, a survey of the divergent and multiple views throughout Islamic intellectual and political history reveals that these were always possibilities and often actualised realities.

Summary

1. The jurists in the early period (700-1100 AD) were divided on the nature of jihad, the majority favouring the view that peace and mutual cooperation should define the Muslim government’s relationship with the other, with only one strain of Shafi‘ite thought teaching the obligation of military jihad against unbelievers because of their unbelief for the purpose of conversion or conquest (the reason for this lack of clarity in early discourse on jihad was the lack of interest in the topic of jus ad bellum); eventually, however, in the eleventh century al-Shafi‘i’s view became accepted as the general consensus amongst the various schools of jurisprudence because of internal and external dynamics underlying legal thought on Islamic international relations

2. After the eleventh century following Sarakhsi’s acceptance of al-Shafi‘i’s paradigm, the “jihad-ideology” became normative across all four schools, but the “permanent hudna” became a viable route for establishing permanent peace as most jurists began accepting this as permissible; in fact such a permanent truce based on mutual recognition of the king and caliph and peaceful coexistence did in fact take place in the French-Ottoman treaty of 1535

3. From the nineteenth century onward the ulama began to return to the early Maliki orientation which favoured peace as the fundamental relationship between Muslim and non-Muslim nations, the view that is now the dominant position amongst the ulama; military jihad was only meant for the purpose of defence, e.g. the jihad in Bosnia, Chechnya, Afghanistan and Palestine

4. Modern day jihadists who operate under a global terrorist movement do not operate according to the principle of Islamic expansionism (although they do embrace it) but argue for defensive jihad, and the means that they use to achieve this has been condemned by nearly all ulama, even those of their own orientation like the Salafi Al-Albani and the Wahhabi Bin Baz, who condemn suicide terrorism and targeting civilians; furthermore, none of their intellectual forebears or members are qualified ulama

5. The verses of the Qur’an do not demand an “abrogation” scheme and can easily be reconciled by using the methods of inter-textual and contextual analysis as espoused, for example, by Mahmud Shaltut (d. 1963) in al-Qur’an wa l-Qital and Muhammad Asad (d. 1992) in The Message of the Qur’an

1 link
2 Robert Spencer, Religion of Peace, p. 75
3 Alfred Guillaume, The Life of Muhammad, pp. 212-3; online in Arabic
4 Sahih Muslim
5 Sahih Muslim
6 link
7 Muhammad Khayr Haykal, Al-Jihad w’al-Qital fil-Islam (Beirut: Dar al-Bayariq, 1996), 1:893
8 quoted in Richard Bonney, Jihad: From Qur’an to Bin Laden, pg. 71
9 for references, see Muhammad Khayr Haykal, al-Jihad wa l-Qital fi l-Islam, pp. 893-4
10 Majid Khadduri, The Islamic Law of Nations, pp. 57-8
11 Ibid, p. 58
12 Sunan Abu Dawud
13 Khaled Abou El Fadl, The Use and Abuse of Holy War in Ethics and Internation Affairs, vol. 14, Issue 1 [March 2000], pp. 137-8
14 Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam, p. 45
15 Sherman Jackson, Jihad in the Modern World, Journal of Islamic Law and Culture, Spring/Summer 2002
16 Ibid, p.51
17 Khaled Abou El Fadl, “Conflict-Resolution as a Normative Value in Islamic Law – Handling Disputes with Non-Muslims” in Faith-Based Diplomacy: Trumping Realpolitik, pp. 191-2
18 Ibn al-Qayyim, Ahkam al-Dhimma
19 Ibn Qudama, al-Mughni
20 Khadduri, The Islamic Law of Nations, pp. 62-4
21 Reuven Firestone, Jihad: The Origins of Holy War in Islam, p. 64
22 ibid pp. 50-1
23 Al-Tabari, Tafsir al-Tabari
24 Rudolph Peters, Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam pp. 126-7
25 Ramadan al-Buti, al-Jihad fi l-Islam, pp. 58-62
26 Imam al-Nawawi, Sharh Sahih Muslim
27 Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed? Wael B. Hallaq, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 16, No 1 (Mar., 1984), pp. 3-41
28 ibid, pg. 4
29 Ibid, pg. 5
30 ibid, pg. 7
31 see ibid, pg. 18
32 quoted in ibid, pg. 21
33 quoted in ibid, pg. 25
34 see ibid, pg. 31
35 Islam Attracting Many Survivors of Rwanda Genocide, Washington Post
36 Peters, Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam, p. 112
37 quoted in ibid, p. 125
38 translated in Rudolph Peters’ Jihad in Medieval and Modern Islam
39 see: al-Jihad wa l-Qital fi l-Islam p. 585 onwards
40 Abd al-Wahhab Khallaf, al-Siyasat al-Shar'iyya aw Nizam al-Dawlat al-Islamiyya pp. 76-77
41 Abd al-Hafiz Abd Rabbih, Falsafat al-Jihad fi l-Islam p. 45
42 Mustafa al-Siba‘i, Ishtirakiyyat al-Islam p. 245
43 Sayyid Sabiq, Fiqh al-Sunnah, 2/613
44 Ali Ali Mansur, al-Shari'at al-Islamiyya wa l-Qanun al-Dawliyy al-Amm p. 296
45 Wahba al-Zuhayli, Athar al-Harb, pp. 113-114
46 Ramadan al-Buti, al-Jihad fi l-Islam, p. 94
47 ibid pp. 94-106
48 Peters, Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam, p. 187
49 Ibid, p. 171
50 Abdal Hakim Murad, Bombing Without Moonlight
51 Jackson, Sherman A., Domestic Terrorism in the Islamic Legal Tradition, Muslim World (Hartford, Conn.) v. 91 no3/4 (Fall 2001) p. 293-310
52 John Gray, Al-Qaeda and What it Means to be Modern (London, 2003), pp. 1-2
53 As a typical example of a traditionalist (in this case, Shafi‘i) reply to a jihadist pseudo-fatwa, see this article

Anti-Judaism in Christian Theology: Necessary or Subsidiary?

2009-12-29T13:25:00.000-08:00

[This was written for my supervisor Dr. Vittorio Montemaggi for the module "Jewish and Christian Responses to the Holocaust"]

Is Christianity Necessarily Anti-Judaic?

Introduction

When considering whether Christianity is inherently anti-Judaic, it is important to define terms. When we talk of Christianity, do we meant the early “Jesus movement” or the “people of Q” that Burton Mack speaks of? Or do we mean the normative Christian tradition of the Church Fathers that took full expression after the Bar Kokhba revolt and after the near effacement of Jewish Christians? It is clear we cannot speak of a unified early church as Paul’s writings are difficult to comprehend without envisaging an early conflict between himself and the ‘super-apostles’ of Jerusalem whose gospel should be rejected in favour of his Gospel (Gal 2). Acts 15 expresses this in more sober and temperamental terms, but nonetheless imagines a conflict between the nomian stance of James and the antinomian Pauline view with Peter perhaps in the middle. Certain scholars on early Christianity have argued a particular Jewish Christianity found within the Letter of James, the Q document, the Gospel of Thomas and the Didache represents an alternative gospel message which was in fact the dominant Jesus movement and Robert Eisenman even argues the Clementine Homilies and Recognitions is an authentic Petrine and Jamesian source wholly directed against the heretic school of Paul. It would therefore be incorrect to assume Christianity is fundamentally a religion that began in the first century BC; rather, the religious experiences and writings of the Church Fathers culminating in official edicts and creedal statements in the fourth century represent the authentic Messianic Christian movement that we may consider normative. Later disagreements between Monophysites, Nestorians and Western Christianity may be understood in light of this developed Christian tradition.

Having defined Christianity as that understood to be an evolved tradition, it is immediately recognisable how such a dynamic tradition can in fact be deconstructed to reclaim certain themes or disclaim others, in light of historical events or religious experiences which may function to direct the Church. With this in mind, I will consider the views of a radical feminist Holocaust Theologian, Rosemary Radford Ruether, who sees traditional Christianity as inherently anti-Judaic, and how such a view in fact does injustice to both the nature of doctrines and the historical and political factors that shaped the attitudes of the Church. The defining characteristic of Christianity is the messiahship of Jesus, and most historians agree Jesus claimed the title of Messiah, the awaited eschatological figure of Jewish lore. According to Ruether, Christology, or claiming Jesus as the Messiah, is inherently anti-Judaic. Ruether’s thesis however is grounded in a linear reading of the Church’s evolution and she thus ignores several key stages in the development of the adversus Judaeos tradition of the Church Fathers and finds Christianity inherently virulent to the Jewish other.

The Developing Tradition

Undeniably the canonical Gospels are hostile to Jews. Matthew attacks the Pharisees (Mt. 23) and clearly attributes the blame for the death of Jesus to the Jews (Mt. 27:25); the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews strongly condemns the cult (Hebrews 10) and explicitly endorses the better character of the Christian covenant. Ruether and some other scholars argue that the earliest examples of the adversus Judaeos literature were in the form of testimonia or ‘collections of citations from the Hebrew scriptures with some commentary appended, in which the confluence of ancient promise and Christian fulfilment and concomitant rejection of non-Christian Jews was made plain’ (Kessler, A Dictionary of Jewish-Christian Relations), but evidence for this is lacking. The first extant texts that have an adversus Judaeos character are Barnabas’s writings and more clearly Justin Martyr’s Dialogue with Trypho (c. 160). The anti-Judaic theme is seen to persist in the writings of John Chrysostom, Augustine of Hippo and Saint Jerome, and through the ages in the edicts of emperors, bishops sermons, later writings of Martin Luther and the ambivalent attitude of late theologians like Karl Barth and Karl Adam. The common themes in such literature include the invalidity and particularity of the law (especially after the destruction of the temple); the replacement of the Jewish covenant as the chosen people by the Christians, the ‘New Israel’; and expropriation of Old Testament material to vindicate Jesus’ Messiahship and his nature within a Trinitarian system. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, Hermann Strack (d. 1922) and Paul Billerbeck (d. 1932) from Germany, R Travers Herford (d. 1950) from England and GF Moore (d. 1931) from America, were Christian scholars who pioneered in the revision of traditional negative Christian attitudes toward the Pharisaic-Rabbinic tradition out of which Christianity emerged (Allan Cutler, 1967).

Jules Isaac pioneered the study of the connection between Christian thought and racial anti-Semitism. He wrote “without centuries of Christian catechism, propaganda and vituperations, the Hitlerian teachings, propaganda and vituperations would not have been possible”. Following him were James Parkes, Gregory Baum (whose later thought was heavily influenced by Ruether), Alan Davies, A Roy Eckardt and Franklin Littell, may of whom are so-called ‘Holocaust Theologians’, those who saw a ‘transcendental uniqueness’ (Ekhardt) in the Holocaust which expressed itself in a revelatory capacity to demonstrate the Church’s ‘wholesale apostasy’ (Littell) and acute responsibility to rectify its stance on the Jews. Isaac was an important influence in the creation of the Nostra Aetate, the Church’s declaration on its relationship with non-Christian religions in the Second Vatican Council, which dealt with the redefinition of the Jewish people in light of a critical reclamation of earlier untainted doctrines, of the election of Israel and its validity as a religion; as James Parkes, the accommodating Anglican theologian wrote, Judaism is “not an alternative scheme of salvation to Christianity, but a different kind of religion”.

The Question of Origins

Christology: The Ruether Thesis

In her 1974 work, Faith and Fratricide, Ruether argues “anti-Judaism is the left hand of Christology”. She asks “Is it possible to say ‘Jesus is Messiah’ without, implicitly or explicitly, at the same time saying ‘and Jews be damned’?” For her, anti-Judaism runs deeper than merely absolving Jews of the charge of deicide as in the Nostra Aetate, as, she argues, most Americans still blamed Jews: with the assertion that the cross redeems and forgives (the right hand) follows the rejection and condemnation of the Christ-killers (the left hand), hence the rejection of the Jews is inherent to the earliest forms of Christianity. There are several problems with this thesis on the origin of Christian anti-Semitism, not least of which is Ruether’s assumption that Christology grew out of a need to understand the crucifixion hence the enemies that are its perpetrators are naturally condemned. Christologies were borne out of other trajectories besides the cross like the wisdom-Christology of the early Q document and its parallel Gospel of Thomas (which may better represent Jesus’ view of himself); furthermore, some Christian theologians like Helmut Koester ‘dehistoricise’ Jesus’ death, hence the killers are themselves insignificant to the cosmic plan that unfolded. Moreover, historians of Jesus like EP Sanders, argue it was the Romans intent on killing Jesus for his threatening claim to be the ‘king of the Jews’, and indeed Jesus’ trial at the Sanhedrin does appear to be extremely out of place and may have been created as part of a later anti-Judaic polemic; hence the charge of deicide may in fact be an expressive effect of anti-Judaism and not its cause.

Ruether rightly points out “the foundations of anti-Judaic thought were laid in the New Testament”. There is a “hardening of attitudes” towards the “sons of the kingdom” (Jews) in Matthew and John’s anti-Judaism is incontestable. She argues anti-Judaism is a synoptic development (common to Matthew, Mark and Luke) which appeared within the first two decades after Jesus’ death and is critical to the Christology Paul was expounding at this time. As evidence she uses the description of the parable of the vineyard in Mark’s Gospel, the earliest of the synoptics, as paradigmatic of Jewish rejectionism and allusion to the Israelites. The allusion to the Israelites is indisputable as the elaborate description of the hedge, pit and tower in the vineyard has clear resemblances with Isaiah 5 and rejectionist rhetoric is clear from the allusion to Psalm 118. However both the elaborate description and the Psalms allusion is absent from the Gospel of Thomas which according to Stevan Davies represents a more primitive form than Mark’s Gospel, hence while maintaining a Christology, anti-Judaism may not be unavoidable. As Thomas Idinopulos writes in his critique of Ruether “We must reckon with a plurality of Christian communities and a plurality of tendencies, not all of which were anti-Judaic”.

Although Paul does develop his Christology from the cross, he does not represent an unrelenting anti-Jewish attitude as Ruether suggests. Ruether makes use of the pseudo-Pauline passage 1 Thessolonians 2:13-16 which condemns Jews as Christ-killers, prophet-killers, gentile-haters, sinners and earners of God’s wrath. Birger Pearson (1971) argues this passage is a later addition as it interrupts the flow of the text and Daly D. Schmidt (1983) argues it is an interpolation on linguistic grounds, further evidence of anti-Judaism being incorporated into later copies as opposed to being original Church doctrine. Although Paul does highlight the crucifixion as crucial to his Christology in 1 Corinthians 2, he only mentions the enemies once as ‘the rulers of this age’ (1 Cor 2:8) referring to the Romans, not the Jews.

The key passage from Romans 9-11 is similarly inconclusive. In this passage, Paul does shift attention to the Gentiles but maintains that the Torah is to be kept with the Jews: God has not abandoned the ancient covenant (Rom 9:1) and “all Israel will be saved” (11:26). Paul does consider the Jews unenlightened (Rom 10:2,3) but this does not mean the Jews are rejected, and he in fact explicitly denies this (Rom 11:1) and confirms God’s gifts and grace are irrevocable (11:29), unlike in Matthew where the rejection of the ‘sons of the Kingdom’ is complete. Ruether says for Paul Jews never knew faith or grace but it is the Gentiles of whom Paul says they “never knew God” and he boasts of his Jewishness (Phil 3:5;Rom 11:1), thinks a new righteousness has come (Romans 10:3), does not deny the law (Rom 7:12) nor the election of Jews (Rom 11:28) – like the Qumran he represented a radical Jewish sect but unlike the Qumran who hoped for the destruction of the mainstream, Paul hoped for the salvation of Israel (11:26).

The Jewish Revolt: The Partition of Church and Synagogue

Ruether ignores the critical Jewish-Roman war from 66-73 AD which according to some early writers like Origen and Eusebius was a result of the civil discord created when James the brother of Jesus was murdered by Ananus the high priest. After the destruction of the Temple in 70 AD, the Church and Synagogue were definitively divided, and the period between this and the second revolt which ended in 135 AD saw the marginalisation of Jewish Christianity, strongly indicating the Church’s reactionary effort to distance itself from Judaism and present Jesus and Christianity as pacifist, anti-Judaic and pro-Roman (James Dunn, The Parting of the Ways Between Christianity and Judaism, 1991). Luke-Acts is clearly antagonistic to Jews and Ruether attempts to use Stephen’s monologues as evidence of Paul’s anti-Judaism, but scholars are agreed all the speeches in Acts are post-70 interpolations and renditions. The second century Gospel of Peter takes this to its logical conclusion, denying Pontius Pilate’s involvement and placing blame for the crucifixion solely on the Jews.

Greco-Roman pagan anti-Semitism antedates Christian anti-Semitism which added a theological flavouring, but was not completely separate as suggested by Ruether. Greco-Roman anti-Judaism was borne out of Jewish separatism which gave the image of arrogance and also Jewish success in converting gentiles and pagan failure, especially after the Maccabean war. Pagan writers condemned Jews for misanthropy and aloofness, superstition in not eating pork, laziness in following the sabbath, atheism, ritual of animal sacrifice and circumcision, ritual murder, disobeying rational laws of the universe, many of which are reminiscent of Christian polemics against Jews. There was some Roman antipathy to Christians for separatism and proselytising as well.

Ruether suggests Hellenising influences on Judaism (e.g. in Philo) and the philosophical attraction of Jewish monotheism fostered an understanding between Jews and Romans. In contrast, she argues, Christians tended to antagonise and ghettoise Jews in a manner distinguishing Christian anti-Semitism from Roman anti-Semitism. However, in comparing the most favourable relationship between Romans and Jews and the most unfavourable relationship between Jews and Christians, she ignores the possibility that the antagonism may have arose from the separatism-isolation-ostracism-oppression dynamic as created by the historical precedent and the political climate. Christians continued this antagonism by competing in converts with Jews and in the second century (following the second Jewish revolt), because of their closeness, attempted to define itself against the Jewish ‘other’ and then from the second to the fourth century attempted to supersede Judaism and the important element here was deicide. The charge of deicide was first enunciated by Justin Martyr and repeated by Origen and Hippoclytus; it was then fiercely used as a stick with which to beat Jews by John Chrysestom who called it an ‘odious assassination’ for which the Jews had ‘no expiation possible, no indulgence, no pardon’. This charge of divine punishment of the Jew was the theological turning point in Jewish-Christian antagonism. The church no longer saw the need to only refute the Synagogue but actively repelled them and gave the Romans a theological justification for their persecution. From Church-Synagogue rivalry an anti-Judaic theology seems an expected outcome (which then devolved into a widespread anti-Semitism in the fourth century) but it is “not some fateful, inner logic of Christology itself” (Idinopulos).

Problems with Holocaust Theology

Holocaust Theology suffers from many flaws, which draws from its excesses in affirming Christian culpability for anti-Semitic crimes. Holocaust Theologian Paul van Buren in Discerning the Way follows Irving Greenberg and Norman Perrin in considering revelation as being reinterpretations of tradition under the pressure of reorienting events in Jewish history; hence the Holocaust and the birth of the State of Israel are revelatory indicated by the ‘radical reversal’ in the Vatican (1965), Pastoral Council to the Catholic Church in Netherlands (1970), French Bishops’ Committee (1973), Faith and Order Commission of the World Council od Churches (1967), the US National Council of Bishops (1975) and the Synod of the Reformed Church in Netherlands (1970). The theologising of Jews as a ‘mirror’ for Christian reflection is not new to Holocaust Theology but whereas pre-Holocaust theology made use of the ‘Jewish mirror’ as a sign of God’s judgement on Israel for its rejection of the truth, post-Holocaust used it as a sign of God’s judgement on the church for the truth in Israel. This new form of theology undoubtedly renders invaluable service in exposing the ‘moral bankruptcy’ of the absolute denial of Christian culpability by Evangelical writers like Stephen Davis. However, its purposes can be self-defeating in its absolutist uncritical interpretations of history and politics. It, for instance, displays uniform support for Israel, which for Eckardt represents a redemptive ‘resurrection’ of the Israelite people after the Nazi destruction, a non-eschatological ‘restorationist’ view. This has meant minimising Palestinian suffering even while writing in full knowledge of how ideas justify suffering. The Palestinians, ethnically cleansed in 1948 and massacred in multitudes as in the Sabra and Shatila incident of 1982, are ‘invisible’ (Stephen Haynes) to Holocaust Theologians. When Ruether, a prominent Holocaust Theologian, unconventionally criticised Israel’s policies in The Wrath of Jonah, she was attacked by Franklin Littell and others as being a cultural anti-Semite, unhistorical, irresponsible and faddish. Littell perhaps best represents this trend of ‘compensatory philosemitism’ (Dieter Kraft) as he attempted to maintain Reinhold Niebuhr’s legacy in a post-1967 world when many liberal Christians lost trust in Israel after the Six Day War exposed the deception of a defenceless victimised Israel in need of external support.

More dangerous to their cause, Holocaust Theologians are characterised by a rhetoric of continuity between Christian anti-Judaism and the Nazi Holocaust in ways that are unnuanced and historically problematic. Littell wrote “the cornerstone of Christian anti-Semitism is the superseding or displacement myth...[which] already rings with a genocidal note”; Eckardt remarked “the holocaust shows the final message of Christian anti-Semitism”; and James Parkes wrote “there is no break in the line which leads from the denigration of Judaism in the formative period of Christian history, from the exclusion of Jews from civic equality in the period of the church’s first triumph in the fourth century, through the horrors of the Middle Ages, to the Death Camps of Hitler in our own day”. Although to a lesser degree to other Holocaust Theologians, Ruether also displays a rhetoric of continuity. In his critique of Ruether the Jewish historian Yosef Yerushalmi writes “From Rosemary Ruether we gather that genocide against the Jews was an inexorable consequence of Christian theological thinking. I do not think that is quite the case”. Although Jews were condemned in Christendom, there was an element of ‘preservation’ in Christian theology that was never quite genocidal; furthermore, a rhetoric of continuity ignores the effects of modernity and the lost war in generating Nazism’s fascist and racist ideologies. Hence, although Christian anti-Judaism was necessary, it is not a sufficient explanation for the Nazi genocide (Roth and Rubenstein).

In ways that lack empathy with real theological beliefs of the common populace, Holocaust Theologians propose untenable reinterpretations of what it means to be Christian, in order to compensate for pre-Holocaust anti-Judaism. Ruether, for example, proposes that Christians like the Jews should accept a proleptic ‘unfulfilled messianism’ as expressed in the Second Coming, as opposed to present salvation which would relativise Christianity and divest it of its imperialistic tendencies. However, if anti-Judaism is rooted more in political and historical conditions and only secondarily in theology which is more ‘expression’ than ‘cause’, then we have reason to reject Ruether’s constructive theology. Ruether’s limited form of Christology dismisses the irreducible central historical claim of Christianity of Creation, Redemption and Coming Kingdom into one unintelligible and unrecognisable to any Christian denomination; it is ‘a case of stopping the disease by shooting the patient’ (Idinopulos). Ruether overestimates the doctrinal effect on anti-Semitic belief and underestimates the experiential realities of core doctrines which cannot simply be undone (as expressed in the writings of Friedrich Schleiermacher). Other attempts in, for example, creating two functional covenants are equally elusive.

Conclusion

As Idinopulos writes ‘both the New Testament canon and the history of the early church show that the conjoining of the confession of Jesus Christ and the condemnation of Jews came about as the initially competitive, eventually combatitive relationship between church and synagogue. The source of Christian anti-Judaism is not Christian thinking per se but the political purpose to which it is put’. Theology cannot undo history. What is required is getting rid of prejudicial characterisations of Judaism as ‘Pharisaism’ or ‘legalism’ and ‘old’; and acknowledging Judaism as an independent tradition. In other words, what is needed is not better theology but better deeds as expressed in institutional edicts, liturgies and catechisms.

Bibliography

Rosemary Radford Ruether, Faith and Fratricide, 1974
Rosemary Radford Ruether, To Change the World, 1981
Arthur Zannoni, Jews and Christians Speak of Jesus, 1994
EP Sanders, The Historical Figure of Jesus, 1993
Charlotte Klein, Anti-Judaism in Christian Theology, 1978
Stephen Haynes, Christian Holocaust Theology: A Critical Reassessment, 1994
Thomas Idinopulos, Is Christology Inherently Anti-Semitic? 1977
Burton Mack, The Lost Gospel, 1994

Evolution and Theology

2009-12-29T13:11:00.000-08:00

[The essay was written with Christian theology in mind but can, I think, apply to any theology. Although the essay assumes Darwinian evolution is the correct scientific explanation for all of life's diversity, I do not hold to this view]

Essay Title: Does Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection pose any problems for theology?

Charles Darwin (1809-1882) was a nineteenth century British naturalist whose theory on the species problem published in his two well known works The Origin of Species (1859) and The Descent of Man (1871) would change the discourse of biological sciences. His influence on biology was profound not because of the originality of his ideas but because of the intense empirical rubric it was structured under and the particular scientific synthetic activity he was undertaking. Darwin’s ideas were set in the background mostly of Cuvier’s comparative anatomy and palaeontology, Lyell’s geology, Malthus’ population theory, Lamarck’s evolution of acquired characteristics, Humboldt’s naturalism (biogeography and ecology), and Linnaeus’ taxonomy. He transformed the species problem within biology from fanciful speculations into rigorous science as Lyell had done with geology. Not a field of biology was left untouched by Darwin’s ideas, of which the modern synthesis is particularly indicative. Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection is best described as a meta-theory under which the biological sciences operate, although the specific workings of the theory itself have given rise to an independent study of evolutionary science.

Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection became widely accepted by the first half of the 20th century when the Darwinian revolution gained exceptional momentum as a result of the modern synthesis. Evolution or the transmutation of species became widely accepted in the latter half of the nineteenth century but many remained sceptical of the Darwinian mechanism of natural selection. Willaim Thomson (Lord Kelvin) (d. 1907) using calculations from the cooling process of the earth’s crust showed the age of the earth was much younger than what Darwin’s mechanism would predict and Fleeming Jenkins (d. 1885) showed how a blending/duplication mechanism of hereditary was incompatible with Darwinism. The revival of Mendelian genetics later proved hereditary to be particulate and Lord Kelvin’s calculations were shown to be erroneous. Early Mendelian genetics however was considered an alternative to Darwinism; genetic macromutations were responsible for the emergence of new species, and natural selection played a small role in creativity. This was maintained till the 1940s by the German geneticist Goldschmidt. It wasn’t until the 1920s with men like JBS Haldane, Sewall Wright and Harold Fisher that a true synthesis between Darwinian natural selection and Mendelian genetics took place. The resulting science was called “neo-Darwinism”. By the latter half of the twentieth century Darwinism became commonplace and a generally accepted scientific theory, and individuals like John Maynard Smith and Ernst Mary were particularly important in transporting Darwinism into a postmodern context.

Darwinian evolution, the most commonly accepted of the “theories of evolution” (Mayr), certainly raises some theological concerns, as was apparent in the religious crisis of the nineteenth century. The theoretical aspect of Darwinian evolution touches on elements of creation, theodicy, metaphysics, ethics and man’s place in nature, all of which are important topics of theology.
In his study of the post-Darwinian controversies, James R Moore sought to eliminate the commonly conceived “camps” of rationalistic Darwinians and dogmatic anti-Darwinian religious people and successfully falsified Huxley’s, White’s and Draper’s conflict or war thesis. Moore created his own “camps” as a more historically sound method of classifying theological and scientific thought in the nineteenth century. Darwin’s opponents were certainly not always theologians; Richard Owen and Louis Agassiz are cases in point. James Moore camps Christians into “anti-Darwinians”, “Darwinists” and “Darwinians”. He shows anti-Darwinians were generally motivated not by religion but philosophical ideas incorporated into religion, particularly the Baconian inductive method and Platonic essentialism or typology expressed in John Ray’s and Linnaeus’ taxonomies. Darwinists, on the other hand, were liberal theologians like Henry Drummond, who created their own caricature of Darwinism to support their theology. In illustrating his “theological paradox” Moore showed how genuine Darwinians were in fact orthodox Calvinists like Asa Gray and Fredrick Wright. David Hollinger shows Moore’s documentation to be selective, and it is perhaps more likely that both the “conflict” model and the inverse “confirmation” model presented by Moore are both historically inaccurate and the religious reaction was more complex than what either model suggest.

Metaphysics and Materialism

Does Darwin’s theory of evolution rule out God? A major ingredient of Darwin’s theory is its intrinsic naturalism, that nature is self-sustained and all material effects including life have naturalistic explanations. This particular scientific method, “methodological naturalism”, has sustained science since the beginning of the twentieth century. Supernatural elements were successfully ruled out and science became a holistic explanation of nature. This “autonomous view of nature” though congruent with most conservative Christian viewpoints has led many to consider Darwinism synonymous with atheism or at least in favour of it. If, as with William Paley in Natural Philosophy and his teleological argument from biology, God can no longer be discerned from creation God becomes superfluous and an unnecessary contrivance. This is how Charles Hodge (d. 1878), the famed Calvinist and his protégé Robert Watts (d. 1895), both professors at the Princeton Theological Seminary, saw it. However it seems Charles Hodge was predisposed to being antagonistic to science, as Herbert Hovenkamp remarked “Hodge was particularly paranoid about science”, and this was perhaps a result of the increased antagonism of Christianity by scientists like John Tyndall. Nonetheless Hodge grasped Darwinism well and it was what he saw as the inherent naturalism of Darwinism which was opposed to orthodox Christianity. In his What is Darwinism? Hodge explains the very use of “natural” in natural selection as “antithetical to supernatural” and thereby Darwin intends to exclude design and final causes (purpose). For Hodge those Darwinian Christians like Asa Gray, were not Darwinians at all for they had not comprehended the “antiteleological nature” of the theory.

Was Charles Hodge correct in asserting that Darwinism was atheistic in that it was an attempt at pushing out God as an explanation? Darwinism undoubtedly constituted a physical theory that had to compete with the contesting idea of “special creation” or “independent creation” hence was constructed as a response to the prevailing supernaturalist view of creation. In this context, it is unsurprising that Darwin chose to emphasise the “naturalness” of his theory, but this obviously does not mean that design and purpose cannot be imposed on the self-contained Darwinian process itself although Darwin himself never acquiesced to this view.

More recently biologist Richard Dawkins (b. 1940) has expressed the view that Darwinism is congenial to atheism: “Darwin made it possible to be an intellectually fulfilled atheist”. It seems, however, that Dawkins approves of Darwinism as the only plausible explanation by eliminating “doomed rivals”. This approach, by which he showed Lamarckism cannot explain the immense variation and creationism postulates an unexplained creator, is philosophical and arguably fallacious. Dawkins at one stage does not only say that God is superfluous but that we cannot invoke God as an explanation because it is “lazy” and creates an unexplained explanation. Elsewhere Dawkins suggests that a sudden appearance of disparate organisms certainly implies creation or “divine intervention” which begs the question why a simpler explanation or one that does not require the explanation of a creator, such as random molecular rearrangement, is not invoked? Dawkins is not only arguing for a deductive evidential support for Darwinism, but its uniqueness in being capable of explaining the diversity of life, and this appears to be primarily motivated by a philosophical adherence to materialism.

Both Hodge and Dawkins are correct to the extent that Darwinism is purely naturalistic and eliminates God as an explanation in biology. That being said, Darwinism as a purely theoretical discipline does not make any assumptions about God and as Darwin wrote “I see no good reason why the views given in this volume [The Origin of Species] should shock the religious feeling of anyone”. The reason for hostility to religion on the part of Darwin’s supporters like Huxley and Spencer was a wider concern for scientific autonomy and removal of ecclesiastical authority. Darwinism worked as a catalyst to this process as it certainly did implicate on the philosophy of religion if not on religion itself.

Finally, Darwin in The Descent of Man suggests religion may be a social phenomenon favoured by natural selection for its survival value. Reducing religion to a psychological and social phenomenon has become common in sociobiology in the works of men like EO Wilson, Richard Alenander and Richard Dawkins. The latter considers religion and God a mass “delusion” which once served an explanatory function but is now obsolete. Though this discipline has been severely criticised on scientific and empirical grounds, it assigns no truth-value to religion. Science itself may be described as an enterprise which humanity are predisposed to for the aid of their survival, but that would not make science any less true.

Creation and Teleology

If God is unnecessary in creation how is that tied with a personal God interested in our salvation, and how does God’s providential action take part in creation? Furthermore Darwin showed the evolutionary process to be inherently random, unpredictable hence indeterminate. How does that square with purpose and teleology? In fact evolutionary theory is part of a common trend in scientific thought displaying indeterminacy as an essential quality of the both the micro and macro world in quantum indeterminacy and the unpredictable initial conditions in chaos theory, respectively.

Ian Barbour listed several theological options as to God’s involvement in the world. Owen Thomas however considered only neo-Thomism and process theology genuinely adequate as they alone give a philosophically satisfying and coherent account of how both divine and creaturely agents are fully active in one unified event. In the philosophy of Thomas Aquinis God is primary and essential agent who works through participatory or secondary agents. Whereas in Thomism God does this voluntarily, process theology imposes on God a persuasive as opposed to coercive attribute which lures creation to a desired end. For neo-Thomists the unpredictability and randomness of evolution represents a loving risk-taking God who grants freedom in nature beyond the laws that govern it prefiguring the ultimate free creature “created” in God’s image.

Although there is no scriptural reason to adhere to an absolute omnipotence, a more conservative reading of theology would imply God’s involvement in creation as a ruler to a kingdom. Some Christians therefore found it difficult to adjust their theology to Darwinism. As James Moore has shown it is for this indeterminate nature of Darwinism that liberal theologians felt obliged to accept a more Lamarckian approach to evolution attributing “directivity” or a “resident force” in organisms allowing them to respond adaptively to the environment creating a linear development in evolution. More recently however, Simon Conway Morris has attempted to show patterns or convergences in the various “routes of evolution” making it more predictable than it would appear from the immense possibilities inherent in evolution. Critics, like Richard Lenski, have shown Conway Morris’ science to be selective (concentrating on convergence and ignoring divergence) and theologically motivated.

Creation-scientists like Henry Morris and Duane Gish, who accept a literal reading of the bible, disregard various elements of physical and biological science that makes their position implausible. A recent movement in America, the intelligent design movement, accepts the basic empirical data surrounding modern evolutionary theory: the earth is 4.5 billion years old, life began some 3.8 billion years ago and gradually emerged in more complex forms. Transmutation or the idea of a continuum between species is for “design theorists” plausible but not a necessary conclusion of the facts. More significant however, is the notion that the facts themselves point to a remarkable functional complexity in biological design that points to the “directed contingency” (choice) of an intelligent designer. The theological implications of this theory are far-reaching as it combines an evolutionary framework that embraces the supporting data but interprets it to show teleology and purpose in nature.

Theodicy

Theodicy is an important consideration since it was a result of revulsion at the cruelty of nature that led Darwin to become an agnostic. The famous “ichneumon wasps” that drove Darwin away from the notion of a beneficent God, and other examples of “nature red in tooth and claw” require a theological explanation. For modern Darwinians, suffering is but a by-product of genes “striving” to get themselves passed on to future generations. And if genes are so uncaring about suffering then may we not conclude as with Dawkins the universe “has precisely the properties we should expect if there is at bottom no design, no purpose, no evil and no good, nothing but blind pitiless indifference”? Religion traditionally answered evil by invoking man’s inherent predisposition to bad and justified it by a salvific redemptive theology and eschatology. But now we know the origin of suffering as a natural adaptation what value do these explanations hold?

Theologian John Haught argues “suffering” as a biological adaptive by-product may have been sufficiently explained by biology but the affective content of suffering is not reducible to adaptation and suffering has therefore not been fundamentally explained. However, from a theological standpoint theodicy, the need to justify evil in the universe must now be extended to nonhuman suffering. Liberal theologians have tended to add value to the “temporal suffering” as Minot Savage put it. The Scottish theologian Henry Drummond considered struggle a method of improvement and Fredrick Temple saw imperfections part of the great cosmic design contained within the “perpetual progress” in evolution. Although new ways of wording this response has emerged, the principle response to evil remains the same: that evil is a consequence of man’s fallen nature or that temporal evil is not evil at all as it is a smaller part in the cosmic plan.

Ethics

Two elements of Darwin’s theory, one with its roots in Darwin and the other Darwinistic as opposed to genuinely Darwinian raise ethical concerns for Christian theology. Sociobiology, the study of how social behaviour evolved in animals to favour their survival, is generally considered antithetical to religion since with Wilson our actions are reduced to “genetically influenced behavioural predispositions” and this contrasts the egoism inherent in this analysis and the self-sacrifice valorised by religion. Evolutionary biologists like Stephen Jay Gould have strong reservations about sociobiology as a genuine Darwinian subdiscipline. Gould, though non-religious, believes religion and science occupies different “domains”, one descriptive and the other prescriptive, which is why he considers ethics and morals fundamentally non-scientific. Many theologians like Stephen Pope, nonetheless, have attempted to appropriate Christian ethics into a sociobiological framework. He distinguishes four levels at which a particular behaviour can be considered: 1. The stated reason, 2. The conscious decision, 3. The unconscious intention, 4. The biological drive (instinct). Pope suggests sociobiology considers human nature at the level of desire and instinct, why a particular behaviour evolved to hold survival value, which correspond to levels 3 and 4, whereas Christian altruism and ethics is associated primarily with the second level of a conscious decision to help another without the ulterior motive of “reciprocity”.
Social Darwinism was invented by Darwin’s contemporary Herbert Spencer before the production of The Origin of Species. It was based on a Lamarckian understanding of “linear progress” (whereas Darwin envisioned a more “bush-like” tree of life) and incorporated progressivism into a social philosophy. Ernst Haeckel was probably responsible for transporting social Darwinism to Germany. The “struggle” in social Darwinism and the subjugation of the weak is opposed to Christian morals. Social Darwinism was more a potent cause of rejecting Darwinism itself though it had little if anything to do with Darwin, and is therefore largely irrelevant as to how the science would pose problems for theology.

Man’s Place in Nature

A difficulty with Darwin’s theory is the continuity of man with other organisms and their organic as opposed to godly nature. Many religious contemporaries of Darwin including Darwin’s greatest supporter in America Asa Gray did not accept human evolution. The anatomist Richard Owen and critic of Darwin rejected man’s evolution on the basis of his dissimilarity with other species. St George Mivart who attempted to harmonise teleology, typology (essentialism) and transmutation posited a direct and immediate creation of a rational soul in every human, similar to the Popes’ views. For Henry Beecher however evolution itself created a gulf between man and other species allowing man to become in the image of God. The concept of imago dei however is itself inert, as it has historically been given multiple meanings, including simply a capacity to communicate with God (Augustine).

Conclusion

As shown earlier, atheism is certainly not a conclusion of Darwinism. Darwinism doesn’t exclude God from existence. It just doesn’t posit God as an explanation in biology and the transmutation of species. Apart from this consideration, I think Darwinism does direct theological discussions in various topics but as to crediting or discrediting theology, Darwinism is mostly neutral except with regards to using a teleological argument to prove God.

Theology is not an immutable discipline but depends strongly on interpretive and scholarly discourse. God’s revelation can be understood in multiple ways and ultimately science with its constrained naturalism cannot interfere with the notion of God as a self-subsisting Being on whom creation is contingent. Theology when reduced to this metaphysical claim about the nature of reality and God becomes easily reconcilable with biological evolution as understood by orthodox science. However, difficulties do arise when introducing corollary philosophical, metaphysical and naturalistic claims that were shaped by human civilisations in their attempt to understand God and the causal relationship between God and creation.

Bibliography

The Blind Watchmaker, Richard Dawkins
The Post-Darwinian Controversies, James Moore (and review by David Hollinger)
The Origin of Species, Charles Darwin
An Evolving Dialogue: Theological and Scientific Perspectives on Evolution, James Miller
Evolution as Religion, Mary Midgley
Life’s Solution, Simon Conway Morris
Darwin’s Black Box, Michael Behe

On the Origins of Modern Science

2009-12-29T12:20:00.000-08:00

[This is an essay I wrote nearly a year ago for one of the theology modules (Theology and Science) I took at Cambridge University - my supervisor for this module was Dr Philip Luscombe who enjoyed and praised the essay (although he disagreed on some points, like the Nazis produced good science) - I reproduce it here without any changes. I may put up other essays I wrote for this course in later posts]

Essay Title:Why did science as we know it emerge in the Christian West?

Introduction

In some ways the question of why science as we know it arose in the west is a tautology, much like ‘why are tubes hollow’? Most proponents of the view that a distinctly ‘modern science’ arose in the west “whether consciously or not, look at science in our day and assign the term ‘modern’ to that science without defining modernity, relying only on the sheer fact that it is contemporaneous with us. They then ask which leading centres produced this ‘modern’ science and find them in Europe and, by extension, the United States, or what is ambiguously called the West. From there, it becomes easy to jump to the conclusion that modern science is Western science. Thus, all other cultures, no matter where they are located and at what point in their history they are ‘captured’, if they may be ‘captured’ at all, could not possibly contain the roots of modern science, nor allow modern science to develop, by the mere fact that they are not Western cultures” (George Saliba, 1999).

It is in this vein that we can delineate between what A Rupert Hall calls ‘externalist’ explanations in modern historiography of science and ‘internalist’ explanations. Externalist explanations look for changing sociological and cultural moods that directly or indirectly impact the production of science. Internalist explanations, on the other hand, find a continuity of ideas transported through history, hence the factor of time appeals more than does sociology. On the extreme end, externalist explanations dissociate completely the situation from the past, in effect equating sociology to the science it creates: “sociological history provides principles sufficing to explain that crucial event, the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century” (Hall caricaturing the Merton-Weber thesis).

An additional concept in which to frame these explanations is what AI Sabra (Harvard historian) calls reductionism and precursorism in the ‘kinematic’ approach to the transmission of scientific knowledge. Reuctionism he defines as “the view that the achievements of [previous] scientists were merely a reflection, sometimes faded, sometimes bright, of earlier examples. Precursorism is equally familiar: it reads the future into the past, with a sense of elation”. Sabra, of course, believes both of these to be extremes and seeks a ‘happy medium’. Externalist explanations function within a reductionist kinematics and have found most favour amongst historians of science, albeit not to the extremity of Robert Merton, since modern science is considered a unique break from past science and only a shift in the mood of the practitioners of science could enable this (e.g. H Floris Cohen, 1994). On the other hand, recent investigations of the last few decades has laid the foundations for a new historiography, in that enough empirical evidence has accumulated to produce a Kuhnian shift in modern historiography although there exists “a resistance by the mainstream of Western historians in acknowledging this influence” (Ahmad Y Hassan). Proponents of a reductionist methodology do persist, like Peter Hodgson (2005) and Sune Engelbrektson (1994) who “[jump] from Ptolemy (d. 150) to Copernicus (d. 1543) without even blinking” (Saliba). More common, however, is the view that there was some kind of continuity with medieval science that provided the roots or the foundations to ‘modern science’ but a truly distinct scientific endeavour in the early modern period was underway (e.g. James Hannam, 2008; Christopher Kaiser, 1991). I believe this controversy over methodology can be resolved by considering the empirical evidence which has for a long period been mostly neglected or relegated to a lesser role.

What is modern science?

Most historians equate modern science with the European scientific revolution of the 16th and 17th centuries (e.g. Butterfield, 1997). This seems to entail the coeval nature of early modernity as a historical period and modern science as an intellectual achievement. However, in order to qualify the view that modern science is discontinuous with the past, a singularity or break from earlier science must be proposed. Since it is widely accepted western science advanced greatly during this period, a Eurocentric view of the world would project this advance on all other civilisations. Furthermore, those current within the ‘revolution’, like Francis Bacon (d. 1626) believed themselves to be revolutionaries, inventing a totalising system of knowing and subjugating the world. Alexander Koyre (d. 1964), an influential historian of science and an important mentor of the celebrated Thomas Kuhn, also considered this period a scientific revolution. Hence in order to support the notion of a truly distinct modern science a particularity of that science must be identified. It is this pursuit of a singularity that has governed much of modern historiography of science. As suggested earlier, some sought to find externalist explanations, metascientific and metaphysical assumptions of that age (in particular within theological reforms), that would assist scientific progress; others considered the economic and political policies as a direct or indirect cause. However, explanans are only required when explanandums exist. Certainly true is that ‘Western’ science experienced a revolution of some sort but to suggest science itself underwent a dramatic temporal change would require an honest study of earlier science and knowledge transmitted from other cultures.

Rather than considering changes in social structure during that period a concept much closer to home would shed light on the definition of science, that is, not the assumptions of science, but the foundations on which it functions. In other words, the epistemological foundations of science during the revolution or a method of scientific activity that produced authentic knowledge could better be used as a sound measure of ‘modern science’. Historians and philosophers of science are acutely aware of the epistemological foundations of modern science which can be summarised as acquired knowledge founded on experience and observation, with a particular importance given to the experimental method, informed by theories argued for in strict terms of mathematical and logical procedures (induction and deduction) and by a healthy attitude of scepticism and questioning of authority (Gutas, 2002). Many aspects of these ‘methods of enquiry’ were thought to be fundamental (and unique) to the scientific revolution, for example Boyle (d.1691) is famous for his use and support of experimentation and Francis Bacon (d. 1626) was unreservedly critical of the inherited Aristotelian “science”. If this method of enquiry is found within a particular circumstance it constitutes modern science. By equating modern science with its epistemological foundations, the undesirable circularity in previous historiography is done away with since we can now objectively judge which elements of science are present or absent within scientific activities throughout time and whether an objective modern science ever existed before Bacon, Galileo and Kepler.

Reductionism v. Precursorism

A valuable way of characterising the two extremes of reductionism and precursorism is as the stagnancy thesis and the continuity thesis. Stagnancy or a static scientific enterprise favours a reductionist model whereas continuity, where past ideas not only feed into later developments but also are in some way their cause, favours to some degree precursorism. Empirical evidence can add weight to either stagnancy or continuity, depending on how often discontinuities and breaks from past science arose. The more regular ‘revolutions’ we find, the more support we have for the continuity thesis. In the following I will briefly consider the failure of recent externalist explanations for ‘modern science’, in particular that of Robert K Merton and more recently Toby E Huff. Next, I will argue the best interpretation of the data is a disjunction of science from the web of culture, society, language, and nationality; rather a continuity of ideas based on the common epistemological basis of true science as outlined above transcended these boundaries to create science as we know it today beginning from the tenth century AD. The discussion will centre around three prominent individuals involved in the interpretation of the history of science: Robert K Merton, Toby Huff and George Saliba in ascending history.

Towards a New Historiography

According to Robert K Merton’s thesis which he developed in the 50s and 60s, English Puritianism and Prussian Pietism, two similar branches of the Protestant Reformation, gave rise to the scientific revolution. Max Weber, the celebrated ‘father of comparative religion’, also made the same observation. Robert Merton based his thesis on two grounds: that ‘value-orientation’, or Protestant ethics, corresponds strongly with the assumptions and motives of science and secondly that there is a statistical relationship between practitioners of science during the revolution and ascetic Protestantism. The values generally proposed to have been the motivators for science are the belief that nature is essentially good and has the potential to reveal God’s glory; the rationality of the universe and the ethical nature of social welfare or utilitarianism. Merton adduces writings from Boyle, John Ray and Francis Bacon (who had a puritan mother) as support for these elements within their science. In sum, empiricism and utilitarianism as elements of ‘value-integration’ between science and theology were proposed. As empirical evidence, Merton showed there was a statistical bias of puritans in the Royal Society, as evidenced in the writings of Thomas Sprat, and among scientists in general. For the German Pietists, Merton proposed Francke as an ideal example of Pietistic rationalism that advanced science within the leading centre of German learning in the seventeenth century, the University of Halle.

In some sense, as sociologist George Becker observed, Merton’s thesis is unfalsifiable as it assumes an indirect ‘value-integration’ of Puritan ethics and modern science, which fits any empirical data. This may account for why Merton refused to recant his theory in spite of later evidence shown to him. Nonetheless, Merton did use empirical evidence to support his case which was later shown to have been over selective and in some instances false (George Becker, 1984). Becker demonstrated that the very standard of Pietistic rationalism Merton used, Francke, was opposed to Christian Wolff a leading enlightenment rationalist on the basis that it would distract from religion. Furthermore, most Protestants reformers, Calvin and Luther included, were ambivalent, circumspect or even hostile to science. Nor was English Puritanism entirely hospitable to science: Richard Baxter and John Cotten, tended to be highly critical of science as an endangerment to Christianity. It is true however that Puritanism did support the harmony of religion and science as demonstrated by the similitude of the two books of God gaining increasing popularity in the seventeenth century, but this did not exceed that of other denominations including Catholicism. Merton, strangely, extends Puritanism to include other groups like Anglicanism, Quakerism and Presbyterianism. It seems therefore, the increased European emphasis on science was not restricted to one particular sociological influence and was perhaps unconnected to sociology. It may have been that the particular period in history itself was conducive to the new western science. Medieval western science was hindered by the same Franckian attitude of the seventeenth century of holding science subservient to religion and not on par or separate from it. From the conflicting attitudes of medieval theologians Siger, Albertus Magnus, Aquinas and Bonaventure as to the relationship between Aristotelian science transmitted in the 12th century into the Latin west, only Magnus’s attitude provided some scope for the ideological laissez-faire required for the advancement of science but that did not seem to have been very popular.

Beginning from the 80s and 90s, a greater appreciation for non-western science (mostly Chinese and Arabic science), began. The earlier approach of viewing early science under the framework of ‘modern science’ and the projection of Western history on other cultures provided only a truncated description of these activities. Since this approach was challenged and the science of earlier civilisations was studied for its own sake, our knowledge of their influence grew rapidly. In 1993 Toby Huff’s The Rise of Early Modern Science was published, which attempted to explain in the light of new data why modern science arose in the west. Huff provided new evidence from historians of Arabic science Otto Neugebaur, Edward Kennedy, Noel Swerdlow, Harner and most prominently George Saliba that Copernicus may have not only been prefigured centuries earlier but indeed had borrowed much of his learning from Arabic sources. Huff as well as Joseph Needham in his Grand Titration also popularised the importance of Chinese science. Both Huff and Needham, however, saw the need to answer specifically the question of why modern science arose in the west. Both Needham and Huff take it as a given that science arose specifically in the west, and based on that assumption they attempt to show reasons why it did not arise in Arabic and Chinese cultures. It is in this vein, that AC Graham observed “It is not altogether easy to break the habit of thinking of history as blindly groping toward a goal that the West alone was clever enough to reach”. In his review of Huff’s work Saliba aptly reveals the defunct nature of such a premise: “Although superficially quite reasonable and legitimate, this manner of formulating the question of why modern science arose in the West, rather than in culture ‘X’ or ‘Y’, hides further theoretical pitfalls. Chief among them is the circularity embedded in this kind of argumentation. For, in order to answer the question, one must exhibit yet another culture, ‘Z’, that followed the same route as the West―whatever that route may have been―and managed to produce modern science in the same way that the West did. Otherwise, the argument quickly collapses.” Saliba demonstrates this circularity in the quote provided in the opening paragraph of this essay. Huff seeks externalist sociological and political explanations for the rise of modern science and attempts to find a combination of these factors present in the west absent elsewhere. Such a methodology has obvious flaws, least of which is ignoring the question of what exactly constitutes ‘modern science’. Saliba also shows that some of Huff’s sociological explanations like “science is especially the natural enemy of authoritarian regimes” fail in the light of the light of empirical evidence, for instance the tremendous achievements of the Nazi and Soviet regimes in the most technically sophisticated sciences.

In the following I will attempt to defend Saliba’s continuity thesis. In doing so, two premises must be confirmed, that the scientific revolution of the west was largely a result of input from elsewhere (just like the medieval flourishing of the 12th and 13th centuries) and that earlier scientists were practicing science in our sense of the term. Saliba does not demonstrate the latter although others like Dimitri Gutas (2002) and AI Sabra (1987, 1996) do.

Avenues of Transfer

George Saliba’s present work involves finding connections between Renaissance and Arabic science. He argues three 19th century assumptions must now be done away with: first, that Arabic science was merely a preservation of Greek learning; second, that the transport of Arabic science into the Latin west ended in the thirteenth century and third, that Renaissance science was discontinuous and was an attempt to regain the sciences of antiquity. His work essentially involves proving wrong the second assumption and consequently concluding the third is false. As Saliba observes “When we learn, for example, that the most innovative mathematical and astronomical ideas that were employed during the European Renaissance were themselves borrowed from Islamic/Arabic or Chinese civilizations through many circuitous routes that are now being investigated, then one is forced to ask about the very roots of modern science and whether they should be placed within the parameters of Western culture or the other cultures where those innovative ideas originated”.

Circumstantial evidence of transfer is not sufficient evidence to support foreign influence. Saliba investigated manuscripts in European libraries published during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries which were translations or commentaries of Arabic texts. For example, Saliba found a translation of Alhazen’s (d. 1040) Elevation of the Pole published in 1543. One of Rhazes’ (d. 925) works was translated in London in 1766 which provided a distinction between measles and small pox, unknown to the Greeks. Andrea Alpago retranslated Avicenna’s renowned Canon in the sixteenth century and significantly he translated works by Ibn al-Nafis (d. 1288). Ibn al-Nafis was the first to propose pulmonary circulation (before William Harvey) and the first to theorise connections between veins and arteries (prefiguring Malpighi) in his polemic against Galenic and Avicennan physiology. It was about the time of Alpago’s translations that Severtus also proposed the view of pulmonary circulation (as opposed to the Galenic “irrigation” and “pulsation” model) apparently for theological reasons; this appears to have been a direct influence of Ibn al-Nafis. Later Columbus and Harvey either directly or indirectly relied on Ibn al-Nafis to further advance this model.

George Saliba’s research before finding these links was as a historian of Arabic astronomy, and as such he and others during the 60s, 70s and 80s found direct links between Copernicus and Arabic astronomers from the Maragha Observatory in Iran. The planetary and lunar models in contrast to Ptolemy’s which Copernicus identified had been taken from al-Tusi (d. 1274), Mu’ayyad al-Din al-Urdi (1266) and Ibn al-Shatir (1375). Copernicus’ proof for the ‘Tusi couple’ used the exact designators of the Latin alphabet as did Tusi in Arabic, indicating Copernicus had some access to al-Tusi. Saliba argues Copernicus’ source had been the French translator Guillaume Postel (d. 1581). Copernicus’ originality was not his heliocentricism but the anti-Ptolemaic empirically-based mathemetised models of planetary motion. Heliocentricism did not have any evidentiary value until gravity was discovered a century later; instead it seems to have been a philosophical manoeuvre on Copernicus’ part borrowing from the old Neoplatonic model. The mathematical modification required of Copernicus after the Maragha discoveries was merely inversing a vector (see: Saliba, 1998).

Other historians of Arabic science like Ahmad Y Hassan and Donald Routledge Hill demonstrate the extensive range of technological and scientific transfer during this period across Spain, Sicily, Italy, Toledo and Byzantium. Arabic was a compulsory part of the curriculum in Italy until the seventeenth century. Mehmet Bayrakdar also showed during the 80s how Darwin was linked to a precursor of the 9th century. Although this link had been suggested before (e.g. in Der Darwinismus im X und XIX Jahrhundert of Fr. Dieterici (Leipzig, 1878)), we now know with some certainty some of the intermediate links. Al-Jahiz (d. 870), although not the first to produce a theory of the transmutation of species, provided the most complete empirically-based theory of evolution at that time in his Book of Animals, which borrowed extensively from the zoology of al-Asma‘i (d. 831). Al-Jahiz advanced survival of the fittest and natural selection as the force guiding evolution; although instead of mutations within DNA, he suggested God’s direct intervention or the Lamarckian inheritance of acquired characteristics were responsible for novel variation (Darwin himself was unaware of the cause of increased variation). Bayrakdar presents some works of Al-Jahiz’s students which contained copious amounts of information from The Book of Animals which were translated in seventeenth century Europe by Abraham Echellensis and D’Herblot which influenced Darwin’s direct precursors. Dawud al-Antaki (d. 1600) may have been an important taxonomist who influenced C. Linnaeus. Ibn Khaldun (d. 1332) a fourteenth century sociologist (and Yvest Lacostes’ words “If Thucydides is the inventor of history, Ibn Khaldun introduces history as a science”) was being discussed during the seventeenth century by d’Herblot and had proposed many economic and sociological theories before Adam Smith and Karl Marx (for example, the labour theory of value). Joseph Schumpeter, the famed economist, considered Ibn Khaldun the closest forerunner to modern economics. Many other examples exist of not only theorising “later” developments but indirectly influencing those developments; these examples include: the correct explanation of the rainbow (Kamal al-Din al-Farisi before Kepler), Newton’s laws of motion (Alhazen, Biruni and Avicenna before Newton), uniformitarianism in geology (Avicenna before Hutton and Lyell) and optics (Alhazen before Newton). In fact, serious historians of science believe a revolution in optics, physics and experimental psychology occurred in the eleventh century (AI Sabra and Omar Khaleefa), while a revolution in astronomy in the Maragha school occurred during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries (George Saliba).

Delimiting Modern Science

Though the above is evidently not extensive and more examples can be adduced as empirical support for the continuity thesis, we must ask if what the earlier scholars were doing can actually be called science, and if a different type of activity began in the modern period, for if this is not addressed we may be engaging in anachronism. Although most scientists in the medieval west and the early modern period saw science as an ancillary to theology, many Arabic scientists appear to have had truly scientific interests, although some can be found to have had similar interests to the medieval theologians of the West. The tenth century Biruni explicitly confirmed that his science was not impeded by his religious convictions unlike “the Indians” and Ahmad Dallal (Georgetown University) observes Qur’anic commentators assisted the advancement of science by “assigning it to a separate and autonomous realm of its own”.

Dimitri Gutas wrote in his conclusion to surveying the activities of some Arabic scientists: “Tallying the results, it is possible to distinguish between the [Arabic] scholars whose purposes and methods were scientific even in our sense of the term [e.g. Ibn Yunus, Biruni, Alhazen, Ibn al-Shatir, Shirazi and al-Tusi], and those who had other aims - personal, theological etc. [e.g. Fakhraddin al-Razi]. In the former case - and these are the scholars we should be investigating - we see that their epistemological foundation was not very different from that of scientists everywhere: applied science resting on experience and observation - and we even get hints that they understood the basics of the experimental method - informed by a theory that was argued for in strict terms of mathematical and logical procedures and by a healthy attitude of skepticism and questioning of authority...The great advances of Arabic science could not be explained in any other way” [emphasis mine]. Both Biruni and Alhazen introduced scientific methods that involved experimentation and peer-review. Alhazen himself was very keen on the experimental faculty and experimented widely on lenses, mirrors, reflection and refraction and is widely acclaimed as the inventor of the pinhole camera. As such, I think we can accurately conclude as did Bradley Steffens (2006) that Alhazen was the first true scientist and modern science began at the turn of the first Christian millennium.

The real question that requires explaining is not why modern science arose in the west but why production of scientific knowledge occurs in some places at the expense of others. Why was the leading culture of science from the eighth to the sixteenth century the Islamic civilisation, and why was it the west from the sixteenth century? Both George Saliba and Dimitri Gutas argue economical affluence of a state invariably results in the immediate production of science: “The immense influx of resources following the ‘discovery’ of the New World at the end of the fifteenth century, the subsequent Age of Discovery and ensuing colonial and imperial adventures almost certainly enriched European courts to an exceptional degree and permitted them to patronize European scientists, artists, philosophers and so on at an unprecedented level” (Saliba). Gutas does, however, suggest that the ideological laissez-faire of Sunni Islam as compared to the medieval west allowed for the advancement of science; the Islamic civilisation harboured scientists from various religious backgrounds and even atheism (e.g. the celebrated Rhazes (d. 925) was an atheist and the physician Hunayn b. Ishaq (d. 873) was a Christian).

Conclusion

The nature of scientific activity is familiar, but its motivating factors are not completely certain to the modern historian of science. Hence I think we can successfully distinguish between what is science on epistemological grounds and once delineated we may consider common sociological themes in climates that produced science. These themes seem to have been correctly identified with economy and state policy on freedom of thought.

Although the above situates modern science under an epistemological framework, it may just as well be presented under the framework of institution, autonomy and sociological impact. The nineteenth century created a new environment for science, giving it a new autonomy. This was the result of the efforts of men like Charles Lyell, Charles Darwin, Thomas Huxley, John Tyndall, and of course the simplistic conflict thesis created by Draper and White. But science as a process did not change. Nonetheless its sociological impact and authority did. As Gutas observes “In [the] climate [of Arabic science], scientific "truths" would have no more authoritative voice, within society as a whole, than any other view championed by whatever group, scientific or not. And not only common people, but also rulers and the elite would have no reason to embrace scientific truth more than anybody else's truth other than considerations of expediency or self-interest”. I believe the authoritativeness of science, propelled by rhetoric and the sheer prowess of empiricism, to be the cause of the massive acceleration of science during the twentieth century; and as such a good argument can be made for ‘modern science’ having begun during the nineteenth century, although I think science is better described as an activity or process than as a global truth initiative.

Selective Bibliography

H Floris Cohen, The Scientific Revolution: A Historiographical Inquiry, 1994
Herbert Butterfield, The Origins of Modern Science, 1997
James Hannam, God’s Philosophers: How the Medieval World Laid the Foundations of Modern Science, 2008
CA Russell, Science and Religious Beliefs, 1973 (Esp. Chapters by Robert Merton and A Rupert Hall)
George Becker, Pietism and Science: A Critique of Robert K. Merton's Hypothesis, 1984
Peter Hodgson, Theology and Modern Physics, 2005
Christopher Kaiser, Creation and the History of Science, 1991
JH Brooke, Science and Religion
George Saliba, Rethinking the Roots of Modern Science: Arabic Manuscripts in European Libraries, 1998
Seeking the Origins of Modern Science? 1999
Dimitri Gutas, Comments of the Epistemological Foundations of Medieval Arabic Science, 2002
AI Sabra, The Appropriation and Subsequent Naturalisation of Greek Science in Medieval Islam, 1987
Situating Arabic Science: Locality Versus Essence, 1996
Mehmet Bayrakdar, Al-Jahiz and the Rise of Biological Evolutionism, 1983
Omar Khaleefa, Who Is the Founder of Psychophysics and Experimental Psychology? 2008
Ahmad Dallal, The Search for a Qur’anic Paradigm of Science, 2007
John West, Ibn al-Nafis, the Pulmonary Circulation and the Islamic Golden Age, 2008
Ahmad Y Hassan, Transfer of Islamic Technology to the West, 2005

The Case for the Muslim Christ

2009-12-07T08:17:00.000-08:00

The major points on which Christianity deviates from the continuity between Judaism, Jewish Christianity and Islam are on the matters of the law, the deification of Jesus (hence departure from true monotheism) and the doctrine of salvation by atonement through the blood of Christ. In the brief analysis below Jesus and the developing Church will be evaluated in order to buttress the Qur’anic view of Jesus. In arguing the following points a strong case can be made that the Islamic conception of Jesus and the early followers is far closer to theological truth and the findings of modern scholarship than most mainstream Christian views. [The points following the Arabic numerals will outline the main arguments; points following the Roman numerals are for supporting evidence; and quotations in the bullet points are to highlight the Qur’anic view in light of the case/s being argued]. As a prelude, it should be remembered the authorship of the four Gospels are unknown, although they are attributed to the four Evangelists after whom the Gospels are named; the following assumes Markan priority and that John’s Gospel followed a different and independent tradition to the synoptic gospels.

1. Jesus followed the law fully and commanded it be followed to its very last detail (Matthew 5:19-20). In fact he asked his followers to be more stringent about the law than the Pharisees that preached it (Matthew 5:20, 23:1-2). Evidence indicating he broke dietary, cleanliness and Sabbath laws are misplaced or misrepresented. As The New Jerome Biblical Commentary states “In historical fact Jesus did not abolish the ceremonial law as such, since otherwise the struggles of the early church recorded in Galatians, Acts 10 and 15 would be unintelligible” (p. 658).

i. EP Sanders wrote “[Does] Jesus [oppose] the law? The short answer is that he does not: rather, he requires a stricter code of practice” (Sanders, The Historical Figure of Jesus, p. 210); he makes the case that Evangelists in their attempt to create a Gentile-friendly caricature of Jesus read violations of the law into his life which are not historical

ii. Sanders writes “The only candidate to be a substantial transgression [of the Law] is plucking grain on the Sabbath. Plucking is an intentional act, and someone who wanted to demonstrate that the Sabbath laws should be broken might have harvested food on that day. This, however, is the very case Jesus defends as being justified by unusual circumstance. A defence based on mitigating circumstance grants that the law is valid, and it reveals that the action was not an instance of opposition to the law.” (ibid, p. 215)

iii. In response to the Gospel claim that Jesus broke the law of hand washing, Sanders writes “Hand washing was a Pharisaic tradition, not a law. In Jesus’ day, it was not even a uniform tradition” (ibid, p. 219)

iv. It was only Mark that interpreted Jesus’ sayings in a way to mean food laws were suspended by Jesus, but later disputes in the early church and the disagreement with Mark found in the other gospels prove that this is Markan “retrojection” and not an accurate interpretation of Jesus’ saying (see Sanders, pp. 218-223)

2. Jesus preached salvation through loving and believing in the One God, in keeping the commandments and in following him (see Mark 10:17-31 and Mark 12:28-34). This is better described as the “Gospel” (Evangel/injil/good news) that he preached, since the gospel was preached before his supposed death and resurrection as the glad tidings given to those obedient to him and who suppress their desires (Mark 8:34-6). After preaching a life of righteousness and poverty, Jesus said he had completed his mission on earth (John 17:4), and this was before the attempt at his life.

i. The Christian view of salvation, which derived not from Jesus but from Paul, lacks both mercy and justice. It lacks mercy because it comes far too late in human history and is stuffed into a singular moment so reduces the salvific potential of earlier peoples, and it lacks real justice as some interpretations of the atonement (the early substitution or ransom theories) imply an innocent man is punished for the crimes of others.

ii. Some Reformation theologians like Fausto Socinus and George Blandrata believed in the “moral example” theory of atonement in which Jesus displayed complete surrender to God’s will and suffered as a result; this view is a common theme in Muslim understandings of Prophets and pious people, and is perhaps what should in fact be learnt from the story. Some martyrs in Islamic history like Imam Husain and Mansur al-Hallaj have become iconic as Islamic passion narratives although they do not have the same kind of salvific purport of Jesus’ suffering –they are archetypal martyr figures and represent a subjective redemption for their followers, not an objective redemptive sacrifice; a “subjective” view of atonement in this sense is a theologically viable position.

iii. Jesus’ parable of the prodigal son (Luke 15:11-32) proves there is a bilateral relationship between man and God and third parties are not objectively and ultimately part of this relationship. Jesus’ teaching that we should pray for our sins to be forgiven as we forgive each other (Matthew 6:12) shows God’s forgiveness is His own pejorative and He does not require a sacrifice to forgive, but just as we may forgiven and overlook our fellow man’s transgressions against us, God can do the same. Jesus teaching shows he is following the Jewish (and Islamic view) that God’s forgiveness is dependant on a repentant heart to which God will turn to in mercy. In the Old Testament, Ezekiel 18 illustrates this well: the wicked man will be forgiven if he turns away from his wickedness and lives a life of righteousness, and no man can be blamed for the sin of the other for “the soul who sins will die”.

• The Qur’an tells Christians to follow the Evangel (5:47) which may be summarised as Jesus’ teaching “Be conscious of God and follow me” (3:50), and that Jesus “confirmed the Law that came before him” (5:46)

• With regards to salvation, the Qur’an teaches that “those who believe in God, and hold fast to Him [by doing righteous works], soon will He admit them to mercy and grace from Himself, and guide them to Himself by a straight way (i.e. to salvation)” (4:175)

• Muslims practice a yearly sacrifice to commemorate Abraham’s devotion to God in order to re-enact his willingness to sacrifice his son; for this reason, the Qur’an sets down the criterion for acceptance of a sacrifice: “It is not their meat nor their blood, that reaches God: it is your devotion that reaches Him: He has thus made them subject to you, that ye may glorify God for His Guidance to you and proclaim the good news to all who do right” (22:37)

3. After the crucifixion, Pilate was surprised to have heard Jesus was dead as the time was considerably short (six hours) (Mk 15:44) and most probably the “first deception” mentioned in Matthew 27:64 refers to the uncertainty of Jesus’ death:

i. Jesus did not die from the usual process of death by crucifixion which takes several days (haemorrhage and dehydration resulting in hypovolaemic shock) as he was taken down after only a few hours

ii. Nor did he die from the method the Jews recommended, asphyxiation by losing the support of his legs by breaking them, as Jesus’ legs were not broken unlike the two others crucified along with him, since he was believed to be already dead; thus there is no clarity as to what caused Jesus’ death

iii. The drink given to Jesus may have been part of the Jewish tradition of giving a sedative drink (wine mixed with myrrh) to one who is condemned to death before he expires: “the one departing to be put to death was given a piece of incense in a cup of wine to help him fall asleep” (Sanh. 43a) – the drink may have included opium (from the poppy widespread in Palestine) which has an anaesthetic, sedative, narcotic and breath inhibiting effect all consistent with Jesus’ reaction to the drink

iv. The word used for spear thrust in John 19:34 is nyssein which as Raymond Brown explains in fact means a “scratch” not a forceful thrust or penetration; in fact, the sudden gush of blood from the small wound on the side proves Jesus was alive as corpses do not bleed except a small trickle of blood that falls downward (Origen knew this but thought the bleeding was a miracle)

v. When Jesus was taken down from the cross, Josephus a Jew who sympathised with Jesus, was given the task of burying him; he was wrapped in linen cloth and a huge quantity of aloe and myrrh were used (John 19:39) – aloe and myrrh in this quantity can only be explained if it was used to treat his wounds and for antisepsis, since such large quantities were not used for embalmment; furthermore Lazarus’ burial described in John’s Gospel differs significantly from Jesus’ (see Ruqaiyyah Waris Maqsood, The Mysteries of Jesus, pp. 185-6)

vi. The events surrounding Jesus supposed death therefore invite scepticism. Even modern scholarship is not sure what caused his death, hence EP Sanders asks in Paul: A Short Introduction “how do you know he was really dead?” and Raymond Brown recognised that crucifixion pierced no vital organ (The Death of the Messiah), so we cannot say for certain that he died on the cross. As the Qur’an says “they did not kill him for certain” (4:157).

4. The better explanation is that he was saved from death given the above information and a large number of facts:

i. Jesus preached the temple of his body will be restored after three days in reference to the scriptures (John 2:18-22), probably alluding to Hosea 6 which is about a wounded man recuperating after three days, not resurrection

ii. Jesus’ call on the crucifix alluding to the Psalmist’s cry (22) is about a man despised and pierced who is eventually rescued by God from the point of death – the passage does not refer to resurrection

iii. The sign of Jonah (e.g. Matthew 12:40) describes Jesus’ miracle as akin to Jonah’s residence in the belly of the fish. Clearly the duration does not provide a connection for the analogy, as Jesus was in the tomb for two days and two nights, not three days and three nights as was Jonah. Nor is the specific place of confinement the resemblance. The resemblance is best understood as the miracle of being saved from almost certain death in a closed confinement – if this is not the case, there would be little resemblance between these two events.

iv. The crucifixion happened outside Jerusalem and Jesus said he could not die outside Jerusalem (Lk 13:33) and thus it logically follows he did not die on the cross

v. Jesus’ prayer to be saved from death was accepted by God (e.g. Hebrews 5:7), just as Jonah’s prayer (Jonah 2:1-2) was accepted

vi. There is evidence based on the language in the document known as Q and in the Gospel of Mark that the early followers of Jesus believed Jesus was alive and was vindicated by his assumption (elevation) into heaven not by resurrection (see Revisiting the Empty Tomb: The Post-Mortem Vindication of Jesus in Mark and Q, Daniel A. Smith, Novum Testamentum, Vol. 45, Fasc. 2 (Apr. 2003), pp. 123-137)

vii. “It is quite obvious,” wrote Raymond Brown, “that the Gospels do not agree as to where and to whom Jesus appeared after his resurrection.” “Just as the Jerusalem tradition leaves little or no room for subsequent Galilean appearances,” he says, “the Galilean narratives seem to rule out any prior appearances of Jesus to the Twelve in Jerusalem.” Citing immense textual evidence, he then declares his disapproval of the simple solution to the contradiction (that Jesus first appeared to the Twelve in Jerusalem and then in Galilee) and concludes “Variations in place and time may stem in part from the evangelists themselves who are trying to fit the account of an appearance into a consecutive narrative.” Brown makes clear that the post-resurrection appearance accounts are creative, substantially non-historical attempts to reconstruct events never witnessed by their respective authors. In any case, the disciples may well have preached he was “alive” not necessarily that he was “resurrected”. The group that focused on the “resurrection” were not the original disciples of Jesus but those concentrated in Antioch from which the tradition in 1 Corinthians 15 emerged. However, it may be possible Jesus’ disciples saw Jesus “alive” after he came out of the tomb; the late Gospel of Peter has an interesting passage in which Jesus came out the tomb with two helpers on his side, perhaps an indication he was still recovering

viii. Paul was stoned and believed to be dead but he immediately rose and walked away (Acts 14:19-20) which proves that someone may have been believed to be dead but was in actual fact alive

ix. Josephus records the case of a man crucified for ten days who did survive after being brought down, which proves it can and did happen

• The Qur’an says (literal translations) “The (Jews) plotted (against Jesus) and God planned and God is the best of planners; when God said to Jesus: I will cause you to swoon and raise you to Myself, and purify you from those who rejected (you). And (I will) make those who followed you above those who rejected (you) at the Day of Resurrection” (3:54-5); the Arabic word “tawaffa” (translated here as “cause to swoon”) is used elsewhere in the Qur’an to mean both “sleep/unconsciousness” and “death” (39:42), but in the context of the verse quoted next it would seem “unconsciousness” is the best interpretation here – hence Jesus’ unconscious state, (resuscitation) and eventual assumption can be understood from this verse

• The Qur’an says “And (some Jews) said: ‘truly we killed (the Messiah) Jesus son of Mary (the Messenger of God)’. (But) they killed him not nor did they crucify him to death, but it was made obscure to them. And indeed those that dispute over this are in doubt concerning it. No knowledge have they but the pursuit of conjecture. And they did not kill him for certain. Rather, God raised him to himself, and God is Mighty (and) Wise” (Qur’an 4:157). “Crucify to death” is one of the meanings of the Arabic “salb” and this kind of repetition where a previous word is made more specific is not uncommon in the Qur’an e.g. “His angels…and Gabriel and Michael” (2:98) and “fruits and palms and pomegranates” (55:68). The word "shubbiha" which most interpreters translated as “was made to appear” also has the meaning, in the passive form that it is in, of “to be doubtful, dubious, uncertain, obscure” (Hans Wehr, A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic, p. 453); this latter translation is better suited in the context and there is no evidence to favour either from the Qur’an itself or the words of the Prophet. Hence the better understanding of the Qur’anic text (as opposed to how some classical commentators understood it) and the Biblical material is that Jesus was put on the pole but did not die as a result, (and was later vindicated by being raised into Heaven)

5. The Jerusalem mother-church was led by James the brother of Jesus who followed the law, was hostile to gentiles and favoured an ascetic life. There is no evidence he preached a resurrection-redemption theology of salvation, although he may have been part of the early Jesus movement that believed in Christ’s vindication through assumption into heaven and preached that he was “alive” (not “resurrected”). James is marginalised in the canonical gospels, but recent scholarship shows he was an ardent follower of Jesus with the aforementioned attributes (see Just James by John Painter).

i. The previously held assumptions that James was a nonbeliever (John 7:3-5, Mark 3:21, 31-35); became a believer after the resurrection (1 Corinthians 15:7); he took over from Peter when Peter ran away (Acts 12:17), are based on evidence that are “flimsy” (Painter, p. 13), and the Gospel evidence proves he was in fact a follower and believer in Jesus and the tradition proves he was the first head of the Jerusalem church not Peter

• The Qur’an says the true believers of Jesus were initially dominant (61:14) perhaps referring to the early church

6. Paul contested the exclusiveness of the Jesus-faith, was influenced by some Antioch “Christians” who preached a different version of the Jesus-faith (hence were expelled from Jerusalem), rejected the law and preached a resurrection-redemption theology of salvation; hence there were clashes between the Pauline Church and the Jerusalem Jamesian Church (Galatians 2, Acts 15); Paul in fact warns against following the “super-apostles” (presumably James and his community) and says his gospel is different to theirs (Galatians 1:6-8) who “preach another Jesus” (1 Corinthians 11:4-5) – it appears the Galatians and the Corinthians followed James’ teachings hence why Paul attempted to divert them back from the “confusion” “some people” created in their minds by “perverting” the gospel (Galatians 1:7)

7. The following texts add support to this very early divergence between the Antioch Greek-speaking Christians and the Aramaic speaking Jewish followers of Jesus in Jerusalem (like James):

i. The Gospel of Thomas: Stevan Davies argues this was written as early as 50 AD as its teachings are more primitive than Matthew and Mark and it contains many parallels to its contemporary gospel Q. Although it was found amongst Gnostic texts in Nag Hammadi it contains less Gnostic language than does the Gospel of John. We know that many gospels floated around before the Evangelists wrote (Luke 1:1) and this may have been one of them; this gospel is peculiar for its “wisdom Christology” where Jesus’ nature as Christ is understood to be his earthly mission to convey the wisdom God taught him, similar to how Muslims understand Jesus as Messiah/Christ; it does not have a passion narrative and its emphasis is on Jesus’ parables and the coming Kingdom of God

ii. Q is one of the two sources used by Matthew and Luke, the other being Mark. Although there is no manuscript evidence, the remarkable degree of similarity between Matthew and Luke in those passages not contained in Mark point to another common source (from Luke 1:1 we know there were many other gospels floating around at this time that are now lost). Burton Mack, who assessed this Gospel writes it was followed by the “people of Q” who “were not Christians (as we understand the term nowadays)…They did not take his teachings as an indictment of Judaism. They did not regard his death as a divine, tragic or saving event. And they did not imagine he had been raised from the dead to rule over a transformed world. They did not gather to worship in his name, honour him as a god, or cultivate memory through hymns, prayers or rituals. They did not form a cult of the Christ such as the one that emerged among the Christian communities familiar to the readers of Paul. This discovery upsets the conventional picture of the origins of Christianity” (The Lost Gospel, pp. 4-5)

iii. The Letter of James: although not written by James as it was compiled a decade or two after his death (70-100 AD), it represents in part the thought of James which upholds the law and preaches salvation through faith and works; scholars of the Epistle do not doubt Hellenising influence from followers of Pauline thought

iv. Didache, the teachings of the Apostles, compiled around the same time as the canonical Gospels encourage obedience to the commandments, an anti-Gentile attitude and do not contain anything about the passion but emphasise Jesus’ role as a teacher and prophet

v. Clementines: Robert Eisenmann in James the Brother of Jesus believes the Clementines may have been a parallel document to Acts which worked from the same source material but with very different and perhaps more accurate conclusions; Acts reduces the significance of James (and probably even purposefully used Steven’s death as a cover-up for what was actually James’ martyrdom), whereas the Clementines embrace James’ leadership; the Clementines describe James as a “preacher” of the Messiah’s teachings and Jesus as “the one true Prophet” (Clementine Homilies 4:34-5); there is some evidence to suggest the Clementine authors were hostile to Paul

8. Eventually the Hellenistic Christianity of Paul that desemiticised and (partially) deified Jesus won favour (although not to the extent of, say, Marcion and the Gnostics) as the church attempted to distance itself from Judaism after the revolts of 67-73 AD and 135 AD (Jews and Christians: The Parting of the Ways, 1999, James Dunn), but during this time there were Jewish Christians who followed a Jamesian pattern of Christianity and not a Pauline one

i. Islam returned to the original (Jewish) teachings of Jesus and the early followers. This has been attested to by many scholars. For example, The New Jerome Biblical Commentary writes parts of Matthew’s Gospel “reflect the outlook of Jewish Christianity, which, as a separate movement, was eventually defeated by Paulinism [churches influenced by Paul] and died out, perhaps to be reborn in a different form as Islam.” (p. 641)

ii. Hans Kung wrote “the traditional and historical parallels between Judaic Christianity and Islam are inescapable” (Christianity and the World Religions, p. 124)

iii. Noticing the similarity between early Jewish Christianity and Islam, Robert Eisenman suggests that some Jamesian groups proscribed by the later church may have dispersed into a variety of desert cults which influenced Islam (Muslims would argue, this is not necessarily the case, as it may be revelation from God simply confirmed the same original teachings of Jesus and James)

iv. James Tabor wrote “The Christianity we know from the Q source, from the letter of James, from the Didache, and some of our other surviving Jewish-Christian sources, represents a version of the Jesus faith that can actually unite, rather than divide, Jews, Christians, and Muslims. If nothing else, the insights revealed through an understanding of the Jesus dynasty can open wide new and fruitful doors of dialogue and understanding among these three great traditions that have in the past considered their views of Jesus to be so sharply contradictory as to close off discussion” (James D. Tabor, The Jesus Dynasty, 2007, pp. 287-8)

v. Jeffrey Butz wrote “It is more than intriguing that the Muslim understanding of Jesus is very much in conformity with the first Christian orthodoxy - the original Jewish Christian understanding of Jesus" (Jeffrey J. Butz, The Brother of Jesus and the Lost Teachings of Christianity, 2005, p. 186)

9. The church argued over the nature of Jesus and upon Constantine’s conversion in 313 he resolved to create an orthodoxy. The influential Athanasius of Alexandria offered a creed of Jesus as fully man and fully God (although one person) and one of the persons of a Trinity and this became official church doctrine. However hair-splitting debates about Jesus’ nature remained as with Nestorians who argued Jesus is two persons, the eternal divine Word and the man Jesus and Monophysites who believed he is one person with a single divine nature

i. None of the ante-Nicene fathers were genuinely Trinitarian: Iraneus (d. 200) said the pre-human Jesus had a separate existence from God, and was inferior to him. Jesus was not equal to Him who was "Supreme over all" and was "the One True and only God". Clement of Alexandria (d. 215) called Jesus a "creature" whereas God was the "Uncreated and Imperishable and Only True God". The Son was not equal to the Father. Tertullian of Carthage (d. 230) taught that the Son is inferior to the Father and said "Before all things, God was Alone". Origen (d. 250) likewise said the Son and the Father were two separate essences and the son was inferior. Lucian of Antioch (d. 312) believed Jesus was not equal to God; his two leading disciples Eusebius of Nicomedia (who influenced Constantine's sister) and Arius of Libya were staunch Unitarians.

ii. Jesus never claimed to be God or divine. In fact he told a man “why do you call me good? No-one is good besides God” (Mark 10:18). James Dunn wrote “There is no real evidence in the early Jesus tradition of what could be fairly called a consciousness of divinity” (Christology in the Making, p. 60) and John Hick describes this as the present consensus (Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion, p. 136); Hick wrote “such evidence as there is, has led the historians of the period to conclude with an impressive degree of unanimity that Jesus did not claim to be God incarnate” and consequently most Christian scholars differentiate between the historical Jesus and the ecclesiastical Christ (The Metaphor of God Incarnate, p. 27). Jesus after all referred to “my God and your God” (John 20:17) akin to Jesus’ statement in the Qur’an “my Lord and your Lord” (Qur’an 3:51), which makes little sense if Jesus is God.

iii. “The title “Son of God” need not of itself be of high significance for in Jewish circles it might mean no more than the Messiah or indeed the whole Israelite nation, and in popular Hellenism there were many sons of God, meaning inspired holy men” (Michael Ramsey, Jesus and the living past, p. 43). As “son of god” was originally meant as a metaphor, Hick wrote “[In Christianity] a metaphorical son of God had become the metaphysical son of God, the second person of the Trinity” (The Metaphor of God Incarnate, pp. 44-5)

iv. Regarding one passage used as evidence to show Jesus did claim divinity, Mark 2:7, in which Jesus declared the forgiveness of an individual, EP Sanders wrote “such a pronouncement would not be regarded as blasphemy by any known Jewish law or by any known interpretation. The text does not have Jesus say ‘I forgive your sins’ but ‘your sins are forgiven’ in the passive voice. In Jesus’ culture the passive voice was used as a circumlocution for God: ‘your sins are forgiven’ means ‘they are forgiven by God’. Jesus only announces the fact, he does not take the place of God.” (Sanders, 213). Jesus is not omniscient (Matthew 24:36), nor is he omnipotent (Mark 6:5), and the trinity is illogical as a being that is fully human (in mind, body and spirit) cannot exist as fully God as their attributes are contradictory and incompatible; Paul describes a world in which there were “many gods and many lords” (1 Corinthians 8:5) so it would not be difficult for the church to divinise Jesus in a non-Jewish (or anti-Jewish) context

• The Qur’an stated a few centuries after Nicea and Chalcedon “The Messiah, son of Mary, was no other than a messenger, messengers the like of whom had passed away before him . . . O people of the Book - stress not in your religion other than the truth, and follow not the vain desires of a people who went astray before you” (5:75), “O people of the Scripture! Do not exaggerate in your religion, nor utter anything concerning God save the truth. The Messiah, Jesus son of Mary, was only a messenger of God, and His word which He conveyed unto Mary, and a spirit from Him. So believe in God and His messengers, and do not say 'Trinity'. Desist, it will be better for you. God is only One God. . . . The Messiah would never have scorned to be a slave of God” (4:171-2). Although in Islam, God has many Names and Attributes (e.g. Qur’an 17:110) He has a single essence, whereas the strongest expression of the Christian creed suggests the hypostases (persons) of the Godhead are in fact three different essences and not attributes of God so it amounts to tritheism and not the true monotheism Jesus preached as the greatest commandment

10. Jesus was sent only to the Israelites (Matthew 10:5-42, 15:24) as was Moses. The “Great Commission” is either a contradiction or a forgery – it is certainly a forgery in Mark’s Gospel (Mark 16:15). We know the Messiah was sent for the salvation of the Israelites, not all nations; it was later “followers” that disobediently changed his message and created a “Gentile mission”. Muhammad was sent to all humanity (e.g. Qur’an 7:158, 34:28). There is evidence from the Old and New Testaments that Muhammad was prophesised:

i. Ishmael will be a great nation according to Genesis (17:20). The covenant of Genesis 15:18-21 was fulfilled only by the Ishmaelites not the Israelites, and the everlasting covenant of circumcision with Ishmael and Abraham occurred before Isaac was born (Genesis 17:9-14). Though there was a covenant with Isaac too (Gen 17:15-19), Genesis 22 in calling Isaac Abraham’s only son proves itself to be a forgery and an attempt at marginalising Ishmael.

ii. Ishmael’s son Kedar became the father of the Arabs. Ishmael was half Hebrew and half African and he married into an Arab/African family (which prefigures Muhammad’s universality and message to the Gentiles). Ishmael went into the ‘wilderness of Paran’ (Gen 21:21, 16:1). The Book of Deuteronomy says “The Lord came from Sinai, and dawned on them from Seir, He shone forth from Mount Paran and he came with 10,000 saints, from his right hand came a fiery law for men” (Deuteronomy 33:2) where “shine forth” implies revelation. This appears to suggest God’s successive revelation from Egypt to Palestine to Arabia. An allusion to this succession also exists in the Qur’an (sura 95:1-3) which refers first to Palestine (Jesus) then mentions Mt Sinai and then Mecca, “the secure city”. Muhammad entered Mecca as conqueror in 630 AD in a bloodless affair with 10,000 of his pious companions and brought law to a lawless tribal society. Habbakuk speaks of “the Holy One from Paran” (Habbakuk 3:3), referring perhaps to Muhammad. Maqsood wrote “Ishmael inhabited the wilderness of Paran, where he sired the Arabian patriarch Kedar; and if the ‘sons of Kedar’ (Isaiah 50:7)received revelation from God and accepted it, and came to a divine alter to ‘glorify the house of My glory’ then surely the ‘holy one from Paran’ of Habbabuk 3:3 is none other than the Blessed Muhammad. And [the Kaba] is the house of God’s glory where the ‘flocks of Kedar’ came to bow the knee. The ‘flocks of Kedar’ have never come to the Trinitarian church, and have remained impenetrable to any influence of it” (The Mysteries of Jesus, 163)

iii. Deuteronomy 18 refers to a Prophet similar to Moses, who will speak in God’s name and must be followed. The similarity between Moses and Muhammad is also mentioned in the Qur’an (73:15), and Muhammad spoke in God’s name (the very first verse of the Qur’an is “in the name of God”), and Moses’ mission resembled Muhammad’s mission more than it did Jesus’

iv. John 14-16 mentions the mysterious Paraclete (advocate, comforter) which has come to be interpreted by the early Muslims as Muhammad. Perikyltos a close cognate of the word translates to the Arabic “Ahmad” the name of Muhammad predicted by Jesus according to the Qur’an. Since Christians believe this refers to the Holy Spirit, Maqsood writes “The words clearly show that the Comforter had to come after the departure of Jesus, and was not with him when he uttered these words. Are we to presume that Jesus was devoid of the Holy Spirit, if its coming was conditional on Jesus’ leaving? The way in which Jesus describes him makes him a human being, with a particular role to fulfil” and therefore is more indicative of Muhammad despite “Trinitarian editing” attempting to make it resemble a disembodied spirit more than a man (The Mysteries of Jesus, p. 164)

v. John the Baptist spoke of one “more powerful” than him to come according to Q (Mt 3:11, Lk 3:16) (“baptise” in the Greek does not necessarily mean placing in water but erecting, confirming and strengthening spiritually). John had a ministry parallel to Jesus indicating the Prophet he referred to was not Jesus. Jesus said after praising John in Q “the least in the Kingdom of God will be greater than John” (Lk 7:28, Mt 11:11) which is explicable only if “least” is understood as “youngest” or “last” i.e. the future and last Prophet

• “Jesus, the son of Mary, said: "O Children of Israel! I am the messenger of God (sent) to you, confirming the Law (which came) before me, and giving Glad Tidings of a Messenger to come after me, whose name shall be Ahmad (Periklytos)."” (61:6)

• “Those who follow the messenger, the unlettered Prophet, whom they find mentioned in their own (scriptures), in the Torah and the Gospel” (7:157)

Summary of the Ten Points:

1. Jesus followed the law, instructed that it be followed, and did not violate it

2. Jesus taught salvation through God’s mercy which would envelop true believers who practice good works, and although sacrifices were practiced in his day and before his time at the temple they were ritual acts of worship intended to draw nearer to God through expressing devotion to Him (i.e. they were a means and not an end in the process of atonement, as God forgives as “we forgive each other”)

3. There was confusion at Jesus’ death, as he did not die from the usual process of hypovolemic shock (as he was on the cross for only a short period) or from asphyxiation from broken legs; and his burial is complicated due to its departure from the normal account of Lazarus’ burial and the evidence suggesting an attempt was made to help him heal

4. The better theological and historical explanation, based on a large number of facts, is survival and God’s rescuing Jesus from the point of death; some evidence (from Q and Mark) suggests the early followers believed he was “alive” and assumed into Heaven (and not “resurrected”) after having witnessed him from the tomb

5. James headed the Jerusalem mother-church and held beliefs equivalent to Islam, that the law is to be upheld, salvation is contingent on faith and works, and Jesus was a Prophet of God sent as His Messiah to “the lost sheep of Israel”; although mentioned in the later Gospel of Matthew, the Great Commission is certainly a forgery in the earlier Mark, and thus its authenticity as a true saying is doubtful

6. Paul was a convert to a different form of “Christianity” practiced in Antioch which introduced Hellenistic concepts into the originally Jewish faith, so he questioned aspects of the Law, partially deified Jesus and preached a different kind of soteriology

7. The early divergence is supported by texts which do not contain a passion narrative, emphasise Jesus’ teachings and even oppose Pauline teachings directly like James, Q, Thomas, Didache and the Clementines

8. Hellenistic Pauline Christianity won out over Jewish Christianity following the separation of the church and synagogue in the aftermath of the Jewish Revolts of 67-73 AD and 135 AD

9. Dispute over Jesus’ divinity raged on after Jesus (who never thought of himself as divine) until the fourth century and an “orthodoxy” was created that was however not universally accepted e.g. by Monophysites and Nestorians

10. The Old Testament alludes to a Prophet from the brethren of Moses and one that will descend from Kedar’s children in an Arabian mountain (from Paran) bringing thousands of men with a fiery law; the New Testament limits Jesus’ universality, by saying he was sent only to the Israelites according to the earliest Gospel evidence (Mark), and limits the time of his mission by saying another “counsellor” will appear after him who will complete the message – that “Prophet” and that “Paraclete” is Muhammad

Relevant Verses of the Qur’an

1. “And in their footsteps We sent [to the Israelites] Jesus the son of Mary, confirming the Law that had come before him: We sent him the Gospel: therein was guidance and light, and confirmation of the Law that had come before him: a guidance and an admonition to those who are (God) conscious” (5:46)

2. “Those who believe in God, and hold fast to Him, soon will He admit them to mercy and grace from Himself, and guide them to Himself by a straight way” (4:175); “It is not their meat nor their blood [from the animals that are sacrificed], that reaches God: it is your devotion that reaches Him: He has thus made them subject to you, that ye may glorify God for His Guidance to you and proclaim the good news to all who do right” (22:37); “[Jesus said]: keep your duty to God and obey me” (3:50)

3. “They killed (Jesus) not, nor crucified him to death, but so it was made obscure to them, and those who differ therein are full of doubts, with no (certain) knowledge, but only conjecture to follow, for they killed him not for certain” (4:157)

4. “God raised (Jesus) up unto Himself” (4:158); “God said: "O Jesus! I will cause you to swoon and raise thee to Myself” (3:55)

5. “As said Jesus the son of Mary to the Disciples, "Who will be my helpers to (the work of) God?" Said the disciples, "We are God’s helpers!" then a portion of the Children of Israel believed, and a portion disbelieved: But We gave power to those who believed, against their enemies, and they became the ones that dominated [i.e. in the early church in Jerusalem].” (61:14)

6.-8. “O people of the Book [i.e. Christians]! exceed not in your religion the bounds (of what is proper) [by deifying Jesus and being lax about the law], trespassing beyond the truth, nor follow the vain desires of people who went wrong in times gone by [i.e. the Antioch Church and subsequent councils affirming the Pauline orientation],- who misled many, and strayed (themselves) from the even way” (5:77)

9. “O People of the Book! Commit no excesses in your religion: Nor say of God aught but the truth. Christ Jesus the son of Mary was (no more than) a messenger of God, and His Word, which He bestowed on Mary, and a spirit proceeding from Him: so believe in God and His messengers. Say not "Trinity": desist: it will be better for you: for God is one God: Glory be to Him: (far exalted is He) above having a son [in a metaphysical literal sense]. To Him belong all things in the heavens and on earth. And enough is God as a Disposer of affairs. Christ disdaineth nor to serve and worship God” (4:172-4)

10. “The unlettered Prophet, whom they find mentioned in their own (scriptures), in the Torah and the Gospel” (7:157); “Jesus, the son of Mary, said: "O Children of Israel! I am the messenger of God (sent) to you, confirming the Law (which came) before me, and giving Glad Tidings of a Messenger to come after me, whose name shall be Ahmad."” (61:6)

Further Reading

Ruqaiyyah Waris Maqsood, The Mysteries of Jesus: A Muslim Study of the Origins and Doctrines of the Christian Church, 2000

Islam's View on Salvation

2009-11-12T03:27:00.000-08:00

When Muslim scholars and laypeople alike consider the term “Islam” they often conflate the global and the local, the universal and the particular: is Islam the primordial religion of man centred on the worship of God, or is it the Muhammadan faith brought some fourteen hundred years ago? A proper reading of scripture reveals both perspectives are correct, in that Islam is the desired submission of all man, past and present, to God’s will, but also the particular manifestation in the example of the Prophet Muhammad and his community. Hence the Qur’an calls Abraham an “upright Muslim (one who submits to God) who associated not (with God)” (3:67) indicating “Islam” or submission to God is linked directly with an unrelenting monotheism. To Jews and Christians who say only they will enter heaven, the Qur’an retorts “Nay, whoever submits (aslama) his whole self to God and is a doer of good, he will get his reward with his Lord; on such shall be no fear, nor shall they grieve” (2:112), which applies generally to those pre and post-Muhammad. Other verses, however, indicate “Islam” specifically applies to the religion brought by Muhammad which involves the particular rituals of Islam, like the hajj. Qur’an 5:3 is placed amidst various verses about laws particular to Islam, and refers to “the day” (which according to traditionists was near the end of the Prophet’s life) on which God says “I am pleased with Islam as your religion”.

Hence, Islam as the universal and primordial religion of man manifests in particular ways depending on the local circumstances and temporal demands of the recipients of God’s revelations. This form of pragmatism explains the Qur’anic view of “supersession” – where particular parts of previous revelations are superseded by elements of later revelation (2:106).

When man first descended and multiplied on earth, they formed a single community worshipping God. The Qur’an says that they then differed with the truth by the direct will of God: “Mankind was but one nation, but differed (later). Had it not been for a word that went forth before from thy Lord [i.e. God’s pre-eternal will], their differences would have been settled between them” (10:19). Having foreseen this divergence, God told Adam when he sent him to earth to complete his mission as God’s viceroy (2:30) that “if, as is sure, there comes to you Guidance from me, whosoever follows My guidance, on them shall be no fear, nor shall they grieve. But those who reject Faith and belie Our Signs, they shall be companions of the Fire; they shall abide therein” (2:38-9). And guidance came, when man differed, in the form of Messengers and Books: “Mankind was one single nation [worshipping One God, then they differed], so God sent Messengers with glad tidings and warnings; and with them He sent the Book in truth, to judge between people in matters wherein they differed” (2:213). These Prophets preached the Oneness of God and total obedience to Him, rejecting all false deities and immoral practices: “We assuredly sent amongst every People a messenger, (with the Command), "Serve God (alone), and eschew Evil"” (16:36); “Not a messenger did We send before thee without this inspiration sent by Us to him: that there is no god but I; therefore worship and serve Me” (21:25) [see also 16:2]. But some inevitably rejected their message: “of the People were some whom God guided, and some on whom error became inevitably (established). So travel through the earth, and see what was the end of those who denied (the Truth).” (16:36).

This human potential to fragment and dissolute made it possible for God to bestow selectively His grace on those who accepted His guidance (although His universal mercy extends to all of creation, see Qur’an 7:156): “If thy Lord had so willed, He could have made mankind one people: but they will not cease to dispute (the truth); except those on whom thy Lord hath bestowed His Mercy: and for this did He create them” (11:118-9). As such, God tests man so He “will certainly know those who are true from those who are false” (29:3). He “hath created life and death that He may try you which of you is best in conduct; and He is the Mighty, the Forgiving” (67:2).

In so doing, God has sent many Prophets to all of humanity: “there is not a nation but a warner hath passed among them” (35:23). The hadiths recount that over a hundred thousand Prophets were sent. As an aside, Islam does not necessarily set a timeframe to this process. Although some early Muslim exegetes, like al-Tabari, influenced by Jewish and Christian accounts believed the universe to be less than ten thousand years old, there is no indication of this in the Qur’an or hadiths. The Qur’an says the heavens and earth were once united and God split them asunder (21:30) which coincides with modern understandings of the Big Bang; the Qur’an also explains the earth was spread out “after” the creation of the heavens (79:30); and that man was created from water (21:30), and was created “in the best of forms” (95:5), after many “stages” of creation (71:14). As for the length of man’s existence on earth, although the hadith do not directly mention the age of the earth, it indicates an old earth as the period between the advent of the Prophet and the final hour is prophesised to be miniscule in comparison to the age of man (Sahih al-Bukhari), putting man’s age in the range of tens of thousands of years if not hundreds of thousands.

As a result of the numerous revelations, many parallel revelations may have come. To the previous communities, each with their revealed scriptures, the Qur’an says: “To each among you have we prescribed a law and an open way. If God had so willed, He would have made you a single people, but (His plan is) to test you in what He hath given you: so strive as in a race in all virtues. The goal of you all is to God; it is He that will show you the truth of the matters in which ye dispute” (5:48). Upon the coming of Muhammad, however, the Qur’an functions as a “guardian” and “confirmation” of all previous revelations, protecting them from the forgeries of their custodians: “To thee (Muhammad) We sent the Scripture in truth, confirming the scripture[s] that came before it, and guarding them in safety: so judge between them by what God hath revealed, and follow not their vain desires, diverging from the Truth that hath come to thee” (5:48). Although many scriptures and Prophets had been sent, one family, the Israelites, are singled out in the Qur’an as being “favoured over the rest of mankind” (2:47) with “kings and prophets” (5:20). Revelation successively came to the Israelites, but they often rebelled and broke God’s laws. This succession ended with Jesus: “We gave Moses the Book and followed him up with a succession of messengers; We gave Jesus the son of Mary Clear (Signs) and strengthened him with the holy spirit.” (2:87).

Though previous Prophets were sent to their local communities, like Moses and Jesus were sent to the Israelites, Muhammad was sent to all of mankind with a universal message to confirm, correct and culminate all previous revelations: “We have not sent thee but as a universal (Messenger) to men, giving them glad tidings (of salvation), and warning them (against sin)” (34:28). All Prophets, however, in essence, preached the same: “The same religion has He established for you as that which He enjoined on Noah - which We have sent by inspiration to thee - and that which We enjoined on Abraham, Moses, and Jesus: Namely, that ye should remain steadfast in religion, and make no divisions therein: to those who worship other things than God, hard is the (way) to which thou callest them” (42:13)

As for individual salvation, man is required to remember and obey God. Each community was given a “divine law” (shir‘ah), which formed a body of moral instructions, often particular to the time. The Muhammadan law “superseded” previous laws, only insofar as it made them more suitable for a universal context. It however does not contradict previous revelations in the basic laws of worshipping God alone, respecting parents, being kind to the poor, the needy and orphans, avoiding murder, adultery and sexual immorality, and avoiding falsehood and lies (e.g. see 6:151-155, 17:23-39, 60:12, 16:90 and 4:58). Some of the minor details in dietary laws and prayer, for example, are modified. Since this “moral and ritual law” is received both in the form of God-given intuition (e.g. see 91:7-8 and 90:10) and revelation, no man is held accountable except by the most basic moral standards until the message reaches him: “Who receiveth guidance, receiveth it for his own benefit: who goeth astray doth so to his own loss: No bearer of burdens can bear the burden of another [but] We never punish until we have sent a messenger.” (17:15). The purpose of the divine law is to direct man away from a state of ignorance (jahilyya) and heedlessness (ghafla) to a state of submission to God (islam), constant remembrance (dhikr) and active awareness of Him (taqwa). The call of the Prophet is described in the Qur’an as something that “gives life” (8:24). Taqwa and dhikr are closely connected as they are the objectives of worship (e.g. see 2:21 and 20:14) and proceed from each other: “Those who have taqwa (conscious awareness of God), when a thought of evil from Satan assaults them, they remember [dhikr], when lo! they see (aright)” (7:201). Taqwa is the benchmark by which God judges man, not gender or race: “O mankind! We created you from a single (pair) of a male and a female, and made you into nations and tribes, that ye may know each other. Verily the most honoured of you in the sight of God is (he who has) the most taqwa. And God has full knowledge and is well acquainted (with all things).” (49:13). Taqwa creates a constant state of awareness and allows the individual to be confident in knowing the right from the wrong: “if you who have taqwa of God He will grant you a criterion (to judge between right and wrong)” (8:29).

Salvation is achieved by entering into the Garden in the eternal presence of God in the Afterlife: “Every soul shall have a taste of death: And only on the Day of Judgment shall you be paid your full recompense. He who is saved far from the Fire and admitted to the Garden will triumph: For the life of this world is but goods and chattels of deception.” (3:185). Admittance to the Garden is solely by God’s special grace which He reserves for those who believe and work righteousness. Islam, however, recognises man’s weakness, hence God is ever-forgiving when man sins. Salvation therefore depends on man’s eventuality and God’s concomitant grace and acceptance: “verily thy Lord, to those who do wrong in heedlessness, but who thereafter repent and make amends, thy Lord, after this, is Oft-Forgiving, Most Merciful” (16:119). This description of soteriology can also been found in the Bible. For example, in Ezekiel 18, only the individual who sins will be to blame, but after committing his wickedness if he “turns away from all the sins he has committed and keeps all (God’s) decrees and does what is just and right, he will surely live; he will not die. None of the offenses he has committed will be remembered against him” (Ezekiel 18:21-22). Contrary to some Christian criticism of this view, it is not legalistic, mechanical or irrational; but it creates an interface between total reliance on God’s grace and man’s own ability to direct that grace to himself. Although some Christians are pessimistic about man’s ability to engineer states within himself, the Church’s eventual recognition of the need for canon law and the need for obedience to some form of law demonstrates that divinely authorised moral instructions cannot be done without. In Islam, although God’s grace is the ultimate source of salvation, faith and works contribute. The Prophet Muhammad said to his companions “The deeds of anyone of you will not save you.” The companions said, “Even you, O Messenger of God?” He said, “No, even I (will not be saved), unless and until God envelops me in His mercy. Therefore, do good deeds properly, sincerely and moderately, and worship God in the forenoon and in the afternoon and during a part of the night, and always adopt a middle, moderate, regular course [i.e. do not be excessive in your works, as they are not the ultimate means to your salvation] whereby you will reach your target (salvation and the mercy of God).” (Bukhari)

Violence in Judaism, Christianity and Islam: Response to Robert Spencer

2009-10-21T14:04:00.000-07:00

Introduction

In his provocative book Religion of Peace? Why Christianity is and Islam isn’t, Robert Spencer devotes one chapter and 29 pages to buttress his belief that violence is rooted in Islam’s theology while absent in Judaism and Christianity, a contention that is most central in proving his thesis that Islam is essentially more violent than Christianity. Spencer’s chief objective in authoring his books is identifying continuity between Islamic scripture and tradition and distasteful elements of modern Muslim society, particularly violent conflict which he associates solely with the religious doctrine of jihad. The following will attempt to show Spencer’s analysis is parochial, biased, often hyperbolic and highly selective, and thus does not represent an objective examination of the facts.

In the chapter “Cherry-Picking in the Fields of the Lord” he complains that “apologists for Islam frequently claim that violent passages from the Qur’an have been “cherry-picked” from a holy book that mainly teaches peace. And almost invariably, these apologists say that the Bible is just as violent, if not more so.” (Religion of Peace, p. 59). After offering a few examples of this lamentable situation, he asks “But is all this really true? Are the Bible and the Qur’an roughly equivalent in their capacity to inspire violence?” (ibid, p. 60)

A First Look

In reading Spencer’s writings, it is difficult to pinpoint his exact argument. He conflates traditional and modern readings of scriptures with the scriptures (Qur’an and hadith) themselves, so one cannot delineate the aspect of “Islam”, whether it is the collective interpretive body or its foundational documents, which are thought to inspire violence. He similarly conflates many aspects of Judaism and Christianity in order to create the opposite impression. Both scripturally and theologically (and as will be shown, historically, too), however, it is untrue to say Islam is the more violent religion.

Starting with the primary sources of the religions, the first observation an outsider would make when comparing the Qur’an with the Bible is the retelling of Biblical stories in the Qur’an (which forms a large bulk of the Qur’an) while omitting the violent detail in the Biblical accounts. The Qur’an is slightly shorter in length to the New Testament, yet contains elements that would normally be associated with both the Old and New Testaments. For example, it speaks of the law of talion (a life for a life) in 5:45 but also says forgiveness is the preferred option (2:178, 17:33) [compare to Numbers 35:31 which does not allow forgiveness], and also asks Muslims to adopt a forgiving nature (7:199) and repay evil with goodness (41:34, 13:22).

The promise of the land of Israel to the Israelites as in Genesis 12 is also mentioned in the Qur’an (5:21-26), but no mention is made of a violent usurpation of the land in the manner described in Deuteronomy 7 and 20 involving the murder of all living things including women and children; in fact, in the Qur’anic account the promise of entering the Holy Land is coupled with an anecdote to illustrate why killing is forbidden (5:27-32). In the Qur’an, Moses discovers God at the Burning Bush, is to speak “gently” (20:44) to Pharaoh and liberate his people, receives revelation at Mt Sinai and deals with the transgressions of his people; despite this level of detail, Moses’ violent encounter with the Midianites, where he commands murder and plunder (see Numbers 31), is not mentioned. After the wall of Jericho collapsed, Joshua in the Bible commanded the murder of all living things including animals, children and women (Joshua 6:21); although Yusha bin Nun (Joshua) is mentioned in hadiths (traditions of the Prophet), this gory detail is omitted. David is mentioned in the Qur’an as one who developed ways of utilising iron, spoke to birds and sang beautiful verses (e.g. 34:10). He also kills Goliath while in Saul’s army for “were it not for God’s repelling some men by means of others, the earth would certainly be in a state of disorder; but God is Gracious to the worlds” (2:251) – in other words, he did not do it for personal gain or greed but because there was a need to disperse oppressive and tyrant forces in the world. David does not, as with the Bible, go on to murder 200 philistines with the motivation of marrying Saul’s daughter, or seduce Bathsheba and plan her husband’s death. The Qur’an’s portrayal of the Prophets is, therefore, generally peaceful, depicting them as people oppressed for their religious views, and as individuals who desperately wanted to save their people from the error of polytheism (e.g. see the parable of the three Prophets in 36:13-32); the Bible on the other hand portrays them often in the opposite light, as plunderers, murderers, lustful, and even incestuous men.

The Qur’an and hadith prescribe capital punishment only for adulterers, murderers and apostates/traitors/rebels [apostasy is often conflated in hadiths with the crime of treason and rebellion, so it is unclear exactly what “apostasy” refers to – the Prophet himself never killed a man purely for apostasy (although some Muslims did apostasise in his lifetime), and Umar the second caliph believed apostates should be confined and treated kindly but not killed – most classical jurists, however, believed apostasy was a capital crime but added various conditions allowing the punishment to be delayed in anticipation of repentance, in contrast to the other crimes of murder and adultery, indicating that the “crime” of apostasy is of a different order, perhaps not fully appreciated in pre-modern juristic discourse; for a modern nuanced discussion, see this article]. The Bible on the other hand prescribes capital punishment for touching Mt Sinai (Exodus 19:12), owning an ox that kills another (Exodus 21:29), killing a burglar after sunlight (Exodus 22:3), having intercourse with a woman in her menstruation (Leviticus 20:18), being a foreigner at a place of worship (Numbers 3:10), performing sorcery (Exodus 22:18), disobeying parents (Deuteronomy 21:20) and blaspheming (Leviticus 24:16). Such excesses are not found in the Muslim scriptures.

The usual retort would be that the Qur’an commands violence against unbelievers whereas the Bible does not. This will be dealt with below.

Worldviews

Spencer first identifies “vastly different” worldviews in Christianity and Islam. Christianity, he writes, is capable of “self-reflection and self-criticism” as it recognises “all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God” (Romans 3:23) but Islam cannot as it pits Muslims as “the best of peoples” (Qur’an 3:110) against unbelievers who are the “vilest of creatures” (Qur’an 98:6). What Spencer fails to realise in this opening argument is that he inadvertently lends credence to the “apologists” he attempts to refute, as he specifically selects passages from both the Qur’an and the New Testament that support his prejudgment, reflecting the flexibility of scriptural invocation. Both Islamic and Christian scriptures support the idea that all mankind are sinful, and both construct, if only partially, an exclusive in-group out-group mentality. The Qur’an is in fact the more inclusive text as it does not purport to supersede a particular religious community, unlike Christianity which claims to have superseded Judaism. The Qur’an, on the other hand, says “to each community is their (own) law and methodology” and to “compete in good” until “God judges between you” (5:48), although it describes the Muhammadan way as the final revealed religion which functions as a “confirmation” and “guardian” of these previous revelations. The Qur’an also confirms that not all of the Scriptuaries (Jews and Christians) are alike as some of them enjoin the good, forbid vice and recite God’s verses (3:113). Hence, the Qur’an recognises the original authenticity of the existing Jewish and Christian religions. As for exclusivisim in the New Testament, according to Paul, those “who preach another gospel” (Paul’s contemporaries who followed a different gospel message to his) are “eternally condemned” (Galatians 1:8), and “unbelievers” are “wicked” and “unclean” (1 Corinthians 16); Jesus, in the New Testament, also preached separation from unbelievers even if they happened to be family members (Matthew 10:34-6), and he told a disciple who wished to bury his father “let the dead bury the dead” (Matthew 8:22) [in contrast to this, towards the end of his mission, Muhammad encouraged Asma, a female companion, to treat her idolatrous mother kindly based on the Qur’an (60:8) (Shaih Bukhari 8:73:9)].

An analogous statement to the passage quoted from Romans, indicating all of humanity sins, is found in a hadith of the Prophet: “Every son of Adam errs, and the best from those who err are the repentant” (Jami‘ al-Tirmidhi, Sunan Ibn Maja); and the Qur'an commands man to turn in repentance to God, all together (24:31).

The Qur’anic description of “unbelievers” (kuffar) exhibits variability and does not conform to absolute readings (although absolute interpretations were often drawn); “unbelief” in the Qur’anic paradigm perhaps best refers to those who reject the truth after it has become clear to them, hence in one passage it refers to those who reject (kafaru) the truth that they recognise (2:89) and another says the unbelievers are those who “recognise God’s favour then reject it” (16:83); another verse describes them as those who continually sin knowingly until death overtakes them (4:18); the earliest reference to those who “disbelieve” (kafaru) describes them as irresponsive or heedless of warnings (2:6). On the other hand, the Qur’an contains passages with extensive dialogues with Jews, Christians and idolaters which would appear out of place if it were the case that they all fell squarely within the Qur’anic understanding of “unbelievers” (kuffar) whose “hearts are sealed” (2:7) [for a more detailed analysis, see Hamza Yusuf, Who are the Disbelievers?]. Based on this nuance in the Qur’an, al-Ghazali (d. 1111), the celebrated medieval theologian, authored a book delineating the various levels of belief and disbelief amongst humanity, entitled Faysal al-Tafriqa bayn al-Kufr wa l-Zandiqa [translated by Sherman Jackson in On the Boundaries of Theological Tolerance in Islam]. He carefully distinguished between those who received a clear explanation of the truth and those who received either a distorted version of it or didn’t receive it at all; with regards to the latter, based on the Qur’anic principle of not holding a people to account unless they received the message (e.g. 17:15), their judgment is postponed to the Afterlife.

Contra Spencer, the Qur’an in fact commands self-criticism and self-reflection: “O ye who believe! Stand out firmly for justice, as witnesses to God, even as against yourselves, or your parents, or your kin, and whether it be (against) rich or poor: for God can best protect both. Follow not the lusts (of your hearts), lest ye swerve, and if ye distort (justice) or decline to do justice, verily God is well-acquainted with all that ye do.” (4:135) It tells Muslims to “not let the hatred of others to you make you swerve to wrong and depart from justice” (5:8). Self criticism is inherent in the Qur’an’s engagement with the local circumstances of the young Muslim community. It criticises the Muslim community when it was involved in spreading a rumour, advising them to take a better course of action if the same situation was to recur (see Qur’an 24:13-23), and it criticises Muslims who failed to obey orders at the Battle of Uhud. Although honest self-criticism and self-reflection are lacking in many Muslim communities today, that is a failing of those communities and not Islam.

Jewish Views on Violence

Spencer asks “But is the Bible really enjoining violence – or capital punishment – against sinners? This question cannot be answered by an evaluation of the text alone, for it does not stand apart from the way believers have understood it and acted upon it...indeed these texts throughout history have never been taken as divine commands...All these passages are after all descriptive, not prescriptive” (Religion of Peace, pp. 64-5). The principle he outlines here, in which scripture is not to be separated from the ways it is understood, is precisely the mechanism by which he expresses his double standards: in the case of Islam, he will shift between scripture and “the way believers have understood it” freely to select the worst possible conclusion whereas he would do the opposite in the case of Christianity and Judaism.

Nonetheless, Spencer is very wrong when he claims “these texts throughout history have never been taken as divine commands” and that they are “all descriptive, not prescriptive”. The Bible commands war, and this is how Ancient Israel understood it [see Gerhard von Rad’s classic Holy War in Ancient Israel]. God promised Israel that they will conquer the land of Canaan (e.g. Genesis 17:8) or the land of Israel (e.g. Ezekiel 40:2). The war it commands in various passages is “Holy War” because God commands it (Numbers 33:50-53), and God fails the Jews when they do not listen (e.g. Num 14:44-5). The post-Biblical Maccabean Wars against the Seleucids was widely believed to be a “Holy War” in this sense – clearly the Biblical command to war (milhemot mitzvah) did not cease once the Bible was completed.

When Rome ruled the Middle East however, the Jews found it difficult to assert themselves in the Holy Land. After a series of revolts they were dealt with a blow in the Bar Kokhba incident of 135 AD, leaving hundreds of thousands of them dead and many of them enslaved and expelled from Jerusalem. It was then that the Talmudic authors for pragmatic reasons produced vows that they would not attempt to “ascend” the Holy Land and will maintain peaceful relations with the Gentile world until the Messiah comes. Maimonides (d. 1204), a major author on Halakhic commandments, however, did not include the vows in his Book of Commandments. He believed, based on verses of Deuteronomy (e.g. 7:4) indicating war was conditioned upon the removal of idolatry, that Jews must continue fighting until the Gentile world submitted, under Jewish dominion, at least to the Noachide laws. Maimonides’ commentator Nahmanides (d. 1270) believed the milhemet mitzvah (the command to war) was still operational, but by means of peaceful migration and settlement in the land of Israel.

Jewish scholar, Reuven Firestone, comments “[despite the vows] the notion of divinely commanded war…was never expunged from the repertoire of Jewish ideas” (Reuven Firestone, “Who Broke Their Vow First” in R Joseph Hoffmann, The Just War and Jihad). Maimonides is testament to that, and the Talmudic injunctions did not preclude war motivated by Messianic expectations, hence the devastating Sabbatean messianic movement (1665-6) of Sabbatai Zevi. Firestone explains that the “Zionist idea” was in fact an orthodox view that was hijacked by secularists. Orthodox Jews had to deal with the tension between the canonised laws of the vows and the scriptural command to war for the holy land. Firestone writes that “most of the earliest Zionists would be identified today as “Orthodox” Jews based on their traditional behaviours and obvious Eastern Europe Jewish culture.” He further explains that the vows were officially abolished after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war when there appeared a climate of “national messianism”. Rabbi Halevi in 1947 argued “there is no ruling (halakhah) that forbids us from establishing a Jewish state with the permission of the nations before the coming of the Redeemer…The Three Vows only have validity in relation to the nation that rules”; he thus concluded that the Palestinians had no right to that land: “[as regards] the nations that do not have power over Israel…[it] is not rebellion, but rather war, and it is not said that God made Israel swear not to make war against the nations of the world” (quoted in ibid, p. 85).

Rabbi Shelomo Goren, Rabbi of the IDF, provided several reasons why the vows have been annulled. Of these, he quoted an early authority, Rabbi Chayim Vital (d. 1620), who put a thousand year limit on the vows; he also quoted Rabbi Meir (d. 1926) who believed that the Balfour Declaration permitted Israel to “ascend” the Holy Land without breaking the vow to maintain peaceful relations with the Gentile world. Firestone concludes: “we have observed how the Talmudic sages of Rabbinic Judaism were successful for a time in removing an important but dangerous and self-destructive aspect of religion from application of the real-time of history”. The war command was however revived in the heat of the decisive international and domestic victories of Israel (e.g. in 1917, 47, 67, 73 - although 73 was a setback, the Rabbis believed it to be a Holy War fought for reclaiming Israel's Land). The valorisation of war in the foundations of the modern state of Israel and its persecution of the Palestinian people are therefore not devoid of religious and scriptural justifications. The ancient command to capture the land of Canaan is still operational in the minds of many religious Jews, and specifically those who support the modern state of Israel.

Spencer quotes mostly modern Christian interpretations of the Biblical passages that command war, and then claims “In short, the consensus view among Jews and Christians for many centuries is that unless you happen to be a Hittie, Girgashite, Amorite, Canaanite, Perizzite, Hevite or Jebusite, these biblical passages simply do not apply to you”. Having referred to Maimonides’ view above, it is clear that this is not true, and many Rabbis, classical and modern, did believe in the religious imperative of war for Israel; as regards the legal justification, for Maimonides it is the removal of idolatry, and for Ancient Israel and modern Rabbis it is the divine bestowal of that land to the Jewish people. Spencer’s assessment that “these passages are after all descriptive, not prescriptive” is therefore false both scripturally and in the way Jews have understood the passages. As will be demonstrated, this is also true of Christianity, especially in the post-reformation period.

Christian Views on Violence

Unlike the Old Testament, the New Testament does not contain any explicit command to war. However it does not follow therefore that pacifism (as with Quakers and Mennonites) was the only theological option available for Christians. As John Cadoux writes “There is a sense in which it is true to say that Jesus gave his disciples no explicit teaching on the subject of war” (John Cadoux, Early Christian Attitudes to War). Michel Desjardins concludes in his study on violence in the New Testament “[T]he New Testament sees nothing inherently wrong with the occasional use of physical violence on others if it serves an appropriate purpose” (Peace, Violence and the New Testament, p. 78). Due to its ambivalent attitude to violence and the Old Testament precedence, there was no shortage of Biblical motivation for war even in Christianity.

Jesus is in fact impressed by the faith of a centurion (Luke 7:1-10) and does not censure his occupation. The Gospels (e.g. Mark 15:39) regard highly a centurion who believed in Jesus. The Gospels record that Jesus drove out moneychangers from the temple. According to some New Testament scholars who believe Jesus was part of the revolutionary Jewish movement called Essenes, prominent among them Robert Eisenmann, this act serves as evidence of organised violence as the temple was well guarded and Jesus would have required more than just a whip to enter the temple and overturn its tables. Peter’s violence directed at a slave was not censured in Mark's Gospel, and there is sufficient proof Jesus had no qualms with carrying weapons (e.g. Luke 22:36-8). Importantly, however, the New Testament, although ambivalent about violence, does not determine “Christian view on war”; the church is far more important in this regard, and as with Judaism and Islam, there is development and divergence in Christian attitudes to war.

In Roland Bainton's authoritative Christian Attitudes to War, published in1960, he describes an evolution: initially, pacifism and non-resistance seems to have been the preferred option, although some have argued Jewish Christians were involved in the early Jewish revolts in 67-73 AD and 135 AD; but by 170 AD, a large number of the soldiers of the so-called Thundering Legion were Christians. This was frowned upon by Tertullian in On Idolatry, not because of war and killing per se but because it was a mode of participation in the material world. Clement and Origen also discouraged Christian participation in war. When Christianity became state religion, however, Ambrose (d. 397) and Augustine (d. 430) developed conceptions of “just war” for the faith. Augustine in fact urged the Roman state to fight the North African Donatist schism, based on the Gospel principle of compelle intrare (compel them to come) from Luke 14:23. Though the verse was originally intended for spiritual “compulsion”, with Augustine it became a physical and violent compulsion of heretical groups to come into true Christianity [which can be contrasted with the Qur’an’s explicit “there is no compulsion in religion” (2:256) and “If it had been thy Lord's will, they would all have believed,- all who are on earth! Wilt thou then compel mankind, against their will, to believe?!” (10:99)]. Augustine’s justification for state involvement in compelling heretics to accept “true” Christianity would become important for later Popes, most prominently Gregory I, and even lawyers like Gratian.

The Crusades represent the final stage in this development, which HEJ Cowdrey calls “total ideological warfare” (“The Genesis of the Crusades” in The Holy War by Thomas Murphy p. 9). Spencer argues elsewhere that the Crusades were justified because of earlier Muslim conquests (e.g. see The Politically Incorrect Guide to Islam), but a few things are to note: firstly, Muslim annexation of Jerusalem in 638 AD was completely peaceful: Umar I allowed Jews to re-enter Jerusalem and Jews and Christians remained the dominant religious groups in Jerusalem until the First Crusade (i.e. there was no attempt to colonise or replace the indigenous population); secondly, Latin Christendom was responsible for the Crusades, while it was Byzantium that had suffered defeat in the Muslim lands – lest it be thought these two were unified, the entire Fourth Crusade (1204) was aimed at subjecting Constantinople, the heart of Byzantium, to Latin rule (this was at the height of the “Great Schism” between the two churches); thirdly, the Christian soldiers were not motivated by defence or any events in the east, as Spencer seems to insinuate, but by a newly found religious zeal. HEJ Cowdrey writes: “Such events as the burning of the Church of the Holy Sepulchure in 1009 by the mad Caliph Hakim were few and far between, and there was no recent outrage that stirred men to the heart. Islam was by and large a tolerant religion; while subject Christians kept themselves duly humbled and paid their taxes, they were not badly off. Nor was it unduly hard for Christians from the West to make pilgrimages to Jerusalem and the other Holy Places” (The Holy War, p. 12). He explains that the Seljuks after Manzikert in 1071 receded by 1092 with the death of the last great sultan Malik Shah. The Byzantine Emperor Alexius requested some mercenaries from the West to make diplomacy better, but “Crusaders by the thousands, under independent command, spoiling for war, and whom he could not control, were not what the circumstances of Byzantium in 1095 called for” (ibid). Cowdrey thus concludes: “All things considered, historians would, I think, now be pretty generally agreed that the First Crusade, the “great stirring of the heart” in the West, was not, at root, caused by any pull of events in the East”.

Cowdrey lists four important factors that contributed to making the Crusades possible. The second and third concern us here: firstly, the knights rose in social class with the help of the clergy. In 950 AD, we see liturgical blessings of banners under which knights fought; in the eleventh century swords and weapons were blessed; various “holy wars” were sanctioned (e.g. the Spanish campaigns; wars against the Muslims of the Mediterranians approved by Pope Leo IV; Ottonian wars against the Magyars; the campaign against Normans of S Italy in 1053 sanctioned by Pope Leo IX); the councils in the tenth and eleventh century enforcing the peace and truce of God (rules of war and days when wars should not be had) indicate there was an increasing atmosphere of war. However, even in the eleventh century, soldiers were required to make penance for killing during war. This was overturned by Gregory VII (d. 1085) in what has been called a turning point in Catholic Christendom: he believed the soldier-saint (miles Christi) would be saved not in spite of but because of fighting; Paul’s spiritual soldiers for Christ, the militia Christi, was given a new earthly significance, and converts to the faith or heretics were told salvation could be had through the holy war.

The “crusading idea” at heart was ideological and merciless. It cared little for rules of war and functioned as a mechanism of Christianising the nations. James A Brundage writes of Christianity’s expansion in Europe “The expansionist wars of Carolingian and Ottonian monarchs, activities in which bishops and other prelates often figured prominently were accompanied by the conversion of conquered populations to Christianity. The role of chruchmen in these wars and the conversions that resulted from them led to an association of war with salvation; and military success was naturally ascribed to God’s pleasure in seeing the number of the faithful increased.” (ibid, p. 103). Christianity’s spread in Europe and the Americas was as much a result of compulsion and force as it was peaceful preaching, if not more. For example, Kind Olaf Tryggvason forced Christianity on much of Viken (the southern part of Norway); Charlemagne, who was crowned by Pope Leo III, forced Saxons to undergo baptisms; King Knut forcibly rooted out paganism from his dominions in Denmark; and the Brethren of the Sword, whose establishment was sanctioned by Pope Innocent III, forced Christianity on the people of Livonia; in the Americas, forced conversions and enslavement of the natives were common, and sanctioned by Pope Alexander VI’s bull Inter Caetera which instructed the “Christianisation” of the Americas. The crusading idea had some force, but this was often clothed in a rhetoric of just war for the faith. James Turner Johnson shows in his The Holy War Idea in Western and Islamic Traditions (p.53) that the “crusades” had religious motivations whereas “just war” as advanced fully by later Christian thinkers like Hugo Grotius had secular motivations.

The Crusades, however, were not the bloodiest wars of Christianity. The post-reformation era (following the fifteenth century) included a number of internal wars (The French Wars of Religion, Thirty Year War, the Dutch Revolution, the Puritan Revolution etc.) and external wars (in the Americas) with disastrous results e.g. approximately 7 million were killed in the Thirty Year War and it is probable tens of millions were killed in the Americas. Here, too, religious and theological justifications were not absent. In the following examples there is an overt use of the Old Testament in formulating a war mentality and theology. The reformation brought with it a reversal back to Old Testament ethics that were rarely in direct conflict with the New Testament.

Heinrich Bullinger (d. 1575), a Swiss reformed theologian in his collection of sermons (Decades) has an essay “On War” in which he wrote of “men who are incurable, whom the very judgement of the lord condemneth and biddeth to kill without pity or mercy”. He also wrote about correcting the “error” of Christian heresies. In both these cases he appealed to holy war in the Old Testament: for the first he used the examples of Joshua and the Amelechites and Moses and Midianites and for the second the Benjaminites. Clearly, for him these were not merely descriptive passages of an ancient historical document with no direction on how to conduct ourselves in the here and now. Bullinger concludes: “Hereunto appertain the wars that are taken in hand for the defence of true religion against idolaters and enemies of the true and catholic faith [which he of course read through Protestant lenses]. They err, that are of the opinion that no wars may be made in defence of religion” (quoted in ibid, p. 57). English Catholic William Cardinal Allen in 1583 wrote A True, Modest and Sincere Defence of English Catholiques. In it, he wrote “there is no warre in the world so just or honourable…as that which is waged for religion”. Again the Old Testament is invoked: he cites Prophet Azaria’s words to King Asa “whoever seeketh not after the lord God of Israel, let him be slaine” (quoted in ibid, p. 58) Bullinger and Allen were not alone in finding continuity between the post-reformation wars and the wars of Israel. There were a number of other theologians who found scriptural justifications for the violence that plagued the Western world. William Gouge, a Puritan, wrote in 1631 in justification for the Puritan Revolution “maintenance of truth and purity of religion moved Israel to make war on their brethren on the other side of Jordan”. Alexander Leighton a Scottish Presbytarian who wanted England to join the Thirty Year War wrote about the “maintenance of religion” being a just cause for war (quoted in ibid, p. 59) At about the same time, however, Vitoria and Grotius both proposed the contrary view, that religion can never justify war. This view would eventually come to dominate Christian attitudes following the formation of the secular notion of unitary nation-states, and following the Enlightenment. In the sixteenth century it seems however that this move was already on its way, and the Islamic caliphate, rather than hindering this progress, was responsible for creating an atmosphere of mutual recognition and peace that would prefigure the modern law of nations. The Ottoman Sultan signed a treaty with France in 1535 which recognised the French King and the Sultan as equals; a similar treaty was made with England in 1580.

The conquest of the Americas in the sixteenth century following Christopher Columbus’s “discovery” of the New World in 1492 was sanctioned by Pope Alexander VI in the papal bull Inter Caetera, in which he enjoined the “Christianisation” of its people. Very few churchmen opposed this, and those that did included the important chronicler Las Casas. As Las Casas’ and others’ testimonies show, this led to perhaps the bloodiest and most savage period in human history, and one that was overlooked by men of the church with bibles open. The Puritans of New England invoked the idea of “holy land” as justification for their conquest - they believed that, as a superior race, New England was promised them as Canaan was promised the Israelites. Notably, at the very same time as the barbaric Christian conquests in the Americas, Muslims were involved in peaceful missionary work in the Indies. Thomas Arnold writes on this contrast: “The [Muslims] did not come as conquerors [to the Indies], like the Spanish in the sixteenth century, or use the sword as an instrument of conversion; nor did they arrogate to themselves the privileges of a superior and dominant race so as to dominate and oppress the original inhabitants [as was the case in the Americas], but coming simply in the guise of traders they employed their superior intelligence and civilisation in the service of the religion, rather than as a means towards their personal aggrandisement and the amassing of wealth” (The Spread of Islam in the World, pp. 365-6)

Ignoring all of the above, including New Testament ambivalence to war, the historical use of the Old Testament as justification for war and the savagery that resulted, Spencer writes “Jesus did not take part in battles, as Muhammad did” (Religion of Peace, p. 67). What he forgets to tell his reader is that Christianity reveres Prophets who came before Jesus that did participate in battle; and there was no shortage of Christian theologians, especially following the reformation, who used these as acceptable archetypes of war. Muhammad’s battles were rarely as bloody as Old Testament battles in which often hundreds of thousands were killed. Lives lost on both sides in Muhammad’s own lifetime totalled no more than one thousand and Muhammad himself did not kill anybody (for example, in perhaps the most decisive battle, the Battle of Badr, seventy Meccans and thirteen Muslims were killed). The crucial difference between Muhammad and Jesus however is that Muhammad was the head of state, a position he was not actively seeking but was pressured into because of Meccan persecution (e.g. see Qur’an 8:30) and the need for a stable Muslim community. Before he became head of state, however, violence in any form was forbidden and the Qur’an commanded Muslims to overlook the early persecution, but make an attempt to establish prayer and give in regular charity [Qur’an 4:77 describes the earlier law of non-aggression in Mecca and the later permission to fight for the oppressed and ill-treated – see also 4:75]; unlike Jesus, therefore, who did commit vigilante acts of violence (in the temple), Muhammad did not. Only when he became a statesman did he engage in lawful acts of war. Taken together and in context, therefore, it may be argued Muhammad was in fact more peaceful than Jesus and the Hebrew Prophets of the Old Testament.

In referring to Christian justification for war, Spencer argues only “clearly spiritual passages” are “applied…to warfare” (Religion of Peace, p. 68). While this is true with references to the New Testament, this is not the case with post-reformation justifications from the Old Testament as shown above. In critiquing Saint Bernard’s justification of war, Spencer writes “while Bernard is able to marshal scriptural passages for the idea that God rewards martyrs, and that God is the lord of both the living and the dead, he does not and cannot adduce any scripture in support of his central assumption: warfare in the name of Christ is justified” (ibid, p69). This sidesteps the more important question: does the assumption that war is not directly commanded in the New Testament mean war is unjustified? Or, more to the point, is there any evidence that Christ would not support the war(s) in question? The great theologians of Christian history, Ambrose, Augustine, Aquinas and the others quoted, would answer: not necessarily. In Christianity, therefore, it is not all too difficult to construct a theology of violence centred on themes from both the Old and New Testament; the historical precedence of such a theology proves its efficacy. It would be difficult to argue Augustine “misunderstood” Christianity as there is far too much room to manoeuvre when it comes to New Testament hermeneutics. Moreover, some of the bloodiest events of human history (e.g. the conquest in the Americas) took place at the hands of Christians supported by Christian theology and Christian institutions.

Islamic Views on Violence

On Islamic views on violence, Spencer writes that “in contrast to the Bible, the Qur’an exhorts believers to fight unbelievers”. As shown above, the Bible also commands war, and according to Maimonides, Deuteronomy indicates it is “idolatry” that is the legal justification for war, not necessarily the inheritance of land. The vital question, therefore, remains: exactly how does Spencer assess what is essential to a particular religion and not essential to another? Both the Bible and the Qur’an command war, and both have been used to motivate war. Spencer argues that Bin Laden “quotes the Qur’an (to justify his acts of terror)”, but the Puritans of England and the Spaniards in America also quoted scripture; hence, it is uncertain exactly at what point, Spencer determines something belongs to a particular religion and not to another.

Islam’s Interpretive Tradition

He admits “the devil can quote scripture for his own purpose” but he qualifies this: “bin Laden’s use of these and other passages is consistent with traditional Islamic understandings of the Qur’an” (Religion of Peace, p. 70). “In Islam” he insists “there is no interpretive tradition of the Qur’an comparable to the traditional Jewish and Christian approaches to the Bible. While Christians and Jews see an unfolding of revelation in language that is often symbolic, allegorical, historical and poetic, Islam is much more literal, even when the text of the Qur’an is opaque and confusing.”

He seems to betray an ignorance of Islam’s intellectual history, particularly in regard to tafsir or Qur’anic exegesis. In fact “symbolic, allegorical, historical and poetic” language dominates in the Qur’an. For example, the Qur’an metaphorically refers to those who do not comprehend as “blind” (e.g. 17:72, 27:81) and “dead” (e.g. 27:80). Most Muslim exegetes also believe many of God’s attributes and actions in the Qur’an e.g. that He “rose” (e.g. 2:29) or is “in heaven” (67:16) or that He “purchases” (9:111) are allegorical and not literal. Much of the Qur’an is in fact a rehearsal of God’s historical message to earlier communities and the lessons that can be learned therefrom; hence a “historical” reading of the Qur’an is paramount to its understanding, as many of the ancient laws are not carried forward into the Muhammadan laws. The Qur’an is also replete with parables, and explicitly mentions “God sets forth parables for men, in order that they may reflect” (14:25). Qur’an 3:7 in fact specifically states many of its verses are allegorical whose interpretations are best left to God.

What does the Qur’an teach?

Contradicting his later assessment that the Qur’anic text can go both ways [i.e. it can be understood to favour both tolerance and intolerance of other religions], he comments that since the Qur’an is taught in madrasas (religious schools), madrasas are useful recruiting tools for jihadists, as the students in madrasas will learn the verses “slay the unbelievers wherever you find them” (9:5) and “when you meet the unbelievers then strike at their necks” (47:4). His translation of 9:5 is contradictory to a later translation he uses (“slay the idolaters”) in the very same chapter. The word “mushrikun” used in the verse means those who associate partners with God, hence the latter translation is more accurate. What Spencer fails to realise, however, is that taking the Qur’an as a whole, as later Muslim theologians like Muhammad Abduh (d. 1905) and Mahmud Shaltut (d. 1964) did and not selectively [as in the classical “evolution theory” discussed below], would better support a peaceful interpretation and defensive fighting only: 2:190 asks Muslims to fight only those who “fight you” and not to “transgress”; 4:90 and 8:61 asks Muslims to resist fighting if the opposition does not fight; 9:5 is surrounded by details specifying the polytheists who had broken their treaty and attacked the believers first (9:4, 13), and 9:29 and 47:4 must be understood in this broader context.

Muhammad Asad (d. 1992), a Jewish convert to Islam and expert commentator of the Qur’an, writes in The Message of the Qur’an under the commentary of 9:29 “In accordance with the fundamental principle, observed throughout my interpretation of the Qur'an, that all of its statements and ordinances are mutually complementary and cannot, therefore, be correctly understood unless they are considered as parts of one integral whole, this verse, too must be read in the context of the clear-cut Qur'anic rule that war is permitted only in self-defence. In other words, the above injunction to fight is relevant only in the event of aggression committed against the Muslim community or state, or in the presence of an unmistakable threat to its security: a view which has been shared by that great Islamic thinker, Muhammad `Abduh. Commenting on this verse, he declared: “Fighting has been made obligatory in Islam only for the sake of defending the truth and its followers.... All the campaigns of the Prophet were defensive in character; and so were the wars undertaken by the Companions in the earliest period [of Islam]” (Manar X, 332)”.

Asad further comments under verse 2:190 “This and the following verses lay down unequivocally that only self-defence makes war permissible for Muslims. Most of the commentators agree in that the expression la ta'tadu signifies, in this context, "do not commit aggression"; while by al-mu'tadin "those who commit aggression" are meant. The defensive character of a fight "in God's cause" - that is, in the cause of the ethical principles ordained by God - is, moreover, self-evident in the reference to "those who wage war against you", and has been still further clarified in 22:39 - "permission [to fight] is given to those against whom war is being wrongfully waged" - which, according to all available Traditions, constitutes the earliest (and therefore fundamental) Qur’anic reference to the question of jihad, or holy war (see Tabari and Ibn Kathir in their commentaries on 22:39). That this early, fundamental principle of self-defence as the only possible justification of war has been maintained throughout the Qur’an is evident from 60:8, as well as from the concluding sentence of 4:91, both of which belong to a later period than the above verse.”

Fred Donner, historian of Islam, writes about the Qur’anic view of war “The Qur’anic text as a whole conveys an ambivalent attitude towards violence. On the one hand, oppression of the weak is condemned [e.g. 4:75], and some passages state clearly that the believers are to fight only in self-defense [e.g. 2:190, 4:90 and 9:36]. But a number of passages seem to provide explicit justification for the use of war or fighting to subdue unbelievers [e.g. 9:29] and deciding whether the Qur'an condones offensive war for the faith or only defensive war is really left to the judgement of the exegete.” Hence, Spencer’s assumption, that the mere teaching of the Qur’an will motivate students to violence or make them susceptible to recruitment to violent operations, is a fallacious one.

As an aside, Spencer misrepresents Qur’an 29:46 as a command not to dialogue with unbelievers, the translation which he chooses being “And dispute ye not with the people of the book except by means better”. Al-Tabari, the dean of classical Qur’anic exegesis, comments: “God (Exalted is He) says Dispute not O believers in God and His Messenger with the Jews and the Christians, and they are the people of the book, except with that which is better. He means (thereby): except with beautiful speech and that is calling to God with His signs (or verses) and (by) conveying His arguments”. The verse is therefore an exhortation to dialogue and preach in a healthy manner, but not to avoid discussions about religion altogether.

The Evolution Theory

Spencer admits “The evidence of the Qur’anic text itself goes both ways” – some verses are tolerant like sura 109, 52:45-7, 73:10-11, 2:256 and others are intolerant. Although he agrees the evidence of the Qur’an goes both ways, Spencer then admits agreement with the classical naskh (abrogation) approach to the fighting verses. The “evolution” theory as espoused by him assumes a progressive supersession of earlier laws of non-confrontation in Mecca with firstly defensive laws of war in Medina and finally a total war against all unbelievers. This was indeed the view espoused by many “classical” (pre-modern) exegetes, first formulated probably around two hundred years after the Prophet Muhammad’s death. But as Reuven Firestone shows, inconsistencies between scholars in deciding which verses of the Qur’an were “abrogating” (nasikh) and which were “abrogated” (mansukh) reveals the arbitrariness and circumstantial nature of such a task. For example 16:125-6 which recommends peaceful preaching, and patience in the face of brutality, Wahidi, an early exegete, reports was revealed in Medina in 625 AD (i.e. after the Battle of Uhud in Medina); in other words, a peaceful verse was revealed in Medina, which is inconsistent with a clear trajectory to a totalitarian ideology of war. Likewise 29:46 which recommends arguing “in the best of ways” with the People of the Book was likely revealed in Medina as there were few Jews and Christians in Mecca. 2:190, a verse which disallows initiating aggression and mandates self-defence only, according to Ibn Abbas, a notable companion of the Prophet, was revealed after the Hudaybiyya Treaty in 628 AD (i.e. 6 years after the migration, hijra, to Medina, and in the supposed final stage of the evolution). Similarly 60:8 which asks believers to treat unaggressive non-Muslims with kindness and equity was revealed according to most exegetes after the peaceful Conquest of Mecca, near the end of the Prophet’s life. A standard work on the nasikh and mansukh (abrogating and abrogated verses) like Ibn al-Jawzi's (d. 1200) reveals a huge degree of divergence. At almost every verse in question, he says “[person x] said this was abrogated, while [person y] said it was not”. For example, he says according to Ibn Zayd, an early exegete, 7:180 (“leave those who blaspheme His name”) was abrogated by 22:39-40, but most early traditionists disagree and believe them to be compatible.

Firestone concludes “Despite the lack of consistency, these verses are cited by the legal literature (and, following them, Western scholars) in such a way as to suggest a historical development in the qur’anic conception of holy war…The fact is that the conflicting qur’anic verses cannot prove an evolution of the concept or sanction for religiously authorised warring in Islam from a nonaggressive to a militant stance” (Jihad: The Origins of Holy War in Islam, p. 64) This is because, if we are to see a consistent evolution “we should expect…a substantial degree of repetition and agreement in the sources over the occasions of revelation and the hierarchy of abrogation. In reading a representative sample of commentaries and naskh and asbab works from the first five Islamic centuries, however, we find tremendous disagreement over what interpretations inspired the major war verses, when they occurred, and to what or whom they refer. This decided lack of agreement destroys the classic argument of divinely guided evolution and reveals its origin as a theoretical solution to the problem of qur’anic contradiction.” “In fact”, Firestone writes “this classic Islamic “evolutionary theory” of warring presumes from the outset that war against non-Muslims would be essentially unrestricted even before the Muslims engaged in the process because that was the policy of the empire under which the theory evolved” (ibid pp. 50-1)

Unlike the preponderant classical view, which as Firestone shows is theoretical and circumstantial, and not an essential Qur’anic scheme, the preponderant modern view takes a more inter-textual and contextual approach whereby all verses of forgiveness and fighting are applicable in the circumstance for which they were prescribed. This is perhaps more accurate and better reflects the Qur’anic view. [Classical and modern views will be described later; but for a detailed discussion, see Rudolph Peters’ Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam].

Spencer mentions the crucial verses 22:39-41 only in passing. These verses were probably the first to be revealed sanctioning military activity among Muslims. The importance of these verses can be gleaned from the fact that they provide an ethical justification for fighting, outline the rationale of God’s facilitation of human conflict and give guidelines for the end-result of fighting. The ethical and legal justification for fighting provided in these verses is that the Muslims were “being oppressed” and were “driven out of [their] homes” for “no reason except that they say: Our Lord is God”. The lasting principle the Qur’an then mentions provides a theological defence of divinely mandated war: “had God not repelled some men by means of others, monasteries, churches, synagogues, and mosques, wherein the name of God is oft mentioned, would assuredly have been pulled down”. In other words, fighting is sanctioned in order to make the remembrance of God possible not only within Muslim communities but non-Muslim communities also. The verses then continue to say God helps those who help in this cause, and they are those who when established in the land maintain prayer (salat) and give in charity (zakat), command the good and forbid the evil. Importantly, “establishing prayer and giving charity (zakat)” is not restricted to Muslims, as Spencer claims elsewhere, since prayer and charity are common to all religions: the Qur’an says of earlier Prophets “We made them leaders, guiding (men) by Our Command, and We sent them inspiration to do good deeds, to establish regular prayers (salat), and to practise regular charity (zakat)” (21:73). Furthermore, “commanding the good and forbidding the evil” is also universal in that previous traditions also practiced this (see e.g. Qur’an 3:113), and it is not equivalent to enforcing or coercing an ethical view, since, for example, another verse tells Muhammad to command what is right but to turn away from the ignorant and foolish (7:199), indicating “commanding” something is compatible with ignoring someone who refuses to listen. These verses (22:39-41) therefore encapsulate the Qur’an’s view on war in simple and precise detail: war is triggered by oppression, persecution and expulsion for the purpose of making God’s remembrance possible amongst all monotheistic traditions by fostering an environment in which praying is established and regular charity is given and good is commanded and bad forbidden. These verses demonstrate why the remembrance of God is superior to jihad [see later, in the section “Contrasting Islam and Christianity”, for hadiths in this regard], as jihad is a means while the remembrance of God is an end. Even in the context of war, the Qur’an commands Muslims to establish prayer and remember God “standing, sitting and reclining” (4: 101-3).

Instead of addressing the full implications of 22:39-41, Spencer ascribes a totalising ideology to the Qur’an itself concentrating on verses 2:190-3. He comments that “the command to fight against “those who fight you” until “there prevail justice and the faith in Allah” indicates when Muslims should stop fighting against unbelievers: not when a peace treaty has been concluded, or when negotiations have settled disputed issues, but when Allah’s religion prevails”. Here, he is himself interpreting the Qur’an and telling Muslims what they should take away from reading these verses. Unfortunately for Spencer, things are rarely so clear. It is true many classical exegetes did take this message from the verse, but modern exegetes as Rudolph Peters shows emphasise the latter part of the verse which unequivocally states “there is no enmity except against the oppressors”. The start of the section also begins “fight those who fight you”; no mention is made of “unbelievers” as Spencer claims. This illustrates his selectivity in quoting, in order to buttress a narrow view of the Muslim scriptures, which has not been universally accepted by Islamic scholarship, neither classically nor in modern times [see later, in the section “Classical and Modern Views on Jihad”]. Muhammad Asad comments that this verse should be understood in light of 22:40. He writes: “[the verse means:] until God can be worshipped without fear of persecution and none is compelled to bow down in awe before another human being (See also 22: 40)”. Hence “religion is God’s” can be understood in the broadest sense that none besides God is worshipped amongst Jews, Christians, Muslims and other monotheists within the areas Muslims have had to resort to fighting because of external aggression.

Contrasting Islam and Christianity: Does the Qur’an Favour Violence over Peace?

In the same vein of attempting to draw an intractable wedge between Islam and Christianity, Spencer contrasts Islam’s supposed “revenge culture” with Christianity’s “turn the other cheek” (Religion of Peace, p. 73), referring to the verse of the Qur’an “if they transgress against you then transgress against them” (2:194). However, he ignores other verses in the Qur’an which indicate forgiveness, patience and mercy are the better options in such an instance. 41:34, 16:126 and 3:186 recommend forgiveness in the face of ill treatment, physical attacks and verbal insults, although an exact application of justice is also within the legal rights of the victim(s). Islam was, in fact, born out of the very revenge culture which Spencer speaks of; the Qur’an refers to such behaviour as “the heat and cant of (the time of) ignorance”, and attempts to reverse this attitude: “While the Unbelievers [of Mecca] got up in their hearts heat and cant - the heat and cant of ignorance,- God sent down His Tranquillity to his Messenger and to the Believers, and made them stick close to the command of self-restraint; and well were they entitled to it and worthy of it. And God has full knowledge of all things.” (48:26) Furthermore, the Qur’an often asks Muslims to turn away from the ignorant and praises those “servants of the Most Merciful” who when addressed by the foolish reply with a word of peace (25:63).

Spencer also contrasts Jesus’ “blessed are the peacemakers” with Muhammad’s encouragement of jihad, a clear example of not comparing like-for-like. Neither the Gospels nor the Muslim scriptures are monothematic, and one can easily be made to contrast the other if quoted disingenuously. Of course, the crucial difference between Jesus and Muhammad, as mentioned earlier is the fact Muhammad was the head of state while Jesus was not. Islam too encourages peacemaking. Abd Allah bin Salam narrates that Muhammad’s first sermon in Medina was “O man! Spread peace, give food to the hungry and pray while others are asleep and you will enter paradise without difficulty” (Jami‘ al-Tirmidhi). The Qur’an contrasts “mischief” (fasad) with “peacemaking” (islah) in various places (e.g. 2:11-12) and peacemaking is strongly encouraged in various matters; for example, the Qur’an says “There is no good in much of their secret conferences save (in) him who enjoineth almsgiving and kindness and peace-making among the people. Whoso doeth that, seeking the good pleasure of Allah, We shall bestow on him a vast reward.” (4:114) The Qur’an repeatedly prohibits mischief (fasad), emphatically stating “God loves not mischief” (e.g. 2:205). Speaking of Israelites who attempted to incite war and create mischief, the Qur’an says “Every time they kindle the fire of war, God doth extinguish it; but they (ever) strive to do mischief on earth. And God loveth not those who do mischief.” (5:64) “War” and “mischief” are therefore not favourable in the Qur’anic perspective, and peace is the normal and preferred situation. Hence in the third major battle fought by Muhammad and his companions, the Battle of the Trench, by divine providence a sandstorm drove out the attackers from Medina; and instead of considering this a missed opportunity, the Qur’an delights in the fact “God averted the hostility of the unbelievers, no good have they acquired – and God has saved the believers from fighting” (33:25)

In attempting to prove that “jihad”, a noble activity in Islam, is the best deed, Spencer chooses Yusuf Ali’s rendition of Qur’an 9:20 which states that those “who believe, suffer exile and strive [jahadu] with might and main” are the “highest rank”, whereas the interpretation of most classical commentators including al-Tabari is that these are of a “higher rank” (not “highest rank”) than those mentioned in the previous verse who “boast of giving drink to the pilgrim and maintain the sacred mosque”. Muhammad’s own words in fact show “dhikr” or remembrance of God is superior to “jihad” as jihad is a means to facilitate dhikr which is an end in itself. This is clear in the explanation of 22:40 above, and 29:45 which says “the remembrance of God is greatest”. Consider the following authentic (sahih) hadiths:

Abu al-Darda' narrates: The Prophet once asked his companions: "Shall I tell you about the best of all deeds, the best act of piety in the eyes of your Lord, which will elevate your status in the Hereafter, and carries more virtue than the spending of gold and silver in the service of Allah or taking part in jihad and slaying or being slain in the path of Allah? The dhikr (remembrance) of Allah." Related in the Malik's Muwatta', the Musnad of Ahmad, the Sunan of Tirmidhi, Ibn Majah, and the Mustadrak of Hakim. Al-Bayhaqi, Hakim and others declared it sahih (authentic).

`Abd Allah ibn `Umar said that the Prophet used to say: "Everything has a polish, and the polish of hearts is dhikr of Allah. Nothing is more calculated to rescue from Allah's punishment than dhikr of Allah." He was asked whether this did not apply also to jihad in Allah's path, and he replied: "Not even if one should ply his sword until it breaks." Bayhaqi narrated it in Kitab al-da`awat al-kabir as well as in his Shu`ab al-iman (1:396 #522), also al-Mundhiri in al-Targhib (2:396) and Tibrizi mentions it in Mishkat al-masabih, at the end of the book of Supplications.

[source]

The reward of fighting is in the altruism, self-sacrifice, patience and chivalry of the warriors – Islam does not valorise the act of killing itself. This is clear from a hadith in which the Prophet Muhammad told his army “Do not wish to meet the enemy, but when you face the enemy, be patient” (Sahih al-Bukhari, 4:52:266c ) and a verse of the Qur’an says “Warfare is ordained for you, though it is hateful unto you” (2:216).

Classical and Modern Views on Jihad

To support his contention that Islam’s doctrine of jihad is essentially offensive and expansionist in character, Spencer refers to a “cluster of verses containing general and open ended commands to fight” (Religion of Peace, 75) – for example, 9:123, 9:73, 9:5 and 9:29 – and comments that although the Qur’anic text goes both ways “very early in the history of Islam, Muslims noticed and began to grapple with how Muhammad’s message changed in character over the course of his Prophetic career”. The earliest source he finds is a redaction of Ibn Ishaq’s biography of the Prophet written two centuries after the Prophet’s death. He reiterates the “evolution theory” highlighted above: “As Muhammad’s career went on, and particularly after his flight to Medina and establishment of the first Muslim political and military entity, he began receiving Quranic revelations allowing Muslims to fight under certain circumstances” (ibid, p. 72). After quoting the modern jihad theorist Sayyid Qutb (d. 1964) and the medieval theologian Ibn al-Qayyim (d. 1350) in support of this progression in the Prophet’s lifetime, he writes “related to Muhammad’s evolving concept of jihad in the Qur’an is the Islamic doctrine of naskh (abrogation)”. Hence, although the “evolution theory” was devised only later, it is ascribed directly to Muhammad, part of Spencer’s way of feeding interpretations that favour his prejudgment into the very foundations of Islam and the Islamic texts. He writes “According to this idea, the violent verses of the ninth sura, including the Verse of the Sword (9:5): “slay the unbelievers wherever you find them” [although the actual translation is “slay the idolaters” as explained above, and taking the verse in context, specifically, the idolaters of Mecca who broke a peace treaty] abrogate the peaceful verses” (ibid, p. 78). He cites the modern Wahhabi scholar Abdullah bin Muhammad bin Humaid and Sayyid Qutb, and among classical scholars the exegetes Suyuti, Ibn Kathir, Ibn Juzayy, Jalal Mahalli and Ibn Kathir and jurists of the four Sunni schools, Abu Zayd al-Qayrawani (Maliki), Ibn Taymiyya (Hanbali), al-Mawardi (Shafii) and al-Marghiani (Hanafi). Based on this narrow sample, he draws the premature conclusion that “the Islamic umma (community) must exist in a state of perpetual war, punctuated only by temporary truces, with the non-Muslim world” (ibid, p.79). Again, he disingenuously contrasts this with the Great Commission in Matthew 28:19, although the Qur’an contains similar passages calling on Muslims to “invite to the way of your Lord with wisdom and beautiful preaching, and argue with them in the best of ways” (16:125) and to “let there be among you a community calling to good, enjoining what is right, and forbidding what is wrong: They are the ones to attain felicity.” (3:104)

Such formulations, as the “evolution theory”, the obligation of the Islamic umma to exist in a state of war with the non-Muslim world and the transient nature of truces, were devised not early in Islamic history as Spencer suggests, but surprisingly late. It should be noted that all the major conquests of the Muslim umma occurred before the classical “evolution theory” was formulated, when the only major written document was the Qur’an. Hence, the classical formulations themselves did not motivate the conquests, although Spencer seems to rely on them more than he does on the Qur’anic text itself which according to his own admission can be interpreted to support both peaceful and ideological readings.

So what did motivate the early conquests? Majid Khadduri notes that the ideology propelling the early conquests “was not a consciously formulated policy” (War and Peace in the Law of Islam, p.51). This article by Sherman Jackson describes how the Muslims found themselves in a pre-existing “state of war” with which they had to contend. Having already had violent clashes with the Byzantines of the Levant [prompted by their unjust execution of a messenger who was sent with the purpose of inviting them to Islam] and encountered the Byzantines of Northern Arabia during the lifetime of Muhammad, the Muslims were aware of the threat they faced to their very survival. They were not militarily superior to either the Byzantine Romans or the Sassanid Persians, but their growing presence meant they had to become part of the heterogenic world of hegemonic empires, for had they not their destruction would be inevitable. After citing a few examples of the state of hostility between sovereign empires assumed throughout the world, Jackson writes “In the case of the Muslim empire, an identical assumption would collude with the presumed "state of war" and produce a sense of mission that was reinforced by the overall medieval thirst for conquest. Jihad, for its part, like the Roman-Byzantine "charismatic victoriousness," would lend itself well to these ambitions and these concerns.” But, he notes, “the Muslim conquests were neither for the sole purpose of conversion nor annihilating the infidel. In addition to the fact that non-Muslims paid higher taxes -- and thus non-conversion operated to the financial advantage of the state -- the rules of jihad stipulated that non-Muslims remained free to practice their religion upon payment of the so-called jizya, or income tax, in exchange for which the Muslim state incurred the responsibility to protect them from outside attack. While the imperial quest for empire invariably informed the policies of every Muslim state, Muslim juristic writings continued to reflect the logic of the "state of war" and the assumption that only Muslims would permit Muslims to remain Muslims. They continued to see jihad not only as a means of guaranteeing the security and freedom of the Muslims but as virtually the only means of doing so. For even peace-treaties were usually the result of one's surrender to demands that had been imposed by a real or anticipated defeat by the sword.”

The Umayyads (661-750) who were the most fervent in expanding the Muslim borders were mostly irreligious men with pan-Arab aspirations. The “thirst for conquest” therefore grew out of the existing “state of war”, and was not necessarily the original intention of the scriptures. Malik (d. 795), the founder of one of the four schools of Islamic legal thought, reportedly held the view that Ethiopia should never be fought as the Prophet Muhammad said “leave Ethiopia for as long as it leaves you”. Examples such as these illustrate that it was less a religious ideology that motivated the early conquests than the need to overcome the perceived state of hostility already existent. In the aftermath of the Umayyad conquests, the jihad ideology as a mechanism of ensuring the security of Muslims by accepting the assumed state of war was formulated. In other words, as Firestone noted “this classical Islamic “evolutionary theory” of warring presumes from the outset that war against non-Muslims would be essentially unrestricted even before the Muslims engaged in the process [of juristic and exegetical reasoning] because that was the policy of the empire under which the theory evolved” (Jihad: the Origins of Holy War in Islam, pp. 50-1). The Muslim jurists wrote at a time when it would be in the interest of Muslim security to advocate an expansionist reading of the Qur’anic concept of jihad; thus, the conclusions drawn reflect this historical condition. As would be expected, this was similar to medieval Christianity. Majid Khadduri writes that “similar to the law of ancient Rome and the law of medieval Chrisendom, the Muslim law of nations was based on the theory of a universal state. Both Christendom and Islamdom, as divine universal nomocracies, assumed that mankind constituted one community, bound by one law and governed ultimately by one ruler...their rules for foreign relations, accordingly, were the rules of an imperial state which would recognise no equal status for the other party (or parties) with whom they happened to fight or negotiate [jus fetiale in ancient Rome]. It follows therefore that the binding force of such a law of nations was not based on mutual consent or reciprocity, but on their own interpretation of their political, moral and religious interest, as they regarded their principles of morality and religion superior to others.” (War and Peace in the Law of Islam, p. 45)

However, although such a theory became a legal norm in classical Islam, it was not universally accepted by all Islamic jurists. Ibn Umar (d. 693), a companion of the Prophet and the son of the second caliph, believed fighting to expand Islam’s borders was not mandatory. Likewise, Sahnun, Malik’s student; Ata b. Rabaha (d. 734), an authoritative Meccan scholar of the first Islamic century; Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr (d. 1071), a renowned Maliki jurist; Sufyan al-Thawri (d. 778), a famous Kufan jurist of the second Islamic century, Ibn Shubramah; ‘Amr b. Dinar and other important jurists all believed the decision to expand Islam’s borders was completely discretionary (nafila) and dependent on the judgment of the caliph (for evidence and quotes, see Muhmmad Khair Haykal, al-Jihad wa l-Qital fi l-Siyasat al-Shar‘iyya pp. 893-4). The Mu‘tazilites, like al-Jahiz (d. 869) and al-Zamakhshari (d. 1143), an early rationalistic school, did not believe in jihad as an expansionist war – they felt human beings are to wander freely and live according to the laws of the lands that they happen to find themselves in. Al-Awza‘i (d. 774), an early Syrian jurist, who witnessed Byzantine and Muslim infighting, favoured expansionism, highlighting the contingency of this juristic opinion. Although this divergence is apparent in early Islam, upon the development of the standard schools of thought, the idea that the caliph must make an effort to expand was thought to be a decisive religious law by many. As these schools were mostly products of eight/ninth century juristic opinions, it is no wonder that they came to this conclusion. Nonetheless, various rules surrounding this formulation were disputed, reflecting the indecisiveness of the scriptural texts themselves. The Hanafis and Shiites for example believed a peace treaty need not be temporary but the caliph may choose to remain on friendly terms with non-Muslim neighbours indefinitely – this, in effect, is similar to the view of Sahnun, Thawri, Ata and the others mentioned above, the only difference being that expansion is still preferred over non-expansionism. Since the Hanafi school of thought dominated amongst the ruling elite for most of Islamic history, it is not difficult to see why extended peace agreements were often made.

Modern views of jihad have evolved to take these nuances into account. In his analysis on the differences between classical and modern discourse on jihad, Rudolph Peters finds the definition of jihad is much broader in modern readings and includes efforts to strengthen Islam through speech, writing, education, invitation and social work. This is more reflective of the use of jihad in the hadith literature where the pilgrimage to Mecca (Hajj), being dutiful to one’s parents, standing up to tyrant rulers and struggling against one’s ego are all called “jihad”. In modern discourse “the principle of peaceful relations between the Islamic and the other states” (Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam, p. 112) dominates based on Qur’an verses 8:61 and 4:90. The legal aims of jihad to defend and protect minorities against oppression are more emphasised, and an overall effort to avoid the classical approach of conflating Muslim security with jihad expansionism is made. These modern authors include Sayyid Ahmad Khan (d. 1898), Cheragh Ali (d. 1895), Molvi Abu Said Hussain, Syed Amir Ali (d. 1928) all from nineteenth century India; and Muhammad Abduh (1905) and Rashid Rida (1935) from nineteenth century Egypt. In the twentieth century this viewpoint was adopted in the works of Muslims jurists like ‘Abd al-Wahhab Khallaf (d. 1956) of Cairo, Wahba al-Zuhayli (b. 1933) of Damascus, Muhammad Ramadan Buti (b. 1928) of Damascus and Wahiduddin Khan (b. 1925) of Delhi. These later jurists deem the fundamental relationship between the Muslim community and non-Muslim communities as peaceful, whereas earlier jurists were more inclined to believe a permanent state of war; this evolution amongst mainstream Muslim jurists is indicative of the dynamics underlying opinions about the nature of jihad.

After citing Qur’an 2:190-4, 4:75,90-1, 9:12-3, 8:61, 60:8, all verses of Medinan origin, which assume a Muslim umma at peace with their neighbours, Peters writes [his use of the term “modernists” is discussed later]: “Taking the aforementioned verses as the decisive ones in the relationship with unbelievers, modernists were obliged to reinterpret the verses that were traditionally understood as giving an unconditional command to fight them. They accomplished this by means of contextual exegesis. Thus 9:5, which is traditionally taken as the sword verse, must according to the modernists, be read in the context of the first part of sura 9 directed against the Meccans that had broken their treaty-obligations...In the same way 9:29 is reinterpreted. The modernists deny the verse contains an unconditional command to fight all People of the Book until they pay the poll-tax but infer from the context that only those Jews and Christians were meant that had violated their pledges and assailed the propagation of the Islamic mission. An additional argument for this interpretation is to be found in the phrase “have been humbled” which implies, according to modernist authors, that previously, they were recalcitrant and that there had been reasons for Muslims to fight them.” (ibid. pp. 126-7)

Rashid Rida (d. 1935), the author of the most renowned work of Qur’anic exegesis in the twentieth century, wrote “everything that is mentioned in the Koran with regard to the rules of fighting, is intended as defence against enemies that fight the Moslems because of their religion” (quoted in ibid, p. 125). Mahmud Shaltut (d. 1963), who was the grand shaykh of al-Azhar in Egypt, showed in his tract al-qur'an wa l-qital [The Qur’an and Fighting; translated in Rudolph Peters’ Jihad in Medieval and Modern Islam] that by taking an inter-textual and contextual approach to the Qur’an as opposed the classical “evolution theory”, jihad becomes primarily defensive.

In his extensive thesis on Jihad, Muhammad Khayr Haykal quotes many modern authorities (ulama) on the subject of jihad and he discovers most of them believe it to be primarily defensive and one that envisages peaceful coexistence (see: al-Jihad wa l-Qital fi l-Siyasat al-Shar‘iyya, Muhammad Khair Haykal, p. 585 onwards,). I will quote a few examples here (all references taken from Haykal’s work). Abd al-Wahhab Khallaf (d. 1956), who was a teacher at Azhar and supervisor of Shari'ah courts in Egypt, wrote in his book al-Siyasat al-Shar'iyya aw Nizam al-Dawlat al-Islamiyya (Political Law or the System of the Islamic State): “Islam establishes relations between Muslims and others as peace and security, not as war and fighting, except when they are targeted with harmful (intentions) to reek havoc in their religion, or quell their call (to Islam), for then jihad would be made obligatory in order to deter the harm and protect the call...and if non-Muslims withhold from their persecution and leave them free to call (to Islam), Muslims should not display a sword or initiate war” (pp. 76-77)

Abd al-Hafiz Abd Rabbih wrote in his work Falsafat al-Jihad fi l-Islam (The Philosophy of Jihad in Islam), quoting and approving another authority, Dr. Muhammad Abd Allah al-Darraz: “We agree expressly that the war legislated in Islam is a defensive war only, and none besides, and it behooves us to point out that defence includes within it two types, both of which the Qur'an alludes to: 1. defending lives and 2. the necessary aid for the Muslim subjects...we see from this war in Islam is an evil, and there is no recourse to it except in (cases of) necessity” (p. 45) In his foreword to this work Dr Muhammad Muhammad al-Fahham (d. 1975?), the grand shaykh of Azhar from 1969-1973, commends the author and approves of the book.

Dr Mustafa al-Sibai (d. 1964), who was Professor of Law at the University of Damascus and established the Faculty of Shariah there in 1955, wrote in his book Ishtirakiyyat al-Islam: “Jihad in Islam is legislated for two purposes: 1. repelling the enemy to free the (Muslim) community in its land and its religion, and 2. rescuing oppressed people from tyrant rulers” (p. 245)

Sayyid Sabiq (d. 2000), a jurist from the Muslim Brotherhood, a teacher at Azhar as well as Umm al-Qura (Mecca) and author of the renowned work Fiqh al-Sunna (Understanding Tradition), wrote therein: “Since the fundamental principle is peace and war is the exception, there is nothing permitting war in Islam whatever the situation except in two situations: 1. when defending life, honour and property, and land when it is occupied; 2. when defending the call to God if one is hampered along his path, by torturing the one who believes it or by preventing one who intends to engage in it or by stopping the caller from his call” (2/613)

The Egyptian judge Ali Ali Mansur wrote in al-Shari'at al-Islamiyya wa l-Qanun al-Dawliyy al-Amm (Islamic and International Law): “Islam does not approve of offensive warfare with the intention of conquest (fath) or expansion (tawassu)...the war that is legislated in Islam is defensive war, to repel the hostility which an enemy initiated, or to defend an established clause in a treaty or an agreement broken by the opposition, or to protect the call (to Islam)” (p. 296)

Wahba al-Zuhayli (b. 1933), Professor of Islamic jurisprudence at Damascus University, wrote “The jurists of both Sunni and Shiite orientation believed, in the age of juristic innovation of the second century, that the fundamental relationship between Muslims and others is war … on the premise of what they understood from the verses of the Qur’an upon its apparent (meaning) and absolute (rendering), without efforts to reconcile and combine between them…perhaps their pretext for this ruling is their condition of being affected by the state of the Muslims at that time of the necessity of firmness before the enemies who surrounded them from every side” (Athar al-Harb, pp. 113-114). Based on Qur’anic verse 8:61 and others and the Prophet’s biography, Zuhayli goes on to argue the fundamental relationship according to the Muslim scriptures is in fact one of peace

Muhammad Abu Zahra (d. 1974), an eminent jurist and teacher at Azhar, wrote “The fundamental relationship in Islam between Muslims and others is peace, and this is the view of the vast majority of the jurists, and the few that disagreed, their discourse was not about the fundamental (relation) but their discourse was about the [perceived] reality [of their time], and was what is considered a contextual judgement not a religious fundamental. And calling the abode of the dissenters "the abode of war" does not prevent the fundamental (relation) being peace” (link)

Rudolph Peters suggests the idea of the “exclusively defensive character of jihad” may have been a popular understanding even before the modern period: “Although the exclusively defensive character of jihad was only recently put forward by the modernists, there are indications that this concept is much older...The collection of Thousand and One Nights contains the didactic story of Tawaddud, a slave girl that astonishes the ulama by her extensive knowledge of Islam. We regard to jihad, we read: ‘He said: “What is the jihad and what are its essential elements (arkan)?” She answered: “As for its essential elements, they are: an attack on us by the unbelievers, the presence of an Imam, preparedness and constance when one meets the enemy”’(Alf layla wa layla Vol. 2, p. 309)” (Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam, p. 187). Jalal al-Din al-Rumi (d. 1273), the famous Persian poet, described jihad as follows “Knowledge and wealth and office and rank and fortune are a mischief in the hands of the evil-natured. Therefore the Jihad was made obligatory on true believers for this purpose, namely, that they might take the spear-point from the hand of the madman.”

In short, the early divergence on the nature of jihad, and the later clarification of its primarily defensive character, show firstly, that the Qur’an does not necessarily carry an expansionist view of jihad and secondly, that both readings have been drawn classically and in modern times. Not only have these views been drawn in pre-modern and modern periods, but Islam’s universality and inclusivity meant that non-violent forms of interpreting the Qur’an inspired great movements like Abdul Ghaffar Khan’s (1890-1988) non-violent resistance of the British in Pakistan which attempted to end the cycle of violence that existed there; Khan’s inspiration was the Qur’an and sunna alone, as his encounter with Gandhi occurred only later; he understood the Qur’anic concept of jihad as a means to struggle for the welfare and advancement of its people, and preferably with the use of non-violence. Likewise, Ibn Umar a companion of the Prophet, may have favoured non-violence and neutrality in the face of war.

Spencer heads one of his sections “Not Just Old Books” in which he attempts to show that the preponderant classical view of jihad is not exclusive to pre-modern Muslim jurists. He makes the Orientalist mistake of essentialising Islam, assuming it to be a homogenous entity. As would be expected, he does not cite any of the above authors. Instead, he proposes a theoretical idea of the structure of Islam’s juristic history; modern jurists, he says, cannot change the classical law because “the gates of ijtihad (juristic reasoning)” have closed. The only authority he provides for this idea is Cyril Glasse, a modern scholar on Islam. Although “closing the gates of ijtihad” was a theoretical way of understanding the evolution of Islamic jurisprudence in some classical understandings, it never actually happened, nor was it accepted in theory by most Islamic jurists, as Wael Hallaq shows in his article “Was the Gates of Ijtihad Closed?” [International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Mar., 1984), pp. 3-41]. Hallaq concludes “the gate of ijtihad was not closed in theory nor in practice”. Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1254), al-Suyuti (d. 1505), Shah Wali Allah al-Dihlawi (d. 1762) all explicitly challenged the idea. Al-Suyuti in fact wrote a book (al-Raddu ‘ala man Akhlada ila l-Ardi wa Jahila anna l-Ijtihada fi Kulli ‘Asrin Fard) in which he compiled the names of many Muslim scholars who practiced ijtihad after the doors were supposedly closed, and he vehemently criticised those who believed ijtihad had come to an end; the process of ijtihad was fermented in the early stages of fiqh, between two to four hundred years after the Prophet’s death, but it was continuously practiced by the Muslim jurists. Nonetheless, the marginal classical view describing the closing of the doors of ijtihad was adopted by early Orientalists like Joseph Schacht (d. 1969) as it colluded with their Eurocentric view that no abstract intellectual thought could occur in Islam, and this notion took root in much of Western scholarship on Islam, but has been challenged in recent decades.

Spencer writes “One fact that is not open to dispute is that all Muslims, whether Shi’ite or Sunni, accept the necessity of jihad”. Shiites do not accept offensive jihad (jihad to expand Islam’s borders) as they believe this is an obligation postponed to the end times when their saviour (al-Mahdi) will return. Jihad is “necessary” (fard) according to all Muslim jurists, past and present, only when there is a military attack on Muslim lands. When there is a distant security threat or no threat at all, there is no agreement on jihad’s legal status; the differences have been clarified above. Thus Spencer is quite wrong when he writes that such a narrow view of jihad has not been disputed.

The End of the Jihad State

Spencer then quotes Karen Armstrong who rightly says expansionist jihad became a dead letter due to the strains of expansionism itself, but comments “The problem is that however much of a dead letter it has become in practice during times of weakness in the Islamic world, this doctrine of Islamic supremacism was never reformed or rejected”. As already shown, “the doctrine of Islamic supremacism” was never universally accepted, and experienced a steep decline in Muslim scholarship during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Historian, Khalid Blankinship, shows with detailed analysis in The End of the Jihad State how the jihad ideology of global domination was only operational in Umayyad times and thereafter jihad became essentially defensive in practice if not in theory. Besides the Umayyad and perhaps the Ottomans this ideology was rarely at work. Spencer says “No one seems to have told the warriors of jihad who besieged Europe throughout the Dark Ages, the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, and up until the seventeenth century that the Islamic empire had already reached the limits of its expansion centuries before. No one seems to have told the modern-day warriors of Islam from Bosnia to the Phillippines that jihad is a dead letter, and that Islam isn’t doing any more expanding” (Religion of Peace, p. 82). Europe-Ottoman clashes were rarely unilateral. For example, preceding the 1453 Constantinople siege, the greatest military victory for the Ottomans, Pope Nicolas V gave permission to capture and enslave Muslims around Constantinople (in a Papal Bull called Dum Diversas). Spencer, as a result of his essentialist understanding of Islam and jihad, assumes that all Muslim activism is for the purpose of expanding Islam as a political entity and ideology, and this includes the fighting in Bosnia and Philippines, where in fact the “jihad” is for self-determination, and is not a concerted effort to expand Islam’s borders. Speaking about Muslim activism in Egypt and elsewhere in the latter part of the twentieth century, Rudolph Peters writes “They first and foremost wanted to change the government of the countries they lived in. Of course, they supported the jihads of Islamic people elsewhere (Palestine, South Philippines, Afghanistan) who were struggling against foreign occupation, but that was a matter of Islamic solidarity and not part of a strategy to realise a unified Islamic polity” (p. 171). [The recent globalised jihad of al-Qaeda is discussed later, in the section “Which is the Modern Threat?”]

The Other Modern View

Spencer, unsurprisingly, does not quote any of the above authors who espouse a different jihad-ethic to classical discourse. Instead he quotes some modern authorities who continue to accept the preponderant classical view of jihad. From mainstream Islam, these generally include those of Wahhabi orientation and others, but it is difficult to quantify. Rudolph Peters, however, reports that most of the religious textbooks in Egypt continue to espouse the modern view described above. Spencer, for example, quotes Munajjid, a Wahhabi, who adopts the classical position. In this regards, Rudolph Peters distinguishes between “modernists” and “fundamentalists”, although such abstractions lack a convincing manifestation in real Muslim communities; instead, much fluidity is seen on a large variety of issues in which Muslims of different orientations choose to adopt traditionalist and anti-traditionalist views [When I use “mainstream” I mean the opinions of the collective body of Muslim ulama thought to lie within acceptable norms by the vast majority of Muslims; this excludes only marginal groups, like Ahmadis, Bahais and extreme liberal modernists who assimilate all things Western into their interpretations of Islam]. However, neither the mainstream “modernist” nor the “fundamentalist” (or, for that matter, the preponderant classical) views allow the kind of terrorism we witness today [see section below, “Traditional Rules of War Vs. Modern Terrorism”].

Rudolph Peters writes: “Surveying the field of modern literature on jihad, we see that modernist authors underline the defensive aspect of jihad, and hold that jihad outside Islamic territory is only permitted when the peaceful propagation of Islam is being hindered or when Muslims living amongst unbelievers are oppressed. Fundamentalist writers on the other hand do not depart to a great extent from the classical doctrine and emphasise the expansionist aspect” (Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam, pp. 122-3) Writing in the early twenty-first century (in the second edition of his work), Peters says “At present, most authors on jihad follow this defensive tendency, although recently, there seems to take place a certain radicalisation towards a more fundamentalist approach. Nevertheless, the text books for religious instruction used in Egypt all describe jihad as defensive war” (ibid, p. 125). The shift between “fundamentalist” and “modernist” outlooks is less reflective of orientations and more reflective of external activity. The fundamentalist perspective grew in the 1960s mostly as a result of Israeli belligerence during the 1967 war, Western support for unsavoury dictatorial governments and outside military presence in Muslim countries; these and other factors may have led to added support for the “fundamentalist” point of view, not necessarily because there was a religious revival (although there was) but because the circumstances demanded such an interpretation in the same way it in the classical period.

As further evidence, Spencer quotes Umdat al-Salik calling it a modern text, although he is in fact using a translation of a classical text by Ahmad Naqib (the translator, NH Keller, includes some other classical scholarly opinions). In reference to Umdat al-Salik he mentions the classical juristic distinction between expansionist and defensive jihad; the latter is deemed an individual obligation (fard ayn) and the former a collective obligation (fard kifaya). As shown above, however, the idea that expansionism is a collective obligation was never universally accepted, and some believed it to be discretionary (nafila) and optional (tatawwu‘).

Spencer cites one of those holding the modern viewpoint mentioned above, Ramadan Buti. The reason, it seems, that Spencer cites Buti and none of the other authors above is Buti’s book has been partially translated into English whereas most of the works above have not been translated (although some have been translated and analysed by scholars like Rudolph Peters). Hence Spencer relies on his reader’s preconception that jihad is essentially offensive in paraphrasing Buti’s thesis in one paragraph. Buti’s aim however was to show that the classical juristic opinions, if taken by their objectives and legal rationales and not their conclusions, give the clear impression that jihad is defensive and not expansionist; the reason being, Buti says, is that there are only two possible legal justifications for fighting: “kufr” (disbelief) or “hiraba” (aggression) and Buti shows only hiraba is consistent with the textual evidence from the Qur’an and sunna and that the majority of early scholars did not agree “kufr” alone was sufficient reason to war; hence, he concludes, based on these basic principles and the fact that the Prophet’s wars can all be understood as defensive or pre-emptive (but not offensive), jihad must be essentially defensive (difa‘i) and cannot assume an expansionist character, despite the juristic conclusions found in the classical period. In a similar vein, Sherman Jackson writes “when the Prophet Muhammad died in Medina, at the height of his power, he died in debt to a Jew. Famous Companions of his, men like Hudhayfah b. al-Yamam, married Jewish women. The second Caliph, 'Umar, under whose reign the Muslim empire expanded more than it did under any other reign, was killed by a Christian in Medina. Clearly, on these facts, if the unbelief of the unbelievers rather than their real or perceived hostility towards the Muslims had been the object of those verses in which the Muslims were commanded to "slay them wherever you find them," certainly Muhammad and his Companions would have understood this and, at the time, there would have been nothing to prevent them from carrying this order out.” Hence, their conclusion is that it is “hostility” not “unbelief” that is the ratio legis for war.

Spencer also quotes Imran Ahsan Khan Nyazee who says Muslims due to their current weakness have entered into a temporary truce with the non-Muslim world. However, Nyazee is not a Muslim authority, but a university professor, and as shown, his view only represents one of two major streams of juristic thought present in modern times.

Traditional Rules of War vs. Modern Terrorism

What should be noted from the above discussion is that neither the “modernist” nor “fundamentalist” (identical to the preponderant classical view) to use Peters’ terminology legitimise modern-day terrorism. For example, the Deobandi School from India which accept the traditional expansionist approach, denounce terrorism as criminal and un-Islamic. Unfortunately, what leads to terrorism is a full-fledged ideological adherence to a global agenda operating on the basis of perceived threats. An “ideology” in this sense is total allegiance to a political agenda where the ends justify the means: hence, “rules of war” become meaningless or secondary. However, in most of classical Islamic literature, rules of war were of primary importance, and ends never justified the means [except for the heretical Kharijite sect, as shown later], as Muslims believed themselves to be a noble and chivalrous people. Although this led to the obvious tension between the ideology inherent in traditional jihad and the ethics of Islamic warfare, the tension reveals the ideology was perhaps not the intended outcome of the original doctrine of jihad. This is the major difference between traditional concepts of jihad and modern-day terrorism. Muhammad Afifi Akiti’s technical discussion here from a traditional perspective reveals this core difference; he shows terrorists must forego essential rules of jihad, such as the necessity of an imam [universal leader of Muslims] to sanction an offensive attack, the impermissibility of killing non-combatants (especially women and children) and the impermissibility of suicide (generally); he also shows they often manufacture pseudo-judicial-rulings in order to justify their departure from the norms of Shari‘ah. This difference, as Bassam Tibi writes, is the difference between traditional jihad, an ethical warfare aimed at bringing peace and order to the world, and modern “jihadism”, a political ideology which disregards traditional rules of war in favour of an “irregular war”.

For instance, on the issue of killing women and children which the hadiths emphatically forbid, Muslim terrorists and their apologists attempt to bypass by invoking weak arguments like the fact that they too are involved in democratically electing the oppressive rulers [ignoring for example the fact many do not vote, and even if they do vote they do not necessarily support their government in everything it does]. Ibn Taymiyya, a medieval scholar admired by puritan Muslims and “fundamentalists”, wrote: “Since lawful warfare is essentially jihad and since its aim is that the religion is God’s entirely and God’s worship is uppermost, therefore, according to all Muslims, those who stand in the way of this aim must be fought. As for those who cannot offer resistance or cannot fight, such as women, children, monks, old people, the blind, handicapped and their likes, they shall not be killed, unless they actually fight with words and acts. Some [jurists] are of the opinion that all of them may be killed, on the mere ground that they are unbelievers, but they make an exception for women and children since they constitute property for Muslims [me: this attribution to “some jurists” is essentially the view of the kharijites, a deviant early Muslim group – see below]. However, the first opinion is the correct one, because we may only fight those who fight us when we want to make God’s religion victorious. God who is exalted has said in this respect “Fight in the cause of God those who fight you, but do not transgress ” (2:190)” (quoted in Peters, Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam, p. 49)

Abu Bakr, the first caliph of Islam and Muhammad’s closest friend, said to the first Syrian expedition: “Stop O people that I may give you ten rules to keep at heart! Do not commit treachery, nor depart from the right path. You must not mutilate, neither kill a child or aged man or woman. Do not destroy a palm-tree not burn it with fire and do not cut any fruitful tree. You must not slay any of the flock or the herds or the camels, save for your sustenance. You are likely to pass by people who have devoted their lives to monastic services; leave them to that which they have devoted their lives. You are likely, likewise, to find people who will present to you meals of many kinds. You may eat; but do not forget to mention the name of Allah.” (Tabari, Tarikh, I, p. 1850) Moreover, all Muslim jurists disallow forceful conversions: “Without any exception, all authors emphatically state that fighting may never serve the aim of compelling people to conversion. Their main scriptural arguments are 2:256 and 10:99. As additional arguments they adduce the Traditions that forbid to kill women, children and aged people, although they are unbelievers. Had jihad served the aim of forcing unbelievers to conversion, it would have been allowed to kill all unbelievers” (Peters, p. 121)

The traditional view of jihad floats between an ethical imperative with strict boundaries and limits and a utilitarian ideology that does not respect rules. Historically and juristically, however, rules of war played a bigger and more prominent role than did the jihad ideology. Traditional juristic writings, for example, generally agree that it is forbidden to kill support personnel (called ‘usafa) directly involved in fighting the Muslim force, hence it would be difficult to justify using an Islamic pretext for the killing of civilians who happen to have voted for their elected rulers, or those who descended from the occupiers residing in Muslim land.

Mercy in Islam and Christianity

Spencer attempts to show Christianity is a merciful faith while Islam is not. He refers to St Francis of Assisi and Mother Teresa as humanitarians who belong to the Christian faith, but ignores Muslim humanitarianism. Muslim charities like Islamic Relief are recognised globally for their hard work, and have received awards from many governments including Pakistan, Malawi and Egypt. Philanthropists like Yusuf Islam and Muhammad Ali are openly Muslim. Muslim contributions, like the state welfare system pioneered by the second caliph Umar (d. 644), have helped in increasing the well-being of humankind. The idea of non-violence practiced by Abdul Ghaffar Khan’s movement in Pakistan, as mentioned above, was inspired by the Qur’an and Islamic teaching, without deference to Martin Luther King or Mahatma Gandhi.

Islam’s mercy oftentimes expressed itself during periods of war. Saladin (d. 1193) showed mercy and chivalry to his Christian enemies when recapturing Jerusalem by overlooking what the Crusaders had done during the First Crusade and allowing them to return safely to Europe. Abd al-Qadir al-Jaza’iri (d. 1883), the famous Algerian hero, protected Christians of Damascus when they were unjustly attacked by the Druze of Syria. During the 1994 Rwanda genocide of Tutsis, Muslim areas were the safest places to be in; mosques harboured Tutsis who were being targeted and this resulted in thousands of Christian lives being saved; Hutu Muslims avoided fighting as they felt the bonds of religion were stronger than ethnicity, and Imams preached non-violence and peace – the head mufi of Rwanda said “We have our own jihad, and that is our war against ignorance between Hutu and Tutsi. It is our struggle to heal” (Islam Attracting Many Survivors of Rwanda Genocide, Washington Post); as a result of this and the fact many churches were actively involved in the genocide, many Rwandans are turning to Islam, with the Muslim population on Rwanda having doubled since the genocide.

During the Second World War, the Paris Mosque saved almost two thousand Jewish children from the Nazi gas chambers; a pamphlet circulating amongst Paris Muslims at this time had written on it: “Yesterday at dawn, the Jews of Paris were arrested. The old, the women, and the children. In exile like ourselves, workers like ourselves. They are our brothers. Their children are like our own children. The one who encounters one of his children must give that child shelter and protection for as long as misfortune-or sorrow-lasts. Oh, man of my country, your heart is generous.” Muslim Albania, Turkey and Morocco also sheltered Jews from the Nazi and Vichy Regimes. The British Indian Army, a third of whom were Punjabi Muslims, were instrumental in the fall of Nazis during the Second World War, which was encouraged by the political leader of Muslims in India, Muhammad Ali Jinnah. African Muslims assisted in the liberation of France from the Nazi and French Vichy governments. Although the Mufti of Jerusalem asked the Muslims of Palestine to oppose the Allied Armies [which is often mentioned in isolation], Palestinian Muslims did not comply as the general sentiment of Muslims world over was opposition to Fascism and Nazism. Islam has, thus, been a blessing for most of the twentieth century. The violent conflicts that we see today in much the Muslim world were a deliberate pre-planned effect of the twentieth century “decolonising” process, which aimed at creating a power struggle between the pro-Western corrupt dictatorial elite and the Muslim majority [see David Fromkin’s A Peace to End All Peace].

Spencer refers to the “Qur’an’s directive to the followers of Muhammad to be “ruthless to the unbelievers” (48:29)” (Religion of Peace, p.86) which he contrasts with Jesus’ “love your enemies”. This, however, is not what the Quran says. It is neither a “directive” nor is it addressed to the “followers of Muhammad”; rather it is a description of the attitude of those who are with Muhammad, i.e. his companions. In fact some traditions show Muhammad himself was merciful to his enemies whereas his companions were not: according to a hadith, the companions of the Prophet, killed a man amongst the enemies in war who only joined the opposition army in search for a woman he loved; when this news reached the Prophet, he reprimanded the Companions and said “was there not amongst you a single merciful person?” [ama kana fimuk rajulun rahim?] (Sunan al-Bayhaqi). The Qur’an says “We have sent thee (Muhammad) not but as a mercy to the worlds” (21:107). It is true, however, that Muslims are not asked to “love their enemies” as the devil, murderers and rapists cannot justly be loved, and the Qur’an forbids taking enemies as “protectors” (60:1); a hadith, however, tells Muslims to “love for your brother/neighbour what you love for yourself” (Sahih Bukhari and Sahih Muslim 1:72) and this includes Muslims and non-Muslims (as well as enemies); for the latter it is hoped they will find the truth and avoid wrongdoing [as said by Imam al-Nawawi the most well-known commentator of Sahih Muslim]. Islam does not prohibit dealing kindly and equitably with non-aggressive non-Muslims as the Qur’an explicitly says (60:8); this verse was in fact revealed after the Conquest of Mecca when Asma, a female companion of the Prophet, was visited by her idolatrous mother – the Prophet recited to her this verse as reason why she should accept her mother’s gifts and host her. After the Prophet’s death, Abd Allah ibn Amr, a companion of the Prophet, slaughtered a sheep and said (to his servant) “Have you presented a gift from it to my neighbour, the Jew, for I heard the Apostle of God (peace be upon him) say: Gabriel kept on commending the neighbour to me so that I thought he would make an heir?” (Sunan Abu Dawud)

As proof of Jesus’ “mercy” as opposed to Muhammad’s, Spencer quotes John 7-8, where Jesus refuses to stone an adulteress to death. This passage however is a known forgery, and surprisingly the only example of mercy Spencer uses. It does not however prove that Jesus was opposed to corporeal punishment or the occasional use of violence [see discussion above]. Paul, however, does seem to suggest he was in favour of corporeal punishment for sexual immorality (see 1 Corintihians 5:1-5).

Spencer’s example of Muhammad’s cruelty is his instruction to stone adulterers. However, having ruled the Islamic state for over ten years, only two or three such events are recorded, and each are used anecdotally to derive lessons. The first, the example which Spencer uses, is in regards to a Jewish couple living in Medina who committed adultery (i.e. they were cheating on their spouses). The Jews denied the punishment of stoning in the Torah, and when they were proven wrong, Muhammad ordered the couple stoned. The significance of this event is not so much in stoning the adulterers, but the establishment and precedence of the law over deception and rebellion.

In the second incident, a male companion Ma‘iz felt compelled by guilt to confess to the Prophet of his sin of having committed adultery. The Prophet turned away until the man repeated his confession several times. Thereupon the Prophet enquired further about what he had done; assuming Ma‘iz misunderstood the nature of adultery, he said to him “perhaps you only kissed (the lady), or winked, or looked at her?” (Sahih Bukhari 8:82:813). When Ma‘iz confirmed he had sexual intercourse, the Prophet commanded that he be stoned to death as the law commands. After the man was stoned, two men spoke disparagingly of the ill fate of this man, saying “this unfaithful man went to the Prophet time after time and every time the Prophet dismissed him. Finally he was killed like a dog” and the Prophet overheard, but did not comment. When they passed by the carcass of a donkey the Prophet said to those who had spoken ill of Ma‘iz “would you eat from this?” and when they expressed their shock, the Prophet said “Defamation of your brother such as you have just perpetrated is worse than this. By the One in whose hand my soul rests, (Ma‘iz) is indeed reposing in one of the rivers of Paradise” (Adab al-Mufrad). The Prophet’s mercy was not so much in discharging the duty of following the law, but in amplifying and expressing the mercy of the law: the man wasn’t some worthless being stoned to death “like a dog”, but someone whose confession and sincere repentance earned him a rank with those who lived in eternal bliss and happiness in Paradise.

Both Islam and Christianity share aspects of mercy and judgment. Theologically, Islam’s mercy plays out more prominently eschatologically whereas in the case of Christianity this is when judgment takes place. Hence, whereas Jesus returns not as saviour but as a judge with an iron rod who makes war against the nations (Revelations 19), Muhammad will act as intercessor for his followers on the Day of Judgment begging God for the salvation of his community which God will grant him. This distinction has been recognised by many scholars of religion (e.g. see Timothy Winter’s “Muhammad from a Muslim Perspective” in Abraham’s Children: Jews, Christians and Muslims in Dialogue, pp. 114-123).

The only thing Spencer finds to support mercy in Islam is God’s name “rahim” (Beneficent) in the Qur’an. But he omits the fact that rahman (Most Merciful) and rahim (Beneficent) are the most repetitive names of God, appearing together at the start of every chapter of the Qur’an except the ninth. They indicate mercy is the dominant characteristic of God “inscribed” on the very “soul” of God according to the Qur’an (6:54). God’s mercy expresses itself in His very act of creation and sustaining existence and humanity. The Qur’an tells of how God’s mercy “extends over all things” (7:156), and hence the Angels call out to God “You have extended (Thy) mercy and knowledge over all things” (40:7). However, God reserves a special mercy for those who respond to His call, believe and perform righteous actions: “(God) is Beneficent to the believing folk” (33:43). Advising moderation, the Prophet Muhammad said to his companions “The deeds of anyone of you will not save you.” The companions said, “Even you, O Messenger of God?” He said, “No, even I (will not be saved), unless and until God envelops me in His mercy. Therefore, do good deeds properly, sincerely and moderately, and worship God in the forenoon and in the afternoon and during a part of the night, and always adopt a middle, moderate, regular course whereby you will reach your target (salvation and the mercy of God).” (Sahih al-Bukhari) In this article Dr. Umar Farooq Abdullah argues Islam is best characterised as “the religion of mercy”. The first hadith a student is taught in madrasas is “The Most Merciful shows mercy to those who show mercy. Show mercy to those on earth and the One in heaven will show mercy to you.” (Sunan al-Tirmidhi) Importantly, this “hadith of primacy” does not distinguish between Muslim and non-Muslim, and advises mercy to all of creation. Since Muslims are asked to learn God’s Names and adopt the beauty that is intrinsic in them, it is significant that although the Qur’anic God is a vengeful God who exacts punishment when it is befitting, His mercy, according to a hadith “outstrips” or “dominates” His anger; often, anger and retribution are means of disciplining people to learn how to be saved in the Afterlife. The Qur’an is replete with what the Sufis like to call God’s Beautiful Names (jamal) (as opposed to His Majestic Names), like “wadud” (loving), “ghafur” (forgiving), “salam” (source of peace), “wahhab” (bestower), “mun‘im” (favourer), all of which point to His infinite mercy, love and kindness.

Spencer seems to suggest Muhammad showed no mercy during his lifetime. However, mercy, clemency and kindness are more reflective of his relationship with his enemies than are anger and hostility. The Prophet once forgave a man who tried to assassinate him in his sleep (Sahih al-Bukhari). He also forgave a group of 70-80 would-be-assassins who were apprehended by his men at Tan‘im (Sahih Muslim, Jami‘ al-Tirmidhi, Sunan Abu Dawud, Musnad Ahmad). He forgave a Jewish woman who tried to poison him (Sahih Muslim). And when he re-entered his birthplace of Mecca in triumph, after years of persecution by its inhabitants, he granted a general amnesty to its people, his bitter antagonists and enemies. He also asked the Angels to avert punishment from the people of Ta’if who had physically abused him for his invitation to Islam. Likewise after Uhud, a battle in which he was seriously injured, he was asked to curse the disbelievers; his reply was: “God has not sent me to curse or vilify, but He sent me as a caller and a mercy…O God, guide my people [i.e. the Meccan enemies]! For they are a people who know not” (al-Bayhaqi). Often, however, the legends of Muhammad’s assassination of the poets, Asma and Abu Afak, are invoked to prove Muhammad’s cruelty; yet these reports are found only in sira works and none of their chains of narration (isnad) have any validity according to the majority of Muslim traditionists.

Spencer attempts to contrast Islam with Judaism in respect to capital and corporeal punishments: “Rabbinic Judaism ever since the destruction of the Temple evolved non-literal ways to understand such commands (as stoning)” (Religion of Peace, p. 87). However, it did not evolve “non-literal ways to understand such commands”; rather, it established a tradition which deemphasised the commands in favour of more stringent preconditions making the punishment difficult to carry out. Such was also the case in classical Islam. The hudud laws (which were much fewer than those in the Torah) were rarely carried out. This was due to a number of factors, as Rudolph Peters shows in his Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law. These include the criterion that no hudud punishment shall be carried out if there is any uncertainty or doubt in the matter – not just “reasonable doubt”, but any doubt at all. In the case of adultery, only a confession that is repeated multiple times (which is only if the individual feels compelled, as this is not the preferred option, according to the majority of Muslim scholars) or four righteous witnesses provide testimony (slander is more severe a crime in Islam than is fornication, and it is considered one of the “seven destructive sins”). The purpose of these hudud laws as with Judaism, was not so much to carry out the punishments, but to create a moral equivalence in the minds and hearts of people, so as to cultivate a culture in which these crimes are abhorrent. Hence when the Qur’an says to amputate the hands of a thief [which according to the jurists does not include petty theft or that done during a famine, but is closer to armed robbery], it adds that this is done for the purpose of drawing an “example from God” (5:38). Yet, just because a person had to undergo a hudud punishment, they are not banished from society or deemed unforgivable – rather, as in the case of Ma‘iz above they are shown admiration and mercy. For example, it is reported that during the lifetime of the Prophet there was a man called 'Abdullah whose nickname was “donkey”, and he used to make the Prophet laugh. The Prophet lashed him because of drinking alcohol. And he was again brought to the Prophet on the same charge and was lashed. On that, a man among the people said, “O God, curse him! How frequently he has been brought (to the Prophet on such a charge)!” The Prophet said, “Do not curse him, for by God, I know he loves God and His Messenger.” (Sahih al-Bukhari) In modern times however we see a resurgence of hudud punishments often executed by mobs. The reason for this phenomenon is the rise of a particular kind of fundamentalism that does not respect traditional norms, and instead wishes to assert an identity in the modern globalised culture of conformism. Oftentimes, too, in order to assert this identity, erroneous shari‘ah judgments are made, e.g. in Pakistan and Nigeria where circumstantial evidence like a woman’s pregnancy is taken as evidence of illicit sex, although this is not the opinion of any of the early schools except a minority opinion in the Maliki school (see Islam and Honor Killings, Zaid Shakir). Nonetheless, although Islam in some places carry this baggage, often many examples of Christian extremism are forgotten; in Nigeria, for example, only recently thousands of children were killed and tortured because they were believed to be witches (Churches involved in Murder, Torture of Thousands of African Children Denounced as Witches, LA Times). Spencer also forgets that Christianity does not discount capital and corporeal punishment from the Old Testament. Jesus, in fact, reaffirms all Biblical laws, big and small (Matthew 5:19-20), and Reconstructionists in America, of a Protestant orientation that does not have antipathy to Old Testament ethics, would like Biblical law (and punishments) in America to restore Biblical morality and a Biblical worldview, where the American Christian nation dominates the world. There is an increasing sentiment amongst right-wing Christians of adopting such a world-view; for example, in America, the Bible was recently used by jurors to prove that a man was to be executed (Amnesty Reveals Bible was used to Decide Execution)

Which was the Historically more Violent: Christianity or Islam?

To make a fair assessment of which of the two religions, Christianity or Islam was the more violent religion historically, the deaths that resulted from Christian or Islamic aggression from the period between 600 and 1900 AD will be considered, as these were times when religion was outwardly the dominant defining characteristics of the neighbouring Islamic and Christian empires. The death counts are based on the expert analysis and estimates of Matthew White here:

Muslims:

Mideast slave trade – 19 million

Timur (14^th-15^th centuries) – 17 million [note: Timur was nominally Muslim, and inherited his war nature from his Mongol heritage which he revered; the fact he fought many Muslim “empires” in India and even killed the Ottoman caliph shows his bloodthirstiness was not motivated by a jihad imperative to expand Islam’s borders but by warmongering; he is included for fairness, as similar personalities are included in analysing Christian death counts below]

Arab Outbreak (till 1100, including heterodox Carmathians, Ismailis): 700,000

Muhammad Shah v. Bukka I (1366) – 500,000 Hindus

Ottomans – 330,000

Armenian massacres (1894-6): 100,000

[India: Ghaznavi: 100,000

Firuz Shah Tughlaq: 100,000

Ala Din Khilji: 20,000

Sultan Ahmad Shah I: would take break after 20,000] = app. 1 million

Akbar: 30,000

Arungzeb: 2.7 million

Babar: 1 million (guesss)

Maratha-Moghul wars: 1 million

[Fez, 1035 – 6000 Jews

Granada, 1066 – 4000 Jews] = 10000

Total: Approximately 46 million

Christians:

American Indians: 20 million

Taiping revolt: 20 million [although this was a heterodox Christian movement, it parallels the inclusion of Timur above]

French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars: 20 million

Atlantic slave trade: 18 million

British forced famines in India (akin to the Communist ones) (1870-1900): 17 million

Thirty Years War: 7 million

Saracen slaughter in Spain: 7 million

French Wars of Religion: 3 million

Saxons and Scandavians in the Christian conquests of Europe: 2 million

100 Years War: 2 million

Crusades: 1.5 million

Albigensian Crusade: 1 million

Waldensian persecution: 900,000 Protestants killed

Nine Years War: 700,000

Carolingian succession (after being crowned by popes): 100,000

Witch Hunts: 100,000

War of Roses: 100,000

Dutch Revolt: 100,000

St Bartholomew’s massacre: 30,000

Executions under Tudors: 20,000

Inquisition: 30,000

Jews killed as scapegoats for Black Death: 10,000; Lisbon, 1506: 3,000 Jews killed

Total: Approximately 119 million

If we approximate, we get 50 million deaths for Muslims and 120 million for Christians. In other words, based on a fair and objective analysis, Christianity’s death toll more than doubles Islam’s. Even if we accept the austere KS Lal’s politically motivated estimate of Hindu massacres in India (~ 50 million as opposed to the approximately 5 million above), Christianity still would have more blood on its hands. Accepting marginal historians like Lal not in the interests of objectivity but to push an agenda would mean the same could be done on the other side: historians like David Stannard could be invoked, who placed the death toll in the Americas at a hundred million (as opposed to the 20 million approximation above) which would blow up Christian deaths to 200 million; in other words, if we are consistent and fair, Christianity’s death toll would still double Islam’s. Could it be argued Christianity’s wars were not religiously motivated while Islam’s were? The major wars like the conquests in Spain and the Americas, the Thirty Year War, the Hundred Year War and the Crusades all had religious justifications and sanction, at least at the start; some were more secular than others but this is also true of Islam: the Umayyad conquests were motivated more by Arab supremacist views and greed than by the Islamic doctrine of jihad. The best explanation for this discrepancy is Islam’s rooted tradition of ethical warfare, whereas Christianity’s precedence in the Old Testament appears to care little for rules of war, hence the murder of women, cattle and civilians.

Which is the Modern Threat?

Which of the three major Western religions, Judaism, Christianity or Islam is the bigger threat to world peace? Starting with Judaism, Israel’s settlement policy in the West Bank and control of the Gaza border and air space is equivalent to military occupation and colonisation. As shown above, this continued oppression of the Palestinian people has religious justifications. In recent times, this has gained wider acceptance in Jewish religious seminaries encouraging Rabbinic militarism (see The Rise of Israel’s Military Rabbis, BBC News); hence, the view that Spencer seems to espouse that only Islamic madrasas breed extremism, needs to be revised. Israel’s settlement policy is the major obstacle to peace in the Middle East, as all nations of the world (and in turn the UN) have accepted Palestinian self-determination and statehood on the June 1967 borders – this includes the Arab League and Hamas in their more recent public declarations. Only Israel is the rejectionist supported all the while by America; American support is largely a result of massive Evangelical support due to their apocalyptic end-time view of Israel’s return to the Holy Land. Thus, Jewish and Christian extremism, here, combine to create a climate of conflict, mistrust and hate, while continuing to punish the Arab peoples.

The Bush administration represented a frightening blend of Evangelical apocalypticism and reckless foreign policy. Bush’s inspirational reading before sending US troops to Iraq were sermons by the Scottish preacher Oswald Chambers, who was sent to Jerusalem in 1917 (Newsweek, 2003, Bush and God, Howard Fineman). Oswald’s sermons emphasise an apocalyptic view of the world. Paul Boyer shows how Biblical concepts of Armageddon was used historically to influence foreign policy, where a surprisingly large number of the American population believed in the prophecies as interpreted by Evangelicals; e.g. Gog was interpreted as Russia during the cold war and in the Bush years Iraq was understood to be the “evil” Babylon, the “great whore” (see Paul Boyer, When US Foreign Policy Meets Biblical Prophecy). Evangelicals did not miss the opportunity to convert Muslims in the Middle East and Afghanistan in the aftermath of the wars. Within a year after the Iraq War there were 30 Evangelical missions in Baghdad; Kyle Fisk, the executive administrator of National Association of Evangelicals, told the LA Times “Iraq will become the center for spreading the gospel of Jesus Christ to Iran, Libya and throughout the Middle East”. Within 2 yrs there were 7 new Evangelical churches in Baghdad (Evangelicals Building a Base in Iraq, Washington Post). This view of the end-times which contrasted the evil Babylon with its antithesis, the good city of Jerusalem, prompted its own literature in the 1990s. Tim LaHaye’s Left Behind series, which elaborated on the Biblical predictions, was followed by tens of millions of readers, thus making it easy for people to accept Bush’s broad “good-versus-evil” explanation, although there was no legal justification for going to war against Iraq. In Afghanistan, Evangelical Troops gave out Bibles and attempted to proselytise the Afghanis (US Troops urged to share faith in Afghanistan, al-Jazeerah News). It is simply untrue therefore that the churches of America are not involved in the wars and that they do not have aspirations of Christianising the Muslim people of war-stricken areas (reminiscent of Christianity’s spread in Europe).

Bush’s foreign policy was couched in the National Security Strategy, released in September 2002, which in its official rhetoric proclaimed: “Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equalling, the power of the United States.” One well-known international affairs specialist, John Ikenberry, has described the declaration as a “grand strategy [that] begins with a fundamental commitment to maintaining a unipolar world in which the United States has no peer competitor”, a condition that is to be “permanent [so] that no state or coalition could ever challenge [the US] as global leader, protector and enforcer”.

What has been the result of American belligerence predicated on a Christian apocalyptic worldview and an aggressive foreign policy? In Iraq, a 100,000 civilians were killed during the war. That is 30 times 9/11 on a people that were not responsible even remotely for the crimes of 9/11. American intervention into foreign governments and its self-interest has disturbed and continues to threaten world peace. Furthermore, writers like Spencer who provide an intellectual basis for anti-Islamic attitudes, breed such ideas as Ann Coulter’s that “we should invade [Muslims’] counties, kill their leaders and convert them to Christianity” and Wafa Sultan’s that the 1.3 billion Muslims in the world must change or be crushed.

Is Islamic jihad a global threat to peace? The violent conflict of Muslims throughout the world today are rarely unprovoked. Unlike the Iraq War where America had no reason for militarily invading Iraq, jihadists, like those in al-Qaeda, who operate within a global network [but are marginal nonetheless as evidenced by Bin Laden’s and Zawahiri’s expulsions from their respective hometowns], do so under perceived threats and hostility. Hence despite the small scale of the threat of al-Qaeda, the only global jihadist movement, it too is not solely dependent on an ideology or religious doctrine – circumstantial factors play a strong if not stronger role. Spencer however likes to include all Muslim efforts for self-determination, in Kashmir, Palestine, Philippines as a global jihad threat, whereas these are mostly local issues. Al-Qaeda’s global operations have killed no more than 4000 individuals globally, that is less than 5% of the number of Iraqi civilians America have killed in Iraq and approximately the same number of soldiers it has itself lost as a result of its reckless wars.

Spencer extends the supposed “Islamic threat” to potentially include all Muslims. The only reason Muslims his readers happen to meet appear peaceful, he writes, is because they don’t know about these aspects of their religion despite being generally devout and religious (Religion of Peace, p. 87). Despite such a ridiculous hypothesis, it is the only logical conclusion to Spencer’s train of thinking when it comes to the doctrine of jihad; since his view is so narrow and grounded on a massively selective reading, it is no surprise the only explanation he can find for peaceful Muslims who want to reside peacefully with their non-Muslim neighbours (which happen to be most Muslims) is a lack of understanding of their own religion or a lack of commitment to some of its principles; but as elaborated above, peaceful interpretations of scripture have always existed manifesting in different proportions in different ages of Islamic jurisprudence reflecting the circumstances of that time. He also says the “theology of jihad” has been deemphasised in recent times due to a “complex of historical reasons” which he does not elaborate; yet the discourse on jihad is alive and well in all scholarly Muslim circles – it is just that the interpretation which Spencer expects it to have does not have as much support and acceptance.

When the Fiqh Council of North America and mosques in Birmingham, England all condemned terrorist activities targeted at innocent civilians, Spencer is sceptical of their true intentions. He argues the concept of “innocent civilian” is “hotly debated” (p. 54) in Muslim societies. As proof, he invokes Anjem Choudhary, a British lawyer and member of the extremist Muhajiroun group; Choudhary said in one interview that he did not believe “non-Muslims” could be innocent, but Choudhary is not a legal scholar of Islamic jurisprudence (mufti/alim/faqih), nor does he have a major following in Britain or anywhere in the world; the view that “non-Muslims” cannot be innocent or that their blood becomes permissible simply because of their disbelief (kufr) is a kharijite view that the vast majority of the Sunni and Shiite schools and jurists do not subscribe to. Majid Khadduri wrote “the slaying of women and children is only permitted by the followers of Nafi b Azraq, of the Khariji sect, who argued that women and children are as guilty of polytheism as adults and therefore should not be spared their lives.” (War and Peace in the Law of Islam, p. 104) It is also interesting that the extremists’ perspective, which is at odds with most Sunnis and Shiites, conform to the Kharijite understanding: ‘[Kharijites] conception of the state was that of a garrison state; an ever-ready community, led by its imam to wage war on the enemies of the faith. Even if the imam does not lead in war, the jihad is incumbent on each believer to fulfil by himself, for he falls in error if he fails to do so.’ (p. 68). Note the marginality of this view, revived only because of the feeling of victimhood amongst Muslims.

Further, Spencer quotes Yusuf al-Qaradawi in support of the idea that “innocent civilians” means something else in Islam. Al-Qaradawi allowed the killing of women in Israel, and the reason he gave is that they were involved in the fighting. This does not contradict the above: non-combatants, that is innocents who are not fighting, are not to be killed or fought. According to Qaradawi these women are militarised and do fight so they are also at war. The principle that innocent civilians are not killed therefore remains according to Qaradawi too. Qaradawi himself condemned 9/11, the 7/7 London bombings, the Bali bombings and the Madrid bombings, because these did in fact target innocents who were not involved in fighting. Israel is a tricky situation and it is unfair to judge rules on the ground there universally as Spencer does in order to justify his scepticism of the American Fiqh Council’s fatwa. Thousands of Muslim scholars worldwide, which represents the vast majority of the Muslim world, condemned the terrorist attacks in the West.

As for Islam’s “bloody borders” which Samuel Huntington used as proof of his “Clash of Civilisations” thesis, David Fromkin in his important work A Peace to End All Peace shows the Ottoman territories in the early part of the twentieth century were relatively tranquil until European intervention in Middle Eastern countries which divided the population on religious bases, and went against the view of the majority by installing pro-Western corrupt leaders in the newly formed Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria. This has for ninety years resulted in almost ceaseless conflict as there is a power struggle between the majority who favour Islamic ideals and values and the powerful minority who with Western support managed to quell the masses; this was a recipe for conflict in the Middle East to secure European self-interest, hence “a peace to end all peace”.

Conclusion

Is Islam a more peaceful religion than Christianity? Or is Christianity “the religion of peace” and Islam not, as Spencer argues? There is no simple answer. Peace or violence is not essential to either of these religions, but both religions have come up with a plurality of solutions to the inherent tension between religious conviction and existence of multiple religions. However Islam has historically been more peaceful than Christianity, and although not the subject of this essay, Islam was also more tolerant of its minorities. The major tension in classical Islam’s view of jihad was that between establishing ethical principles during fighting a war well-documented in the Qur’an and hadith and a full-fledged utilitarian (hence, unethical) ideology aimed at subjugating the entire world to Muslim rule; taken together, it seems the ethical principles eventually won out. In Christianity however there was no counterbalance to an ideology of global domination, hence war in Christianity was rarely devoid of extremity and war crimes: the Crusades and the treatment of Native Americans are testament to this. It may be argued, therefore, that Islam is more peaceful than Christianity, but neither of them can monopolise the title of “religion of peace” or “religion of violence” for that matter.

Reasons why humans commit violence are complex but are tied in much more with our human nature than to one religion or set of beliefs. Belief-systems, whether political, ideological or religious, normally only function to direct that violence in a manner that is deemed beneficial. A single set of beliefs is rarely responsible for acts of violence; rather the prevailing norms, cultures, morals, perceptions, ideas, and multiple belief-systems work to influence human conflict or peace. In the case of modern world conflicts, politics is a much greater factor while religions also play a lesser role. Robert Spencer, by reducing all violence committed by Muslims into a religious ideology encapsulated within the Islamic jihad principle, commits the fallacy of adopting a narrow binary view of world politics in which the evils of our world and society are externalised into this supposed global threat. He indulges in self-exaltation and calls on others to support the so-called “Judaeo-Christian” Western values that are superior to any other value system in human history; such arrogance and antagonism is the mirror image of the terroristic jihad groups like al-Qaeda which also see the world in a similar fashion.

In summary, in the course of the above, I hope to have shown the following: In Judaism, the Bible was known to command war in order to establish Israelites in the Land of Israel. This has been taken as an authoritative and normative mitzvah curbed only for pragmatic reasons after the Bar Kokhba revolt with the added clause that it can be re-established if the messiah comes or the gentile nations give them leave, hence it resurged in modern Israel with extreme Jewish voices advocating a religiously inspired colonisation and occupation of the lands of the Palestinians. In Christianity, the Church was actively involved in invasion and conquest for the purpose of affecting conversion in Europe and the Americas. This led to huge human losses, and was largely justified by reference to Old Testament war ethics and New Testament themes. In modern times Evangelical apocalyptic views have motivated detrimental foreign policies. In Islam, the doctrine of “jihad” is a flexible one, which took on various forms depending on circumstances and the political climate. No one “essential” interpretation of the Qur’anic view of fighting exists. Hence, the “Islamic threat” is far more reflexive than rooted in the tradition of Islam. Theologically, it is therefore untrue to say Islam is more violent than Judaism or Christianity or that it has a greater propensity to violence. Modern-day terrorism is not reflective of classical or modern views of jihad as it disregards the ethical aspects of traditional jihad for a full-fledged ideology that respects few limits. Robert Spencer’s narrow reading of the evidence conforms to his preformed bias of arrogating to “Western Christianity” all that is good and to Islam all that is bad. With such a presupposition, his conclusions lack objectivity and when weighed against the evidence, fail.

Coming Up...

2009-10-21T13:34:00.001-07:00

I will be posting a response to Robert Spencer on this blog soon. The response will attempt to deconstruct his major arguments in regards to the Islamic doctrine of jihad and reveal the deception which he attempts to pass off as scholarship. Although a little rushed, I hope the post will get most of the major points across. Such a response is needed, as unfortunately many people buy into his misrepresentation, and his Islamophobic rhetoric provides an intellectual framwork for the prevelant anti-Islamic attitudes we see today.